diff --git a/src/Challenge.php b/src/Challenge.php
index c36fc08..a70ade4 100644
--- a/src/Challenge.php
+++ b/src/Challenge.php
@@ -77,29 +77,86 @@ public static function clampCost(int $cost): int
     }
 
     /**
-     * Verifies a base64-encoded payload as posted by the ALTCHA widget. Both
-     * client-solution payloads (the common case) and server-signature payloads
-     * (used by ALTCHA Sentinel / Spam Filter) are accepted — `altcha-org/altcha`
-     * tells the two apart by the presence of `verificationData`.
+     * A payload that passed every check.
+     */
+    public const REASON_OK = 'ok';
+
+    /**
+     * No `altcha` field was posted at all — typically a bot posting straight at
+     * the form handler, or the widget script never running.
+     */
+    public const REASON_MISSING = 'missing';
+
+    /**
+     * Present, but not a decodable ALTCHA payload.
+     */
+    public const REASON_MALFORMED = 'malformed';
+
+    /**
+     * Solved correctly, but the challenge's validity window had already closed
+     * by the time the form was submitted — the visitor spent longer on the form
+     * than {@see self::DEFAULT_EXPIRES_SECONDS}.
+     */
+    public const REASON_EXPIRED = 'expired';
+
+    /**
+     * Not a challenge we issued: forged, or signed with a different HMAC key
+     * (e.g. after a key rotation).
+     */
+    public const REASON_INVALID_SIGNATURE = 'invalid_signature';
+
+    /**
+     * Our challenge, but the proof-of-work answer is wrong.
+     */
+    public const REASON_INVALID_SOLUTION = 'invalid_solution';
+
+    /**
+     * Failed verification without the library attributing a specific cause.
+     */
+    public const REASON_INVALID = 'invalid';
+
+    /**
+     * Verifies a base64-encoded payload as posted by the ALTCHA widget.
      */
     public function verify(string $base64Payload): bool
+    {
+        return $this->classify($base64Payload) === self::REASON_OK;
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * Verifies a payload and reports *why* it failed instead of collapsing the
+     * outcome to a bool. Telling an expired challenge apart from a forged one is
+     * the difference between "our validity window is too short for this form"
+     * and "we're being attacked" — so the reason is what makes the decision log
+     * worth keeping.
+     *
+     * Both client-solution payloads (the common case) and server-signature
+     * payloads (used by ALTCHA Sentinel / Spam Filter) are accepted —
+     * `altcha-org/altcha` tells the two apart by the presence of
+     * `verificationData`.
+     *
+     * @return string one of the REASON_* constants
+     */
+    public function classify(string $base64Payload): string
     {
         if ($base64Payload === '') {
-            return false;
+            return self::REASON_MISSING;
         }
 
         $decoded = base64_decode($base64Payload, true);
         if ($decoded === false) {
-            return false;
+            return self::REASON_MALFORMED;
         }
 
         $payload = json_decode($decoded, true);
         if (! is_array($payload)) {
-            return false;
+            return self::REASON_MALFORMED;
         }
 
         if (isset($payload['verificationData'])) {
-            return ServerSignature::verifyServerSignature($payload, $this->hmacSecret)->verified;
+            return ServerSignature::verifyServerSignature($payload, $this->hmacSecret)->verified
+                ? self::REASON_OK
+                : self::REASON_INVALID;
         }
 
         if (! isset($payload['challenge'], $payload['solution'])
@@ -107,7 +164,7 @@ public function verify(string $base64Payload): bool
             || ! is_array($payload['solution'])
             || ! is_array($payload['challenge']['parameters'] ?? null)
         ) {
-            return false;
+            return self::REASON_MALFORMED;
         }
 
         $challenge = new AltchaChallenge(
@@ -121,10 +178,25 @@ public function verify(string $base64Payload): bool
 
         $altcha = new Altcha($this->hmacSecret);
 
-        return $altcha->verifySolution(new VerifySolutionOptions(
+        $result = $altcha->verifySolution(new VerifySolutionOptions(
             algorithm: new Pbkdf2,
             payload: new Payload($challenge, $solution),
-        ))->verified;
+        ));
+
+        if ($result->verified) {
+            return self::REASON_OK;
+        }
+        if ($result->expired) {
+            return self::REASON_EXPIRED;
+        }
+        if ($result->invalidSignature) {
+            return self::REASON_INVALID_SIGNATURE;
+        }
+        if ($result->invalidSolution) {
+            return self::REASON_INVALID_SOLUTION;
+        }
+
+        return self::REASON_INVALID;
     }
 
     /**
diff --git a/src/Integration.php b/src/Integration.php
index 5b7b765..bc731a5 100644
--- a/src/Integration.php
+++ b/src/Integration.php
@@ -8,6 +8,13 @@ class Integration
 
     public const SCRIPT_HANDLE = 'gravityforms-altcha-widget';
 
+    /**
+     * A valid, correctly solved payload that had already been accepted once.
+     * Lives here rather than on {@see Challenge} because replay is enforced by
+     * this class, not by the verification itself.
+     */
+    public const REASON_REPLAY = 'replay';
+
     public static function register(): void
     {
         $instance = new self;
@@ -65,18 +72,19 @@ public function validate(array $result): array
             ? sanitize_text_field(wp_unslash($_POST[self::POST_FIELD]))
             : '';
 
