From cfe21e678956b4622e2899e2146d6ca00481f81d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Neil Dewhurst <ndewhurst@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 20 Jul 2026 17:52:51 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Harden docs-deploy-surge.yml against artifact poisoning (sync
 from docs-template)
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Syncs .github/workflows/docs-deploy-surge.yml to the canonical neo4j/docs-template
version to resolve the critical CodeQL artifact-poisoning alert. Adds:
- validate-changelog step (rejects a symlinked changelog before it is read into
  the PR comment – prevents arbitrary-file-read from a poisoned artifact)
- process.env.RUN_ID instead of ${{ env.RUN_ID }} in the github-script step
  (avoids GitHub Actions expression injection)
- extended zipinfo suspicious-path-check: rejects empty archives, absolute paths,
  path traversal (..), and Windows-style backslash separators

No branch or path filters changed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---
 .github/workflows/docs-deploy-surge.yml | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 43 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/.github/workflows/docs-deploy-surge.yml b/.github/workflows/docs-deploy-surge.yml
index 54035a1..682c6cf 100644
--- a/.github/workflows/docs-deploy-surge.yml
+++ b/.github/workflows/docs-deploy-surge.yml
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ on:
       - completed
 
 jobs:
-  # [Optional] Restrict automatic dpeloyment to PRs from the upstream repo
+  # [Optional] Restrict automatic deployment to PRs from the upstream repo
   # For fork PRs, requires manual approval via the "preview" environment.
   # For PRs from the main repository this job is skipped and deploy-docs runs immediately.
   # Setup: create a "preview" environment in Settings → Environments with required reviewers.
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ jobs:
             var artifacts = await github.rest.actions.listWorkflowRunArtifacts({
                owner: context.repo.owner,
                repo: context.repo.repo,
-               run_id: ${{ env.RUN_ID }},
+               run_id: process.env.RUN_ID,
             });
 
             var matchArtifactDocs = artifacts.data.artifacts.filter((artifact) => {
@@ -86,13 +86,32 @@ jobs:
 
       - id: suspicious-path-check
         name: Suspicious paths check
+        shell: bash
         env:
           ARTIFACT_DIR: ${{ runner.temp }}/artifacts/docs
         run: |
+          set -euo pipefail
           cd "$ARTIFACT_DIR"
-          if unzip -l docs.zip | grep -q "\.\./"; then
+          
+          mapfile -t ZIP_ENTRIES < <(zipinfo -1 docs.zip)
+          if [ "${#ZIP_ENTRIES[@]}" -eq 0 ]; then
+            echo "docs.zip is empty"
             exit 1
           fi
+          for entry in "${ZIP_ENTRIES[@]}"; do
+            if [[ "$entry" =~ ^/ ]]; then
+              echo "Blocked absolute path in artifact: $entry"
+              exit 1
+            fi
+            if [[ "$entry" =~ (^|/)\.\.(/|$) ]]; then
+              echo "Blocked path traversal in artifact: $entry"
+              exit 1
+            fi
+            if [[ "$entry" == *\\* ]]; then
+              echo "Blocked Windows-style path separator in artifact: $entry"
+              exit 1
+            fi
+          done
 
       - id: hidden-files-check
         name: Hidden files check
@@ -131,7 +150,27 @@ jobs:
         run: |
           cd "$ARTIFACT_DIR"
           unzip changelog.zip
-      
+
+      # The changelog file is built from untrusted PR content and its contents
+      # are posted to the PR as a comment. A malicious artifact could make
+      # `changelog` a symlink pointing at an arbitrary file the runner can read,
+      # turning the comment step into an arbitrary-file-read. Reject anything
+      # that isn't a plain regular file before we read it.
+      - id: validate-changelog
+        name: Validate changelog is a regular file
+        if: ${{ steps.find-changelog.outputs.has-changelog == 'true' }}
+        env:
+          CHANGELOG_FILE: ${{ runner.temp }}/artifacts/changelog/changelog
+        run: |
+          if [ -L "$CHANGELOG_FILE" ]; then
+            echo "Security Alert: changelog is a symlink — refusing!"
+            exit 1
+          fi
+          if [ ! -f "$CHANGELOG_FILE" ]; then
+            echo "changelog missing or not a regular file"
+            exit 1
+          fi
+
       - id: get-deploy-id
         name: Get deploy ID
         env: