From a93441a325e094e487c29e5e51df1d6326b6dc69 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Algis Dumbris Date: Fri, 2 Oct 2026 16:21:56 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 1/3] fix(profiles): nested code_execution profile refusals carry block_reason (Spec 108 T166) A call_tool refused by the caller's profile inside code_execution wrote its blocked tool_call child without block_reason, so activity could not tell a tier refusal from a rule or unannotated one. The sandbox gate now reports the typed reason through a second optional method, and the child record persists it as both the first-class field and the metadata key. --- internal/jsruntime/runtime.go | 21 ++- .../runtime_authz_blockreason_test.go | 83 ++++++++++ .../runtime/activity_block_reason_test.go | 68 ++++++++ internal/runtime/activity_service.go | 11 +- internal/runtime/event_bus.go | 13 +- .../server/activity_result_status_test.go | 3 + internal/server/audit_funnel.go | 5 +- ...e_execution_profile_v3_blockreason_test.go | 150 ++++++++++++++++++ .../server/code_execution_profile_v3_test.go | 34 +++- internal/server/mcp.go | 11 +- internal/server/mcp_code_execution.go | 43 +++-- 11 files changed, 414 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-) create mode 100644 internal/jsruntime/runtime_authz_blockreason_test.go create mode 100644 internal/runtime/activity_block_reason_test.go create mode 100644 internal/server/code_execution_profile_v3_blockreason_test.go diff --git a/internal/jsruntime/runtime.go b/internal/jsruntime/runtime.go index ccc7c3cbb..bfbf877bc 100644 --- a/internal/jsruntime/runtime.go +++ b/internal/jsruntime/runtime.go @@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ type AuthzGateReport struct { Message string // the envelope message shown to the script caller RequiredPerm string // the tier the lookup resolved, when one was resolved Arguments map[string]interface{} + BlockReason string // host-defined typed cause of a profile policy refusal (Spec 108 FR-029); empty for every other refusal } // AuthzObserver receives AuthzGateReports. Implementations must be safe for @@ -504,7 +505,7 @@ func (ec *ExecutionContext) checkDispatchGates(serverName, toolName string) (gat // T104). It is the ONLY reporting seam: resolveDispatchGates calls it on // every refusing return, once, so a refusal is never re-reported by the // completion path (which a refused call never reaches). nil observer = no-op. -func (ec *ExecutionContext) reportAuthzRefusal(serverName, toolName string, code ErrorCode, message, requiredPerm string, args map[string]interface{}) { +func (ec *ExecutionContext) reportAuthzRefusal(serverName, toolName string, code ErrorCode, message, requiredPerm string, args map[string]interface{}, blockReason string) { if ec.authzObserver == nil { return } @@ -519,6 +520,7 @@ func (ec *ExecutionContext) reportAuthzRefusal(serverName, toolName string, code Message: message, RequiredPerm: requiredPerm, Arguments: stripAuthInjectedArgs(args), + BlockReason: blockReason, }) } @@ -583,12 +585,12 @@ func (ec *ExecutionContext) resolveDispatchGates(serverName, toolName string, ar if ec.authInfo != nil && !ec.authInfo.isAdmin() { if profileDenies || !ec.authInfo.CanAccessServer(serverName) { message := fmt.Sprintf("token does not have access to server '%s'", serverName) - ec.reportAuthzRefusal(serverName, toolName, ErrorCodeAccessDenied, message, "", args) + ec.reportAuthzRefusal(serverName, toolName, ErrorCodeAccessDenied, message, "", args, "") return errorEnvelope(ErrorCodeAccessDenied, message), "", nil } } else if profileDenies { message := fmt.Sprintf("server not allowed: %s", serverName) - ec.reportAuthzRefusal(serverName, toolName, ErrorCodeServerNotAllowed, message, "", args) + ec.reportAuthzRefusal(serverName, toolName, ErrorCodeServerNotAllowed, message, "", args, "") return errorEnvelope(ErrorCodeServerNotAllowed, message), "", nil } @@ -616,12 +618,19 @@ func (ec *ExecutionContext) resolveDispatchGates(serverName, toolName string, ar if requiredPerm == PermissionTierUnresolved { message := fmt.Sprintf("permission denied: tool '%s:%s' cannot be resolved against the current tool list of server '%s' (undiscovered or stale name), so no permission tier applies to it", serverName, toolName, serverName) - ec.reportAuthzRefusal(serverName, toolName, ErrorCodePermissionDenied, message, requiredPerm, args) + ec.reportAuthzRefusal(serverName, toolName, ErrorCodePermissionDenied, message, requiredPerm, args, "") return errorEnvelope(ErrorCodePermissionDenied, message), "", nil } if refusal, ok := gate.(interface{ ProfilePolicyRefusal() string }); ok { if message := refusal.ProfilePolicyRefusal(); message != "" { - ec.reportAuthzRefusal(serverName, toolName, ErrorCodeAccessDenied, message, requiredPerm, args) + // The typed reason comes from a SECOND optional method so the + // refusal never depends on it (Spec 108 FR-029): a gate that + // only implements ProfilePolicyRefusal still refuses. + blockReason := "" + if typed, ok := gate.(interface{ ProfilePolicyBlockReason() string }); ok { + blockReason = typed.ProfilePolicyBlockReason() + } + ec.reportAuthzRefusal(serverName, toolName, ErrorCodeAccessDenied, message, requiredPerm, args, blockReason) return errorEnvelope(ErrorCodeAccessDenied, message), "", nil } } @@ -636,7 +645,7 @@ func (ec *ExecutionContext) resolveDispatchGates(serverName, toolName string, ar if !ec.authInfo.HasPermission(requiredPerm) { message := fmt.Sprintf("token does not have '%s' permission for tool '%s:%s'", requiredPerm, serverName, toolName) - ec.reportAuthzRefusal(serverName, toolName, ErrorCodePermissionDenied, message, requiredPerm, args) + ec.reportAuthzRefusal(serverName, toolName, ErrorCodePermissionDenied, message, requiredPerm, args, "") return errorEnvelope(ErrorCodePermissionDenied, message), "", nil } diff --git a/internal/jsruntime/runtime_authz_blockreason_test.go b/internal/jsruntime/runtime_authz_blockreason_test.