-        if ($this->challenge()->verify($payload)) {
+        $challenge = $this->challenge();
+        $reason = $challenge->classify($payload);
+
+        if ($reason === Challenge::REASON_OK) {
             if (! $this->isReplay($payload)) {
                 Logger::record('altcha', 'pass', ['form' => $formId]);
 
                 return $result;
             }
-            $reason = 'replay';
-        } else {
-            $reason = $payload === '' ? 'missing' : 'invalid';
+            $reason = self::REASON_REPLAY;
         }
 
-        Logger::record('altcha', 'fail', ['form' => $formId, 'reason' => $reason]);
+        Logger::record('altcha', 'fail', $this->failureContext($formId, $reason, $payload, $challenge));
 
         $result['is_valid'] = false;
         $result['form']['validation_summary_message'] = $this->errorMessage();
@@ -85,6 +93,35 @@ public function validate(array $result): array
         return $result;
     }
 
+    /**
+     * Builds the non-PII context recorded alongside a rejection.
+     *
+     * `reason` alone answers most questions, but not the one that matters most
+     * for an expired challenge: was the visitor a few seconds over, or half an
+     * hour? `expired_for` (seconds past `expiresAt`) turns "expiry is hurting
+     * us" from a hunch into a number, and shows whether the widget's renewal is
+     * doing its job in the field.
+     *
+     * @return array<string, mixed>
+     */
+    private function failureContext(mixed $formId, string $reason, string $payload, Challenge $challenge): array
+    {
+        $context = ['form' => $formId, 'reason' => $reason];
+
+        if ($reason !== Challenge::REASON_EXPIRED) {
+            return $context;
+        }
+
+        $fingerprint = $challenge->fingerprint($payload);
+        if ($fingerprint === null || $fingerprint['expiresAt'] === null) {
+            return $context;
+        }
+
+        $context['expired_for'] = max(0, time() - $fingerprint['expiresAt']);
+
+        return $context;
+    }
+
     /**
      * One-time-use enforcement. A signed challenge stays verifiable until it
      * expires, so without this a bot could solve the proof once and replay the
diff --git a/test/unit/ChallengeTest.php b/test/unit/ChallengeTest.php
index 2ddc5b6..fa6eae7 100644
--- a/test/unit/ChallengeTest.php
+++ b/test/unit/ChallengeTest.php
@@ -148,6 +148,85 @@ public function test_fingerprint_returns_null_for_unparseable_payloads(): void
         $this->assertNull($challenge->fingerprint(base64_encode(json_encode(['no' => 'signature']))));
     }
 
+    public function test_classify_accepts_a_valid_solution(): void
+    {
+        [, $payload] = $this->solvedPayload();
+
+        $this->assertSame(Challenge::REASON_OK, (new Challenge(self::SECRET))->classify($payload));
+    }
+
+    public function test_classify_reports_missing_for_an_empty_payload(): void
+    {
+        $this->assertSame(Challenge::REASON_MISSING, (new Challenge(self::SECRET))->classify(''));
+    }
+
+    public function test_classify_reports_malformed_for_undecodable_payloads(): void
+    {
+        $challenge = new Challenge(self::SECRET);
+
+        $this->assertSame(Challenge::REASON_MALFORMED, $challenge->classify('!!!not-base64!!!'));
+        $this->assertSame(Challenge::REASON_MALFORMED, $challenge->classify(base64_encode('not json')));
+        $this->assertSame(
+            Challenge::REASON_MALFORMED,
+            $challenge->classify(base64_encode(json_encode(['challenge' => 'wrong-shape']))),
+        );
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * The distinction this whole classification exists for: a visitor who sat on
+     * a long form past the validity window must be distinguishable from an
+     * attacker posting a forged proof.
+     */
+    public function test_classify_reports_expired_separately_from_invalid(): void
+    {
+        [, $payload] = $this->solvedPayload(expiresSeconds: -10);
+
+        $this->assertSame(Challenge::REASON_EXPIRED, (new Challenge(self::SECRET))->classify($payload));
+    }
+
+    public function test_classify_reports_invalid_signature_for_a_foreign_challenge(): void
+    {
+        $altcha = new Altcha('attacker-secret');
+        $foreign = (new Challenge('attacker-secret', cost: 1000))->create();
+
+        $solution = $altcha->solveChallenge(new SolveChallengeOptions(
+            algorithm: new Pbkdf2,
+            challenge: $foreign,
+        ));
+        $this->assertNotNull($solution);
+
+        $payload = (new Payload($foreign, $solution))->toBase64();
+
+        $this->assertSame(
+            Challenge::REASON_INVALID_SIGNATURE,
+            (new Challenge(self::SECRET))->classify($payload),
+        );
+    }
+
+    public function test_classify_reports_invalid_solution_for_a_garbled_answer(): void
+    {
+        [$challenge, $payload] = $this->solvedPayload();
+
+        $arr = json_decode(base64_decode($payload, true), true);
+        $arr['solution']['derivedKey'] = str_repeat('0', strlen($arr['solution']['derivedKey']));
+
+        $this->assertSame(
+            Challenge::REASON_INVALID_SOLUTION,
+            (new Challenge(self::SECRET))->classify(base64_encode(json_encode($arr))),
+        );
+    }
+
+    public function test_verify_agrees_with_classify(): void
+    {
+        [, $valid] = $this->solvedPayload();
+        [, $expired] = $this->solvedPayload(expiresSeconds: -10);
+        $challenge = new Challenge(self::SECRET);
+
+        $this->assertTrue($challenge->verify($valid));
+        $this->assertFalse($challenge->verify($expired));
+        $this->assertFalse($challenge->verify(''));
+    }
+
     public function test_clamp_cost_constrains_to_bounds(): void
     {
         $this->assertSame(Challenge::MIN_COST, Challenge::clampCost(1));