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+# Predicate: ACS conformance verdict evidence, version 1.0.1-draft
+
+Predicate type URI (proposed, pending acceptance):
+`https://github.com/GenAI-Security-Project/agent-control-standard/blob/main/docs/predicates/acs-verdict-evidence-v1.md`
+
+Status: proposed draft `v1.0.1-draft`. Modeled on the
+[agent-change-admission-v1](https://github.com/probityai/agent-evidence-vocabulary/blob/main/docs/predicates/agent-change-admission-v1.md)
+predicate: same DSSE v1 envelope, same field table, same verification-step
+layout, same versioning rule. This draft records the field list after the
+sharpening on issue #33 (2026-10-18). Breaking change versus `v1.0.0-draft`:
+the runner no longer writes a lift state; `witness_scope` lift falls out of a
+peer-authored artifact, and the quarantine record carries its own integrity
+envelope. Not normative until accepted.
+
+## Purpose
+
+A conformance suite executes a named vector against a deployment and records
+one verdict about one ACS-Core requirement: did the observed behavior match
+the expected disposition for that requirement, and how independently was that
+claim witnessed. This predicate packages that verdict so that a consumer of
+the requirement ledger can tell, from bytes alone, (a) which vector and which
+clause the verdict is about, (b) what was expected and observed, (c) whether
+the witness is the deployment itself or someone who can check the requirement
+without the enforcement point's own account, and (d) how much of the record
+integrity covers versus what the runner's own signature covers.
+
+A rejection is recorded with the same weight as a pass. A vector that cannot
+yet be scored is quarantined, not silently defaulted.
+
+## Envelope
+
+The verdict is signed as a DSSE v1 envelope. The signature covers the DSSE
+pre-authentication encoding of the payload type and the payload bytes, never
+the raw payload:
+
+```text
+"DSSEv1" SP LEN(payloadType) SP payloadType SP LEN(payload) SP payload
+```
+
+The carriage is in-toto Statement v1, `payloadType`
+`application/vnd.in-toto+json`: the statement's `_type` is
+`https://in-toto.io/Statement/v1`, its `subject` is the digest-named vector,
+`predicateType` is the URI above, and the verdict object is the statement's
+`predicate`.
+
+A signature's `keyid` is the lowercase hex SHA-256 of the raw public key. A
+consumer pins its trusted keys out of band; a key carried inside the envelope
+is never trusted. An envelope may carry an additional co-signature by a key the
+consumer does not pin: that is the default honest state, non-repudiation only,
+and it lifts nothing.
+
+## Fields
+
+Every field below is required in a verdict record. A verifier checks them in
+this order and names the first one that is absent or malformed.
+
+| Field | Type | Meaning |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| `vector_id` | 16 lowercase hex | First 16 chars of the SHA-256 of the vector input's canonical form |
+| `profile` | non-empty string | ACS profile the clause belongs to (e.g. `acs-core`) |
+| `anchor` | non-empty string | Repo-relative, resolvable anchor to the normative clause (a heading anchor, not bold text) |
+| `clause` | non-empty string | Human-readable clause name, matching the anchor |
+| `verdict` | one of `pass`, `rejected`, `unmeasurable`, `quarantined` | The four-state verdict; `quarantined` uses the quarantine record below |
+| `witness_derivation.runner.id` | non-empty string | Runner identifier |
+| `witness_derivation.runner.hosting_operator_id` | non-empty string | Comparable identifier of the operator who runs the runner |
+| `witness_derivation.deployment_operator_id` | non-empty string | Comparable identifier of the operator of the deployment under test |
+| `witness_scope` | one of `SELF`, `PEER`, `EXTERNAL` | Derived per the table below; never asserted independently |
+| `verification_basis` | non-empty array of strings | Values from the registry: `wire_transcript`, `signed_decision_record`, `policy_state`, `terminal_state_evidence`, `anchor_commitment` |
+| `expected` | object | Expected disposition and reason codes |
+| `observed` | object | Observed disposition and reason codes |