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..9bdc1cb80 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/jsruntime/runtime_authz_blockreason_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ +package jsruntime + +import ( + "context" + "testing" +) + +// fakeProfileGate stands in for the host's per-call gate capture. refusal is +// the disclosed profile-refusal text; reason is the typed block reason. +type fakeProfileGate struct { + refusal string + reason string +} + +func (g *fakeProfileGate) ProfilePolicyRefusal() string { return g.refusal } +func (g *fakeProfileGate) ProfilePolicyBlockReason() string { return g.reason } + +// refusalOnlyGate implements only ProfilePolicyRefusal: the refusal must never +// depend on the optional block-reason method (Spec 108 FR-029, T166). +type refusalOnlyGate struct{ refusal string } + +func (g *refusalOnlyGate) ProfilePolicyRefusal() string { return g.refusal } + +// TestAuthzObserver_ProfileRefusalReportsBlockReason proves a profile policy +// refusal reaches the observer with the host's typed block reason, that the +// refusal itself does not depend on the optional method, and that a +// non-profile refusal carries no reason. +func TestAuthzObserver_ProfileRefusalReportsBlockReason(t *testing.T) { + const message = "blocked by profile: s:t is above the cap" + lookup := func(gate ToolGate) ToolGateLookup { + return func(serverName, toolName string) (string, ToolGate) { return "write", gate } + } + + cases := []struct { + name string + opts ExecutionOptions + wantCode ErrorCode + wantReason string + }{ + { + name: "profile refusal with typed reason", + opts: ExecutionOptions{ToolGateFunc: lookup(&fakeProfileGate{refusal: message, reason: "profile_tier"})}, + wantCode: ErrorCodeAccessDenied, + wantReason: "profile_tier", + }, + { + name: "refusal-only gate still refuses with empty reason", + opts: ExecutionOptions{ToolGateFunc: lookup(&refusalOnlyGate{refusal: message})}, + wantCode: ErrorCodeAccessDenied, + wantReason: "", + }, + { + name: "non-profile refusal carries no reason", + opts: ExecutionOptions{AllowedServers: []string{"other"}}, + wantCode: ErrorCodeServerNotAllowed, + wantReason: "", + }, + } + for _, tc := range cases { + t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) { + caller := newMockToolCaller() + observer := &recordingAuthzObserver{} + tc.opts.AuthzObserver = observer + result := Execute(context.Background(), caller, `call_tool("s", "t", {})`, tc.opts) + if !result.Ok { + t.Fatalf("execution failed: %+v", result.Error) + } + if len(caller.calls) != 0 { + t.Fatalf("a refused call must never dispatch upstream, got %d", len(caller.calls)) + } + reports := observer.snapshot() + if len(reports) != 1 { + t.Fatalf("exactly one authz report expected, got %d", len(reports)) + } + if reports[0].Code != tc.wantCode { + t.Fatalf("Code = %q, want %q", reports[0].Code, tc.wantCode) + } + if reports[0].BlockReason != tc.wantReason { + t.Fatalf("BlockReason = %q, want %q", reports[0].BlockReason, tc.wantReason) + } + }) + } +} diff --git a/internal/runtime/activity_block_reason_test.go b/internal/runtime/activity_block_reason_test.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..75d7cadd5 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/runtime/activity_block_reason_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,68 @@ +package runtime + +import ( + "testing" + "time" + + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" + "go.uber.org/zap" + + "github.com/smart-mcp-proxy/mcpproxy-go/internal/storage" +) + +// TestActivityService_ToolCallCompletedPersistsBlockReason proves the typed +// block reason of a profile-refused code_execution sub-call (Spec 108 FR-029, +// T166) travels emit -> event -> record: on record.BlockReason and, for one +// release, on Metadata["block_reason"], next to parent_id and attribution. +// An empty reason must leave the legacy record shape byte-identical. +func TestActivityService_ToolCallCompletedPersistsBlockReason(t *testing.T) { + cases := []struct { + name string + blockReason string + }{ + {name: "profile rule", blockReason: "profile_rule"}, + {name: "no reason", blockReason: ""}, + } + for _, tc := range cases { + t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) { + store, cleanup := setupTestStorage(t) + defer cleanup() + svc := NewActivityService(store, zap.NewNop()) + + rt := &Runtime{ + eventSubs: make(map[chan Event]struct{}), + internalEventSubs: make(map[chan Event]struct{}), + } + sub := rt.subscribeInternalEvents() + defer rt.UnsubscribeEvents(sub) + + rt.EmitActivityToolCallCompletedAttributed( + "github", "create_issue", "", "req-1", "internal", "blocked", "blocked by profile", 0, + nil, "", false, "", nil, "", "", 0, 0, + "", nil, "p-1", tc.blockReason, + ActivityAttribution{Profile: "x", ProfileSource: "pin"}, + ) + + select { + case evt := <-sub: + svc.handleEvent(evt) + case <-time.After(time.Second): + t.Fatal("no completion event published") + } + + records, _, err := store.ListActivities(storage.DefaultActivityFilter()) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.Len(t, records, 1) + rec := records[0] + assert.Equal(t, "p-1", rec.ParentID) + assert.Equal(t, "x", rec.Profile) + assert.Equal(t, tc.blockReason, rec.BlockReason) + if tc.blockReason == "" { + assert.Nil(t, rec.Metadata, "no reason and nothing else to record: Metadata stays nil, no empty map") + return + } + assert.Equal(t, tc.blockReason, rec.Metadata[storage.MetadataKeyBlockReason]) + }) + } +} diff --git a/internal/runtime/activity_service.go b/internal/runtime/activity_service.go index 48bc4d53e..401c50d9e 100644 --- a/internal/runtime/activity_service.go +++ b/internal/runtime/activity_service.go @@ -627,6 +627,9 @@ func (s *ActivityService) handleToolCallCompleted(evt Event) { // Correlation id of the parent code_execution call (empty for a top-level // dispatch). First-class on the record so ?parent_id= can filter on it. parentID := getStringPayload(evt.Payload, "parent_id") + // Spec 108 FR-029: typed cause of a profile-refused code_execution + // sub-call (T166); empty for every other completion. + blockReason := getStringPayload(evt.Payload, storage.MetadataKeyBlockReason) // Default