From 98a49efdbe42c1b47cc9cca5d0d4aca8b8709ab1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Feanil Patel <feanil@axim.org>
Date: Tue, 8 Sep 2026 09:10:44 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] fix: sandbox served course assets to prevent stored XSS

Studio course assets are served by the contentserver with the uploader-supplied
Content-Type and no neutralizing headers, on a route mounted on the Studio (CMS)
origin. An author with file-upload permission can upload an HTML or SVG file
containing script; when another user opens the asset URL it runs same-origin
with the Studio session, enabling privilege escalation (self-granting
course-admin, or Django superuser via same-origin /admin/ when a global-staff
user views it).

Send `Content-Security-Policy: sandbox` on every course-asset response so the
asset loads in an opaque origin and cannot script against the Studio/LMS
session. A per-course escape-hatch flag, course_assets.allow_unsafe_asset_rendering,
lets operators temporarily disable sandboxing for a course whose content must be
migrated first.

Closes GHSA-c6xg-fh3c-vvhh.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit 2efdce0760561db2bcd3a2895c93480d01f0a308)
---
 .../contentserver/test/test_contentserver.py  | 54 +++++++++++++++++++
 .../core/djangoapps/contentserver/views.py    | 33 ++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 87 insertions(+)

diff --git a/openedx/core/djangoapps/contentserver/test/test_contentserver.py b/openedx/core/djangoapps/contentserver/test/test_contentserver.py
index df29b64d2781..d24cd6b3c1f5 100644
--- a/openedx/core/djangoapps/contentserver/test/test_contentserver.py
+++ b/openedx/core/djangoapps/contentserver/test/test_contentserver.py
@@ -15,10 +15,13 @@
 from django.test import RequestFactory
 from django.test.client import Client
 from django.test.utils import override_settings
+from edx_toggles.toggles.testutils import override_waffle_flag
 from opaque_keys import InvalidKeyError
+from opaque_keys.edx.keys import CourseKey
 
 from common.djangoapps.student.models import CourseEnrollment
 from common.djangoapps.student.tests.factories import AdminFactory, UserFactory
+from openedx.core.djangoapps.waffle_utils.models import WaffleFlagCourseOverrideModel
 from xmodule.assetstore.assetmgr import AssetManager
 from xmodule.contentstore.content import VERSIONED_ASSETS_PREFIX, StaticContent
 from xmodule.contentstore.django import contentstore
@@ -376,6 +379,57 @@ def test_vary_header_sent(self):
         assert resp.status_code == 200
         assert 'Origin' == resp['Vary']
 