+| `behavior_snapshot` | object or `null` | Runner-captured run data (rolling chain hashes, runner id); may be `null` in an offline deterministic sample |
+| `integrity.payload_digest` | 64 lowercase hex | SHA-256 of the canonical bytes of exactly the fields named in `integrity.payload_digest_fields` |
+| `integrity.payload_digest_fields` | non-empty array | The names of the fields the digest covers |
+| `integrity.does_not_cover` | array | Lists `behavior_snapshot`, `integrity`, `provenance`, `subject` |
+| `integrity.binding` | non-empty string | States the binding consequences: observed hashes are bound only by the runner's own envelope signature; the subject is bound by the envelope, not by `payload_digest` |
+| `provenance.peer_artifact` | 64 lowercase hex or `null` | `null` when no peer artifact exists. Otherwise the SHA-256 of the canonical bytes of the peer-signed verification statement (see below) |
+| `provenance.anchor` | object or `null` | Persistence only: `{kind: "rfc3161-timestamp" \| "transparency-log", reference}`; never lifts `witness_scope` |
+
+A record may carry further fields (e.g. `observed_at` RFC 3339 timestamps); a
+verifier ignores fields it does not check. A record must not carry any field
+by which the runner asserts its own scope — there is no `lift_state`, no
+`checked`, no `signer_relationship` written into the runner's envelope.
+
+### The peer verification statement
+
+A lift above `SELF` requires an artifact the runner did not author: an
+in-toto Statement v1 signed by a peer key the consumer pins, whose predicate
+
+- names **this vector** in its subject (digest equal to the verdict subject),
+- names **the requirement** it checked (`anchor`/clause match), and
+- names the **evidence artifact** it checked it with — either
+  `{"kind": "client_run", "deployment": ...}` (the peer drove its own client
+  against this deployment) or
+  `{"kind": "wire_transcript", "transcript_digest": ..., "vector": ...}`.
+
+`provenance.peer_artifact` is the SHA-256 of that statement's canonical bytes.
+The runner can point at it; it cannot produce it.
+
+## Deriving `witness_scope`
+
+`witness_scope` is computed by the consumer, never asserted by the runner.
+SELF falls out of identifier equality; a lift requires a verified
+`peer_artifact`, and the signer's relationship comes from the pinned peer key's
+out-of-band record, not from a field in the runner's envelope.
+
+| `hosting_operator_id == deployment_operator_id` | `provenance.peer_artifact` | derived `witness_scope` |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| equal | `null` | `SELF` |
+| equal | present, verifies, pinned relationship = peer | `PEER` |
+| equal | present, verifies, pinned relationship = external | `EXTERNAL` |
+| unequal | `null` | not a valid `SELF` record: rejected at verification step 9 (`witness_scope_misderived`) |
+| any | present but signature invalid, or requirement/artifact does not match this vector | `contradicted` (`peer_artifact_unverified`) |
+
+A co-signature over the runner's envelope is not in this table: absent a peer
+artifact, it is the default honest state — non-repudiation only — and the
+record reads `SELF` however the runner might wish to relabel it. There is no
+field in which it could do so.
+
+`provenance.anchor` never appears in this table. A timestamp or a
+transparency-log entry proves the digest existed at a time and was not
+backdated; it is persistence, not verification. A `SELF` record carrying an
+anchor remains `SELF`.
+
+## `payload_digest` scope
+
+`payload_digest` is SHA-256 of the canonical JSON (keys sorted, no whitespace,
+UTF-8) of exactly the fields listed in `integrity.payload_digest_fields` — in
+the reference sample: `anchor`, `clause`, `expected`, `observed`, `profile`,
+`vector_id`, `verdict`, `verification_basis`, `witness_derivation`,
+`witness_scope`. It proves those bytes are intact.
+
+It deliberately does **not** cover:
+
+- `behavior_snapshot` — observed run data is bound only by the runner's own
+  DSSE envelope signature; a reader is told this by `integrity.binding` so
+  the digest is not mistaken for a binding of the observed hashes.
+- `integrity` and `provenance` themselves (self-reference).
+- `subject` — the record is tied to the vector by the envelope's subject
+  digest, not by `payload_digest`.