source to "mcp" if not specified (backwards compatibility) activitySource := storage.ActivitySourceMCP if source != "" { @@ -635,7 +638,7 @@ func (s *ActivityService) handleToolCallCompleted(evt Event) { // Build metadata with intent information if present var metadata map[string]interface{} - if toolVariant != "" || intent != nil || contentTrust != "" || profileSlug != "" || toonOutput != nil { + if toolVariant != "" || intent != nil || contentTrust != "" || profileSlug != "" || toonOutput != nil || blockReason != "" { metadata = make(map[string]interface{}) if toolVariant != "" { metadata["tool_variant"] = toolVariant @@ -656,6 +659,11 @@ func (s *ActivityService) handleToolCallCompleted(evt Event) { if toonOutput != nil { metadata["toon_output"] = toonOutput } + // Both the metadata key and the first-class field, for one release, + // the same rule handlePolicyDecision follows (data-model.md, T062). + if blockReason != "" { + metadata[storage.MetadataKeyBlockReason] = blockReason + } } // Name the MCP client on the record itself, so it survives session eviction. metadata = s.withClientInfo(metadata, sessionID) @@ -680,6 +688,7 @@ func (s *ActivityService) handleToolCallCompleted(evt Event) { WorkSessionID: s.resolveWorkSession(sessionID), RequestID: requestID, ParentID: parentID, + BlockReason: blockReason, Metadata: metadata, RequestBytes: requestBytes, ResponseBytes: responseBytes, diff --git a/internal/runtime/event_bus.go b/internal/runtime/event_bus.go index 3c8632c80..122f5c6a7 100644 --- a/internal/runtime/event_bus.go +++ b/internal/runtime/event_bus.go @@ -495,15 +495,16 @@ func (r *Runtime) EmitActivityToolCallStarted(serverName, toolName, sessionID, r // parentID is the correlation id of the parent code_execution call for a // sandbox sub-call; empty for every top-level dispatch func (r *Runtime) EmitActivityToolCallCompleted(serverName, toolName, sessionID, requestID, source, status, errorMsg string, durationMs int64, arguments map[string]interface{}, response string, responseTruncated bool, toolVariant string, intent map[string]interface{}, contentTrust, profile string, requestBytes, responseBytes int, detectionText string, toonOutput map[string]interface{}, parentID string) { - r.EmitActivityToolCallCompletedAttributed(serverName, toolName, sessionID, requestID, source, status, errorMsg, durationMs, arguments, response, responseTruncated, toolVariant, intent, contentTrust, profile, requestBytes, responseBytes, detectionText, toonOutput, parentID, ActivityAttribution{}) + r.EmitActivityToolCallCompletedAttributed(serverName, toolName, sessionID, requestID, source, status, errorMsg, durationMs, arguments, response, responseTruncated, toolVariant, intent, contentTrust, profile, requestBytes, responseBytes, detectionText, toonOutput, parentID, "", ActivityAttribution{}) } // EmitActivityToolCallCompletedAttributed is EmitActivityToolCallCompleted plus // the Spec 108 FR-029 scope attribution (profile, client, token in effect for // this call). attr is the LAST parameter, so the position of `status` that // TestActivityCompletionNeverHardcodesSuccess pins does not move; the zero -// value leaves the payload exactly as it was before Spec 108. -func (r *Runtime) EmitActivityToolCallCompletedAttributed(serverName, toolName, sessionID, requestID, source, status, errorMsg string, durationMs int64, arguments map[string]interface{}, response string, responseTruncated bool, toolVariant string, intent map[string]interface{}, contentTrust, profile string, requestBytes, responseBytes int, detectionText string, toonOutput map[string]interface{}, parentID string, attr ActivityAttribution) { +// value leaves the payload exactly as it was before Spec 108. blockReason is +// the profile.BlockReason of a profile-refused sub-call, "" for everything else. +func (r *Runtime) EmitActivityToolCallCompletedAttributed(serverName, toolName, sessionID, requestID, source, status, errorMsg string, durationMs int64, arguments map[string]interface{}, response string, responseTruncated bool, toolVariant string, intent map[string]interface{}, contentTrust, profile string, requestBytes, responseBytes int, detectionText string, toonOutput map[string]interface{}, parentID string, blockReason string, attr ActivityAttribution) { // Spec 042: classify failed tool calls into the upstream error categories. // We never record the error message itself; only a fixed enum value. if status == "error" && errorMsg != "" { @@ -573,6 +574,12 @@ func (r *Runtime) EmitActivityToolCallCompletedAttributed(serverName, toolName, if parentID != "" { payload["parent_id"] = parentID } + // Spec 108 FR-029 (T166): the typed cause of a profile tool-policy refusal + // of a code_execution sub-call. Only set when non-empty, so every other + // completion keeps its payload byte-for-byte. + if blockReason != "" { + payload[storage.MetadataKeyBlockReason] = blockReason + } if a := attr.payload(); a != nil { payload[attributionPayloadKey] = a } diff --git a/internal/server/activity_result_status_test.go b/internal/server/activity_result_status_test.go index 9758e935e..3c95e7fb1 100644 --- a/internal/server/activity_result_status_test.go +++ b/internal/server/activity_result_status_test.go @@ -135,6 +135,9 @@ var statusArgIndex = map[string]int{ // — ctx became the first parameter in Spec 107 PR-D (FR-012), moving // status from index 5 to 6. "emitActivityToolCallCompleted": 6, + // Spec 108 T166: the block-reason variant takes the same leading + // parameters, so it is held to the same rule. + "emitActivityToolCallCompletedWithBlockReason": 6, } func TestActivityCompletionNeverHardcodesSuccess(t *testing.T) { diff --git a/internal/server/audit_funnel.go b/internal/server/audit_funnel.go index 390bacac1..8f48ae8cb 100644 --- a/internal/server/audit_funnel.go +++ b/internal/server/audit_funnel.go @@ -507,11 +507,14 @@ func (o *nestedAuthzObserver) ObserveAuthzGate(report jsruntime.AuthzGateReport) refusal := errors.New(report.Message) o.toolCaller.storeToolCallInHistory(report.ServerName, report.ToolName, report.Arguments, nil, refusal, startedAt, 0) o.toolCaller.emitSubCallRefused(report.Ctx, report.ServerName, report.ToolName, - mintCorrelationID(report.ServerName, report.ToolName), report.Arguments, refusal, startedAt, 0) + mintCorrelationID(report.ServerName, report.ToolName), report.Arguments, refusal, startedAt, 0, report.BlockReason) } if o.proxy == nil || o.proxy.auditSink == nil { return } + // Note: the audit reason below stays the Spec 107 vocabulary even for a + // profile refusal (report.BlockReason is not mapped here); aligning it + // with the top-level gate's `other` is a Spec 107/108 follow-up. reasonKey := telemetry.BlockReasonTokenScope switch report.Code { case jsruntime.ErrorCodeServerNotAllowed: diff --git a/internal/server/code_execution_profile_v3_blockreason_test.go b/internal/server/code_execution_profile_v3_blockreason_test.