+    def test_asset_served_with_csp_sandbox(self):
+        """
+        By default the contentserver sends ``Content-Security-Policy: sandbox`` on
+        course asset responses, so an uploaded asset (e.g. an HTML or SVG file) is
+        loaded in an opaque origin and cannot run JavaScript against the Studio/LMS
+        session.
+        """
+        resp = self.client.get(self.url_unlocked)
+        assert resp.status_code == 200
+        assert resp['Content-Security-Policy'] == 'sandbox'
+
+    @override_waffle_flag(views.ALLOW_UNSAFE_ASSET_RENDERING, active=True)
+    def test_asset_sandbox_disabled_when_flag_enabled_globally(self):
+        """
+        Enabling the ``course_assets.allow_unsafe_asset_rendering`` opt-out flag
+        globally removes the sandbox header from asset responses.
+        """
+        resp = self.client.get(self.url_unlocked)
+        assert resp.status_code == 200
+        assert 'Content-Security-Policy' not in resp
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _enable_unsafe_asset_rendering_for(course_key):
+        """Add an enabled per-course opt-out override for the sandbox flag."""
+        WaffleFlagCourseOverrideModel.objects.create(
+            waffle_flag=views.ALLOW_UNSAFE_ASSET_RENDERING.name,
+            course_id=course_key,
+            override_choice=WaffleFlagCourseOverrideModel.ALL_CHOICES.on,
+            enabled=True,
+        )
+
+    def test_asset_sandbox_disabled_by_per_course_override(self):
+        """
+        A per-course opt-out override for THIS course removes the sandbox header
+        from its assets.
+        """
+        self._enable_unsafe_asset_rendering_for(self.course_key)
+        resp = self.client.get(self.url_unlocked)
+        assert resp.status_code == 200
+        assert 'Content-Security-Policy' not in resp
+
+    def test_asset_sandbox_unaffected_by_other_course_override(self):
+        """
+        A per-course opt-out for a DIFFERENT course must not disable sandboxing
+        here -- this course's assets are still served with the sandbox header.
+        """
+        self._enable_unsafe_asset_rendering_for(CourseKey.from_string('course-v1:Other+Other+Other'))
+        resp = self.client.get(self.url_unlocked)
+        assert resp.status_code == 200
+        assert resp['Content-Security-Policy'] == 'sandbox'
+
     @patch('openedx.core.djangoapps.contentserver.models.CourseAssetCacheTtlConfig.get_cache_ttl')
     def test_cache_headers_with_ttl_unlocked(self, mock_get_cache_ttl):
         """
diff --git a/openedx/core/djangoapps/contentserver/views.py b/openedx/core/djangoapps/contentserver/views.py
index cbdb4124fef7..15e6c2a5287c 100644
--- a/openedx/core/djangoapps/contentserver/views.py
+++ b/openedx/core/djangoapps/contentserver/views.py
@@ -196,6 +196,18 @@ def process_request(request):
         response['Content-Type'] = content.content_type
         response['X-Frame-Options'] = 'ALLOW'
 
+        # Serve every course asset under a Content-Security-Policy sandbox.
+        # ``sandbox`` is a document directive: it only takes effect when the asset
+        # is loaded as a document -- a top-level navigation to the asset URL, or an
+        # <iframe>/<object>/<embed> -- which are exactly the contexts where an
+        # uploaded HTML or SVG file would otherwise execute script in the Studio/LMS
+        # origin. There the asset is placed in an opaque origin with scripting
+        # disabled, so it cannot script against the session. The
+        # ``course_assets.allow_unsafe_asset_rendering`` flag disables this
+        # per-course for content that must be migrated first.
+        if not ALLOW_UNSAFE_ASSET_RENDERING.is_enabled(safe_course_key):
+            response['Content-Security-Policy'] = 'sandbox'
+
         # Set any caching headers, and do any response cleanup needed.  Based on how much
         # middleware we have in place, there's no easy way to use the built-in Django
         # utilities and properly sanitize and modify a response to ensure that it is as
@@ -291,6 +303,27 @@ def is_content_locked(content):
 )
 
 
+# .. toggle_name: course_assets.allow_unsafe_asset_rendering
+# .. toggle_implementation: CourseWaffleFlag
+# .. toggle_default: False
+# .. toggle_description: When enabled for a course, allows that course's uploaded
+#   assets to be served WITHOUT the ``Content-Security-Policy: sandbox`` header.
+#   By default (flag off) the contentserver sandboxes every course asset response,
+#   so an uploaded asset (for example an HTML or SVG file with embedded scripts) is
+#   loaded in an opaque origin and cannot execute JavaScript against the Studio/LMS
+#   session, preventing stored XSS and privilege escalation via uploaded assets.
+#   Enable this flag for a specific course only as a temporary measure if that
+#   course has legitimate asset content that breaks under sandboxing, until the
+#   content can be migrated to a safer authoring mechanism.
+# .. toggle_warning: Enabling this re-exposes the course to stored XSS via
+#   uploaded assets. Prefer migrating the offending content over enabling it.
+# .. toggle_use_cases: open_edx
+# .. toggle_creation_date: 2026-09-02
+ALLOW_UNSAFE_ASSET_RENDERING = CourseWaffleFlag(
+    'course_assets.allow_unsafe_asset_rendering', module_name=__name__,
+)
+
+
 def is_user_authorized(request, content, location):
     """
     Determines whether or not the user for this request is authorized to view the given asset.