+
+## Quarantine record
+
+When `verdict` is `quarantined`, a second Statement carries:
+
+| Field | Meaning |
+| --- | --- |
+| `quarantine_ref` | URL of the open spec issue whose closure resolves the vector's uncertainty, or `null` when no such issue exists yet |
+| `quarantine_gap` | When `quarantine_ref` is `null`, the normative gap this vector's uncertainty is evidence of |
+| `owner` | The accountable party (originator until the spec workstream takes the gap) |
+| `review_by` | ISO date by which the gap must be resolved or the vector re-triaged; follows the `review_by` precedent on proposed terms |
+| `excluded_from` | States the vector is excluded from formal results until the gap resolves |
+| `expiry_disposition` | What happens when `review_by` passes with the gap open: the vector reverts to `unmeasurable` and stays excluded; the owner must re-quarantine with a new `review_by` or reference the gap issue's resolution; a quarantined vector never becomes a formal pass or reject while the gap is open |
+| `integrity.payload_digest` | SHA-256 of the canonical bytes of the quarantine record's own declared fields (`vector_id`, `status`, `reason`, `quarantine_ref`, `quarantine_gap`, `owner`, `review_by`, `excluded_from`) — so a silent edit to any of them breaks the digest |
+
+## Verification
+
+A verifier takes the envelope, a policy (payload type, predicate type, trusted
+keys, required verification bases) and any stored transcripts it holds. It
+returns `supported`, `contradicted` or `not_established`, with the reason code
+of the first check that fails.
+
+| Step | Check | Decision and reason |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| 1 | The bytes parse as a DSSE envelope with payload type, base64 payload and at least one signature | no verdict, `malformed_envelope` |
+| 2 | Payload type is `application/vnd.in-toto+json` | `not_established`, `unsupported_payload_type` |
+| 3 | A signature naming a pinned keyid verifies | `contradicted`, `untrusted_key` / `signature_invalid` |
+| 4 | The payload is an in-toto Statement v1 | `not_established`, `payload_not_statement` |
+| 5 | `predicateType` is this URI | `not_established`, `unsupported_predicate` |
+| 6 | Every field in the table is well formed, in table order; no runner-written lift field is present | `not_established`, `field_invalid:<field>` |
+| 7 | A subject carries `digest.sha256` equal to the canonical vector input | `contradicted`, `subject_digest_mismatch` |
+| 8 | `payload_digest` recomputed over `payload_digest_fields` equals the claim | `contradicted`, `payload_digest_mismatch` |
+| 9 | `witness_scope` equals the value derived from ID equality and `provenance.peer_artifact` (signature, requirement match, evidence artifact kind, pinned relationship) | `contradicted`, `witness_scope_misderived` / `peer_artifact_unverified` |
+| 10 | A `quarantined` record carries `quarantine_ref` or `quarantine_gap`, `owner`, `review_by`, `expiry_disposition`, and its own `integrity.payload_digest` recomputes | `not_established`, `quarantine_field_missing:<field>` / `contradicted`, `quarantine_digest_mismatch` |
+
+A record that passes every step is `supported`. A verifier that also holds the
+vector input and the wire transcript may re-execute the vector and compare its
+own outcome with the signed verdict; such a recomputation adds to these steps
+and never replaces one.
+
+## What a valid record does not establish
+
+A supported verdict means the pinned key signed exactly these bytes and the
+declared digest fields recompute. It does not establish that the evaluations
+ran, that the observed hashes are true, that an unpeered co-signature holder is
+an independent witness, or that a timestamp proves independence. A digest is
+integrity; an anchor is persistence; neither is provenance. What the verifier
+recomputed from bytes and what it accepted on a signer's signature are
+separate statements, and a verifier reports them separately.
+
+## Versioning
+
+This document is `v1.0.1-draft`; on acceptance it becomes `v1.0.0` at the URI
+above. A change that adds an optional field or a reason code that refuses
+nothing previously supported edits this page. A change that adds a required
+field, renames a field, changes a field's type, or supports a verdict version
+1 refuses is breaking: it is published as `acs-verdict-evidence-v2.md` at a
+new path, and this page stays.