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..cceeb20f1 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/server/code_execution_profile_v3_blockreason_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,150 @@ +package server + +import ( + "testing" + "time" + + "github.com/mark3labs/mcp-go/mcp" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" + + "github.com/smart-mcp-proxy/mcpproxy-go/internal/config" + "github.com/smart-mcp-proxy/mcpproxy-go/internal/contracts" + "github.com/smart-mcp-proxy/mcpproxy-go/internal/runtime" + "github.com/smart-mcp-proxy/mcpproxy-go/internal/storage" +) + +// waitNestedChild polls for the tool_call child of parentID on (server, tool). +// Activity is persisted by the bus subscriber, so a fixed sleep would be flaky. +func waitNestedChild(t *testing.T, rt *runtime.Runtime, parentID, server, tool string) *storage.ActivityRecord { + t.Helper() + var found *storage.ActivityRecord + require.Eventually(t, func() bool { + records, _, err := rt.StorageManager().ListActivities(storage.ActivityFilter{ParentID: parentID, Limit: 50}) + require.NoError(t, err) + for _, record := range records { + if record.Type == storage.ActivityTypeToolCall && record.ServerName == server && record.ToolName == tool { + found = record + return true + } + } + return false + }, 5*time.Second, 10*time.Millisecond, "child record %s:%s of %s", server, tool, parentID) + return found +} + +// waitCodeExecutionParent returns the request id of the code_execution parent +// record, which is the parent_id its sandbox children carry. +func waitCodeExecutionParent(t *testing.T, rt *runtime.Runtime) string { + t.Helper() + var parentID string + require.Eventually(t, func() bool { + records, _, err := rt.StorageManager().ListActivities(storage.ActivityFilter{ + Types: []string{string(storage.ActivityTypeInternalToolCall)}, Tool: "code_execution", Limit: 50, + }) + require.NoError(t, err) + if len(records) == 0 { + return false + } + parentID = records[0].RequestID + return parentID != "" + }, 5*time.Second, 10*time.Millisecond, "code_execution parent record") + return parentID +} + +// codeExecProfileFixture is the work-readonly fixture with code execution +// enabled for it, a github upstream that has a deny-rule match +// (list_secrets), an unannotated tool (search_code) and a write tool, and the +// activity service started. +func codeExecProfileFixture(t *testing.T) (*MCPProxyServer, *runtime.Runtime, *countingUpstream) { + t.Helper() + proxy, rt := newProfilesV3Fixture(t) + updated := *rt.Config() + updated.Profiles = append([]config.ProfileConfig(nil), updated.Profiles...) + updated.Profiles[0].CodeExecution = boolPtr(true) + rt.UpdateConfig(&updated, "") + up := startCountingUpstream(t, proxy, rt, "github", + writeSpec("create_issue"), readSpec("list_secrets"), toolSpec{Name: "search_code", Description: "Search code"}) + startProfileV3ActivityService(t, rt) + return proxy, rt, up +} + +// TestCodeExecution_ProfileV3NestedRefusalReasons pins the block_reason of the +// child record for every profile refusal cause, for both script APIs, and its +// absence for a refusal that is not a profile tool-policy one (data-model.md). +func TestCodeExecution_ProfileV3NestedRefusalReasons(t *testing.T) { + cases := []struct { + name string + code string + server string + tool string + wantReason string + }{ + {"tier above cap", `call_tool("github", "create_issue", {})`, "github", "create_issue", "profile_tier"}, + {"deny rule", `call_tool("github", "list_secrets", {})`, "github", "list_secrets", "profile_rule"}, + {"unannotated", `call_tool("github", "search_code", {})`, "github", "search_code", "profile_unannotated"}, + {"call_tools batch element", `call_tools([{server: "github", tool: "create_issue", args: {}}])`, "github", "create_issue", "profile_tier"}, + {"server outside profile", `call_tool("filesystem", "read_text_file", {})`, "filesystem", "read_text_file", ""}, + } + for _, tc := range cases { + t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) { + proxy, rt, up := codeExecProfileFixture(t) + + result, err := proxy.handleCodeExecution(urlProfileCtx(proxy, "work-readonly"), mcp.CallToolRequest{ + Params: mcp.CallToolParams{Arguments: map[string]interface{}{"code": tc.code}}, + }) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.NotNil(t, result) + require.False(t, result.IsError, resultText(t, result)) + require.Empty(t, up.dispatched(), "a refused nested call must never reach the upstream") + + parentID := waitCodeExecutionParent(t, rt) + child := waitNestedChild(t, rt, parentID, tc.server, tc.tool) + assert.Equal(t, storage.ActivityStatusBlocked, child.Status) + assert.Equal(t, parentID, child.ParentID) + assert.Equal(t, "work-readonly", child.Profile) + assert.Equal(t, "url", child.ProfileSource) + assert.Equal(t, tc.wantReason, child.EffectiveBlockReason()) + if tc.wantReason == "" { + assert.Empty(t, child.BlockReason) + assert.NotContains(t, child.Metadata, storage.MetadataKeyBlockReason) + } + }) + } +} + +// TestCodeExecution_ProfileV3NestedRefusalMatchesTopLevel proves the nested +// child and the top-level policy_decision for the same refused tool agree on +// block_reason, attribution and refusal text. +func TestCodeExecution_ProfileV3NestedRefusalMatchesTopLevel(t *testing.T) { + proxy, rt, _ := codeExecProfileFixture(t) + ctx := urlProfileCtx(proxy, "work-readonly") + + top, err := proxy.handleCallToolVariant(ctx, auditCallToolRequest("github:create_issue", nil), contracts.ToolVariantWrite) + require.NoError(t, err) + require.True(t, top.IsError) + _, err = proxy.handleCodeExecution(ctx, mcp.CallToolRequest{ + Params: mcp.CallToolParams{Arguments: map[string]interface{}{"code": `call_tool("github", "create_issue", {})`}}, + }) + require.NoError(t, err) + + child := waitNestedChild(t, rt, waitCodeExecutionParent(t, rt), "github", "create_issue") + var decision *storage.ActivityRecord + require.Eventually(t, func() bool { + records, _, listErr := rt.StorageManager().ListActivities(storage.ActivityFilter{ + Types: []string{string(storage.ActivityTypePolicyDecision)}, Server: "github", Tool: "create_issue", Limit: 50, + }) + require.NoError(t, listErr) + if len(records) == 0 { + return false + } + decision = records[0] + return true + }, 5*time.Second, 10*time.Millisecond, "top-level policy_decision") + + assert.Equal(t, decision.EffectiveBlockReason(), child.EffectiveBlockReason()) + assert.Equal(t, "profile_tier", child.EffectiveBlockReason()) + assert.Equal(t, decision.Profile, child.Profile) + assert.Equal(t, decision.ProfileSource, child.ProfileSource) + assert.Equal(t, decision.Metadata["reason"], child.ErrorMessage) +} diff --git a/internal/server/code_execution_profile_v3_test.go b/internal/server/code_execution_profile_v3_test.go index 3d821db69..b7b8fa3c3 100644 --- a/internal/server/code_execution_profile_v3_test.go +++ b/internal/server/code_execution_profile_v3_test.go @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ import ( "github.com/smart-mcp-proxy/mcpproxy-go/internal/auth" "github.com/smart-mcp-proxy/mcpproxy-go/internal/config" "github.com/smart-mcp-proxy/mcpproxy-go/internal/profile" + "github.com/smart-mcp-proxy/mcpproxy-go/internal/runtime" "github.com/smart-mcp-proxy/mcpproxy-go/internal/storage" "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" @@ -48,12 +49,7 @@ func TestCodeExecution_ProfileV3HiddenAndRefused(t *testing.T) { require.True(t, result.IsError) require.Equal(t, "unknown tool: code_execution", resultText(t, result)) - go rt.ActivityService().Start(rt.AppContext(), rt) - startDeadline := time.Now().Add(5 * time.Second) - for !rt.ActivityService().Started() && time.Now().Before(startDeadline) { - time.Sleep(time.Millisecond) - } - require.True(t, rt.ActivityService().Started(), "activity service must subscribe before the policy decision is emitted") + startProfileV3ActivityService(t, rt) result, err = proxy.handleCodeExecution(urlCtx, mcp.CallToolRequest{ Params: mcp.CallToolParams{Arguments: map[string]interface{}{"code": "1 + 1"}}, }) @@ -75,6 +71,19 @@ func TestCodeExecution_ProfileV3HiddenAndRefused(t *testing.T) { t.Fatal("profile code_execution denial did not persist block_reason") } +// startProfileV3ActivityService starts the runtime's activity service and waits +// for it to subscribe, so activity events emitted afterwards are persisted by +// the bus subscriber (the write is asynchronous). +func startProfileV3ActivityService(t *testing.T, rt *runtime.Runtime) { + t.Helper() + go rt.ActivityService().Start(rt.AppContext(), rt) + startDeadline := time.Now().Add(5 * time.Second) + for !rt.ActivityService().Started() && time.Now().Before(startDeadline) { + time.Sleep(time.Millisecond) + } + require.True(t, rt.ActivityService().Started(), "activity service must subscribe before the activity is emitted") +} + func TestCodeExecution_DanglingProfileHiddenFromDiscovery(t *testing.T) { proxy, _ := newProfilesV3Fixture(t) proxy.currentConfig().EnableCodeExecution = true @@ -321,6 +330,7 @@ func TestCodeExecution_ProfileV3NestedCallBlockedBeforeUpstream(t *testing.T) { updated.Profiles[0].CodeExecution = boolPtr(true) rt.UpdateConfig(&updated, "") up := startCountingUpstream(t, proxy, rt, "github", writeSpec("create_issue")) + startProfileV3ActivityService(t, rt) result, err := proxy.handleCodeExecution(urlProfileCtx(proxy, "work-readonly"), mcp.CallToolRequest{ Params: mcp.CallToolParams{Arguments: map[string]interface{}{ @@ -355,6 +365,18 @@ func TestCodeExecution_ProfileV3NestedCallBlockedBeforeUpstream(t *testing.T) { } require.NotEmpty(t, childParentID, "profile-refused nested call is persisted") require.Equal(t, parentID, childParentID, "the refused child record links to its parent execution") + + // Spec 108 US1-5 / FR-029 (T166): the activity child carries the typed + // block reason and the caller's scope attribution. + child := waitNestedChild(t, rt, parentID, "github", "create_issue") + assert.Equal(t, storage.ActivityTypeToolCall, child.Type) + assert.Equal(t, storage.ActivityStatusBlocked, child.Status) + assert.Equal(t, storage.ActivitySourceInternal, child.Source) + assert.Equal(t, string(profile.BlockReasonTier), child.BlockReason) + assert.Equal(t, "profile_tier", child.Metadata[storage.MetadataKeyBlockReason]) + assert.Equal(t, "work-readonly", child.Profile) + assert.Equal(t, "url", child.ProfileSource) + assert.Equal(t, v3TierRefusal(t), child.ErrorMessage) } func profileV3ToolNames(tools []mcp.Tool) []string { diff --git a/internal/server/mcp.go b/internal/server/mcp.go index 6697efdfe..26f0feb22 100644 --- a/internal/server/mcp.go +++ b/internal/server/mcp.go @@ -866,9 +866,18 @@ func (p *MCPProxyServer) emitActivityToolCallStarted(ctx context.Context, server // from errorMsg. A post-dispatch output block already wrote the line as // outcome:blocked; the attempt's dedup makes this call a no-op then. func (p *MCPProxyServer) emitActivityToolCallCompleted(ctx context.Context, serverName, toolName, sessionID, requestID, source, status, errorMsg string, durationMs int64, arguments map[string]interface{}, response string, responseTruncated bool, toolVariant string, intent map[string]interface{}, contentTrust, profile string, requestBytes, responseBytes int, detectionText string, toonDecisions []toonenc.Decision, parentID string) { + p.emitActivityToolCallCompletedWithBlockReason(ctx, serverName, toolName, sessionID, requestID, source, status, errorMsg, durationMs, arguments, response, responseTruncated, toolVariant, intent, contentTrust, profile, requestBytes, responseBytes, detectionText, toonDecisions, parentID, "") +} + +// emitActivityToolCallCompletedWithBlockReason is emitActivityToolCallCompleted +// plus blockReason: the profile.BlockReason of a pre-dispatch profile +// tool-policy refusal (today only the code_execution sandbox's nested gate); +// empty for everything else. It mirrors the emitActivityPolicyDecision / +// emitActivityPolicyDecisionWithBlockReason pair, and keeps status at index 6. +func (p *MCPProxyServer) emitActivityToolCallCompletedWithBlockReason(ctx context.Context, serverName, toolName, sessionID, requestID, source, status, errorMsg string, durationMs int64, arguments map[string]interface{}, response string, responseTruncated bool, toolVariant string, intent map[string]interface{}, contentTrust, profile string, requestBytes, responseBytes int, detectionText string, toonDecisions []toonenc.Decision, parentID, blockReason string) { p.auditToolCallFromStatus(ctx, status, durationMs, requestBytes, responseBytes) if p.mainServer != nil && p.mainServer.runtime != nil { - p.mainServer.runtime.EmitActivityToolCallCompletedAttributed(serverName, toolName, sessionID, requestID, source, status, errorMsg, durationMs, arguments, response, responseTruncated, toolVariant, intent, contentTrust, profile, requestBytes, responseBytes, detectionText, toonOutputMetadata(toonDecisions), parentID, p.activityAttribution(ctx, sessionID)) + p.mainServer.runtime.EmitActivityToolCallCompletedAttributed(serverName, toolName, sessionID, requestID, source, status, errorMsg, durationMs, arguments, response, responseTruncated, toolVariant, intent, contentTrust, profile, requestBytes, responseBytes, detectionText, toonOutputMetadata(toonDecisions), parentID, blockReason, p.activityAttribution(ctx, sessionID)) } } diff --git a/internal/server/mcp_code_execution.go b/internal/server/mcp_code_execution.go index 1ffc2be2f..7cf20047a 100644 --- a/internal/server/mcp_code_execution.go +++ b/internal/server/mcp_code_execution.go @@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ func (p *MCPProxyServer) handleCodeExecution(ctx context.Context, request mcp.Ca serverName, toolName, profile.IntrinsicTier(identity.Annotations, identity.Found), ) if !admitted && reason != profile.ReasonServerNotInProfile { - sandbox.profileRefusal, _ = profileToolPolicyRefusal(reason, tier, profileResolution.Policy.Cap, serverName, toolName, profileRefusalSubject(profileResolution, profileIdx)) + sandbox.profileRefusal, sandbox.profileBlockReason = profileToolPolicyRefusal(reason, tier, profileResolution.Policy.Cap, serverName, toolName, profileRefusalSubject(profileResolution, profileIdx)) } return required, rawGate } @@ -823,11 +823,21 @@ type upstreamToolCaller struct { // dispatchGate's second result carried along: false means no gate was // evaluated (a proxy without storage). type sandboxGate struct { - gate toolGate - gated bool - profileRefusal string + gate toolGate + gated bool + profileRefusal string + profileBlockReason profile.BlockReason } +// The sandbox asserts these two methods separately (jsruntime +// resolveDispatchGates). Changing ProfilePolicyRefusal's signature would +// silently stop the assertion matching and DROP nested profile refusals, so +// both are pinned at compile time. +var _ interface { + ProfilePolicyRefusal() string + ProfilePolicyBlockReason() string +} = (*sandboxGate)(nil) + func (g *sandboxGate) ProfilePolicyRefusal() string { if g == nil { return "" @@ -835,6 +845,16 @@ func (g *sandboxGate) ProfilePolicyRefusal() string { return g.profileRefusal } +// ProfilePolicyBlockReason is the typed cause (profile_tier, profile_rule, +// profile_unannotated) of the refusal ProfilePolicyRefusal reports, "" when the +// gate is not refused (Spec 108 FR-029). +func (g *sandboxGate) ProfilePolicyBlockReason() string { + if g == nil { + return "" + } + return string(g.profileBlockReason) +} + // CallTool implements jsruntime.ToolCaller. It takes the gate read itself, // for a caller that captured none (a sandbox wired with the tier-only // ToolAnnotationFunc, or a unit test driving the bridge directly). @@ -933,7 +953,7 @@ func (u *upstreamToolCaller) callTool(ctx context.Context, serverName, toolName if u.proxy != nil { u.proxy.auditAuthz(ctx, "deny", policyRefusalReasonKey(gate)) } - u.emitSubCallRefused(ctx, serverName, toolName, requestID, args, refusal, startTime, duration) + u.emitSubCallRefused(ctx, serverName, toolName, requestID, args, refusal, startTime, duration, "") return nil, refusal } if u.proxy != nil && u.proxy.dispatchGatePause != nil { @@ -979,7 +999,7 @@ func (u *upstreamToolCaller) callTool(ctx context.Context, serverName, toolName u.recordToolCall(serverName, toolName, startTime, duration, false, refusal.Error()) u.storeToolCallInHistory(serverName, toolName, args, nil, refusal, startTime, duration) u.proxy.auditAuthz(ctx, "deny", telemetry.BlockReasonToolNotCallable) - u.emitSubCallRefused(ctx, serverName, toolName, requestID, args, refusal, startTime, duration) + u.emitSubCallRefused(ctx, serverName, toolName, requestID, args, refusal, startTime, duration, "") return nil, refusal } certified = live @@ -1028,7 +1048,7 @@ func (u *upstreamToolCaller) callTool(ctx context.Context, serverName, toolName if u.proxy != nil { u.proxy.auditToolCall(ctx, "error", "", "", duration.Milliseconds(), nil, nil) } - u.emitSubCallRefused(ctx, serverName, toolName, requestID, args, refusal, startTime, duration) + u.emitSubCallRefused(ctx, serverName, toolName, requestID, args, refusal, startTime, duration, "") return nil, refusal } if err == nil { @@ -1230,17 +1250,20 @@ func subCallByteSizes(args map[string]interface{}, result interface{}) (requestB // ctx is the sub-call's context carrying its audit.Attempt (Spec 107): the // `authz deny` was written by the caller at the refusing gate, so the funnel // this goes through writes no further audit line for a blocked status. -func (u *upstreamToolCaller) emitSubCallRefused(ctx context.Context, serverName, toolName, requestID string, args map[string]interface{}, refusal error, startTime time.Time, duration time.Duration) { +// +// blockReason is the profile.BlockReason of a profile tool-policy refusal +// (Spec 108 FR-029); every other refusal passes "". +func (u *upstreamToolCaller) emitSubCallRefused(ctx context.Context, serverName, toolName, requestID string, args map[string]interface{}, refusal error, startTime time.Time, duration time.Duration, blockReason string) { if u.proxy == nil { return } - u.proxy.emitActivityToolCallCompleted(ctx, + u.proxy.emitActivityToolCallCompletedWithBlockReason(ctx, serverName, toolName, u.sessionID, requestID, string(storage.ActivitySourceInternal), storage.ActivityStatusBlocked, refusal.Error(), duration.Milliseconds(), args, "", false, // The policy gate refused this before dispatch, so there IS no response // and 0 response bytes is a true zero, not an unmeasured one. The // request was still formed and is measured like any other. - "", nil, "", "", rawByteSize(args), 0, "", nil, u.parentCallID) + "", nil, "", "", rawByteSize(args), 0, "", nil, u.parentCallID, blockReason) } // shedHasCanonicalRecord reports whether callErr is a limiter shed the From e2ecdde6a0a5863e54f6fc06a4562353f59a189b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Algis Dumbris Date: Fri, 2 Oct 2026 16:21:58 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 2/3] fix(profiles): access explain move-client hint names the destination profile (Spec 108 T167) The move-client fix printed 'mcpproxy client set-profile ' beside a label that named a concrete profile. Fix gains an additive, move_client-only profile field and the CLI prints the real command, keeping the placeholder for a daemon that predates the field. --- cmd/mcpproxy/access_cmd.go | 6 ++++- cmd/mcpproxy/access_fix_command_test.go | 18 +++++++++++++++ internal/httpapi/access_explain_route_test.go | 2 +- internal/profile/contract_test.go | 9 +++++--- .../testdata/contract/explain_blocked.json | 2 +- internal/runtime/profiles_types.go | 4 ++++ internal/server/access_explain.go | 8 +++++-- internal/server/access_explain_test.go | 22 +++++++++++++++++++ oas/docs.go | 2 +- oas/swagger.yaml | 6 +++++ 10 files changed, 70 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/cmd/mcpproxy/access_cmd.go b/cmd/mcpproxy/access_cmd.go index ddcd422d1..f35824bbf 100644 --- a/cmd/mcpproxy/access_cmd.go +++ b/cmd/mcpproxy/access_cmd.go @@ -140,7 +140,11 @@ func fixCommand(f runtime.Fix, tool string) string { case profile.FixAddServerToProfile: return fmt.Sprintf("mcpproxy profile update %s --add-server %s", f.Target, server) case profile.FixMoveClient: - return fmt.Sprintf("mcpproxy client set-profile %s ", f.Target) + dest := f.Profile + if dest == "" { + dest = "" // a daemon that predates the field + } + return fmt.Sprintf("mcpproxy client set-profile %s %s", f.Target, dest) case profile.FixEditToken: return "mcpproxy token create --name --profile " case profile.FixEnableServer: diff --git a/cmd/mcpproxy/access_fix_command_test.go b/cmd/mcpproxy/access_fix_command_test.go index 0bd5871bf..3dabcda51 100644 --- a/cmd/mcpproxy/access_fix_command_test.go +++ b/cmd/mcpproxy/access_fix_command_test.go @@ -9,6 +9,24 @@ import ( "github.com/smart-mcp-proxy/mcpproxy-go/internal/runtime" ) +// The move_client label names a concrete destination profile, so the command +// beside it must too (FR-035). A daemon that predates Fix.Profile sends none, +// and the hint then falls back to the placeholder. +func TestAccessExplain_MoveClientFixNamesDestinationProfile(t *testing.T) { + for _, tc := range []struct { + name string + fix runtime.Fix + want string + }{ + {"names destination", runtime.Fix{Action: profile.FixMoveClient, Target: "cursor", Profile: "work-full"}, "mcpproxy client set-profile cursor work-full"}, + {"old daemon, no field", runtime.Fix{Action: profile.FixMoveClient, Target: "cursor"}, "mcpproxy client set-profile cursor "}, + } { + t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) { + require.Equal(t, tc.want, fixCommand(tc.fix, "github:create_issue")) + }) + } +} + // A tool_approval failure targets one tool, so its hint must approve only that // tool: `upstream approve ` with no tool list approves every pending // tool of the server. Only a quarantined SERVER (target = the server name) is diff --git a/internal/httpapi/access_explain_route_test.go b/internal/httpapi/access_explain_route_test.go index 4d4775c2e..545ce586a 100644 --- a/internal/httpapi/access_explain_route_test.go +++ b/internal/httpapi/access_explain_route_test.go @@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ func TestAccessExplainRoute_ResponseShapeEqualsTheSharedFixture(t *testing.T) { Verdict: profile.ExplainVerdictHidden, FirstFailure: profile.StepTierCap, Fixes: []internalRuntime.Fix{ {Step: profile.StepTierCap, Action: profile.FixAllowInProfile, Target: "work-readonly", Label: "Allow github:create_issue in Work Read-only"}, - {Step: profile.StepTierCap, Action: profile.FixMoveClient, Target: "cursor", Label: "Move Cursor to Work Full"}, + {Step: profile.StepTierCap, Action: profile.FixMoveClient, Target: "cursor", Profile: "work-full", Label: "Move Cursor to Work Full"}, }, } for _, s := range profile.StepOrder() { diff --git a/internal/profile/contract_test.go b/internal/profile/contract_test.go index 84d7d0e03..5cf7f4250 100644 --- a/internal/profile/contract_test.go +++ b/internal/profile/contract_test.go @@ -109,9 +109,10 @@ func TestContractFixtures_Decode(t *testing.T) { Verdict ExplainVerdict `json:"verdict"` FirstFailure ExplainStep `json:"first_failure"` Fixes []struct { - Step ExplainStep `json:"step"` - Action FixAction `json:"action"` - Target string `json:"target"` + Step ExplainStep `json:"step"` + Action FixAction `json:"action"` + Target string `json:"target"` + Profile string `json:"profile"` } `json:"fixes"` } require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal(readFixture(t, "explain_blocked.json"), &explanation)) @@ -125,6 +126,8 @@ func TestContractFixtures_Decode(t *testing.T) { require.Equal(t, "work-readonly", explanation.Fixes[0].Target) require.Equal(t, FixMoveClient, explanation.Fixes[1].Action) require.Equal(t, "cursor", explanation.Fixes[1].Target, "move_client targets the client id") + require.Equal(t, "work-full", explanation.Fixes[1].Profile, "move_client names the destination profile slug") + require.Empty(t, explanation.Fixes[0].Profile, "only move_client carries a destination profile") }) t.Run("activity_attributed.json decodes source and block-reason enums", func(t *testing.T) { diff --git a/internal/profile/testdata/contract/explain_blocked.json b/internal/profile/testdata/contract/explain_blocked.json index 226347f5c..567fc2893 100644 --- a/internal/profile/testdata/contract/explain_blocked.json +++ b/internal/profile/testdata/contract/explain_blocked.json @@ -17,6 +17,6 @@ "first_failure": "tier_cap", "fixes": [ {"step": "tier_cap", "action": "allow_in_profile", "target": "work-readonly", "label": "Allow github:create_issue in Work Read-only"}, - {"step": "tier_cap", "action": "move_client", "target": "cursor", "label": "Move Cursor to Work Full"} + {"step": "tier_cap", "action": "move_client", "target": "cursor", "profile": "work-full", "label": "Move Cursor to Work Full"} ] } diff --git a/internal/runtime/profiles_types.go b/internal/runtime/profiles_types.go index dd0dda5c8..54733fb53 100644 --- a/internal/runtime/profiles_types.go +++ b/internal/runtime/profiles_types.go @@ -234,6 +234,10 @@ type Fix struct { Action profile.FixAction `json:"action"` Target string `json:"target"` Label string `json:"label"` + // Profile is set for move_client only: the destination profile slug the fix + // moves the client to. Target stays the client id (UIs navigate by it) and + // Label carries the title, so neither can name the slug. + Profile string `json:"profile,omitempty"` } // AccessExplanation is GET /access/explain (FR-035, data-model §7). diff --git a/internal/server/access_explain.go b/internal/server/access_explain.go index dc3c82eea..e7019f340 100644 --- a/internal/server/access_explain.go +++ b/internal/server/access_explain.go @@ -127,6 +127,10 @@ func (p *MCPProxyServer) explainFixes(ev *AccessEvaluator, subject profile.Acces add := func(action profile.FixAction, target, label string) { fixes = append(fixes, runtime.Fix{Step: step, Action: action, Target: target, Label: label}) } + // addMove is add for move_client, which also names the destination profile. + addMove := func(client, dest, label string) { + fixes = append(fixes, runtime.Fix{Step: step, Action: profile.FixMoveClient, Target: client, Profile: dest, Label: label}) + } toolID := server + ":" + tool profName := ev.res.Name if subject.Kind == profile.AccessSubjectProfile { @@ -157,7 +161,7 @@ func (p *MCPProxyServer) explainFixes(ev *AccessEvaluator, subject profile.Acces continue } if altEv.Evaluate(server, tool).Callable { - add(profile.FixMoveClient, subject.ClientID, fmt.Sprintf("Move %s to %s", clientDisplay(subject.ClientID), titleOf(cfg, other))) + addMove(subject.ClientID, other, fmt.Sprintf("Move %s to %s", clientDisplay(subject.ClientID), titleOf(cfg, other))) return } } @@ -184,7 +188,7 @@ func (p *MCPProxyServer) explainFixes(ev *AccessEvaluator, subject profile.Acces case subject.Kind == profile.AccessSubjectClient: if cfg != nil && len(cfg.Profiles) > 0 && subject.CredentialState != profile.CredentialStateNone { target := cfg.Profiles[0].Name - add(profile.FixMoveClient, subject.ClientID, fmt.Sprintf("Move %s to %s", clientDisplay(subject.ClientID), titleOf(cfg, target))) + addMove(subject.ClientID, target, fmt.Sprintf("Move %s to %s", clientDisplay(subject.ClientID), titleOf(cfg, target))) } else { add(profile.FixChangeSetting, "anonymous_profile", "Set anonymous_profile") } diff --git a/internal/server/access_explain_test.go b/internal/server/access_explain_test.go index 32f8c0bf1..a0f37805b 100644 --- a/internal/server/access_explain_test.go +++ b/internal/server/access_explain_test.go @@ -128,6 +128,10 @@ func TestExplain_FixesOrderedByPreference(t *testing.T) { for _, fix := range e.Fixes { assert.Equal(t, profile.StepTierCap, fix.Step) } + // FR-035: the destination profile slug travels with move_client only, so a + // client can print a runnable command (the label carries the title). + assert.Equal(t, "work-full", e.Fixes[1].Profile, "move_client carries the destination slug") + assert.Empty(t, e.Fixes[0].Profile, "only move_client carries a destination profile") e, err = f.proxy.Explain(context.Background(), cursor, "github:search_code") // unannotated require.NoError(t, err) @@ -150,6 +154,24 @@ func TestExplain_FixesOrderedByPreference(t *testing.T) { assert.Equal(t, "cursor", e.Subject.Name) } +// A client bound to a profile that no longer exists fails the profile step; its +// move_client fix names the destination profile too. +func TestExplain_DanglingClientBindingMoveFixNamesDestination(t *testing.T) { + f := newProfilesV3RESTFixture(t, nil) + f.mintClient("cursor", "work-readonly", auth.ProfileModeLocked) + updated := *f.rt.Config() + updated.Profiles = append([]config.ProfileConfig(nil), updated.Profiles[1:]...) + f.rt.UpdateConfig(&updated, "") + + e, err := f.proxy.Explain(context.Background(), profile.AccessSubject{Kind: profile.AccessSubjectClient, ClientID: "cursor"}, "github:list_issues") + require.NoError(t, err) + require.Equal(t, profile.StepProfile, e.FirstFailure) + require.NotEmpty(t, e.Fixes) + assert.Equal(t, profile.FixMoveClient, e.Fixes[0].Action) + assert.Equal(t, "cursor", e.Fixes[0].Target) + assert.Equal(t, updated.Profiles[0].Name, e.Fixes[0].Profile) +} + func TestExplain_ProfileSubjectOffersNoMoveClient(t *testing.T) { f := newProfilesV3RESTFixture(t, nil) e, err := f.proxy.Explain(context.Background(), profile.AccessSubject{Kind: profile.AccessSubjectProfile, Profile: "work-readonly"}, "github:create_issue") diff --git a/oas/docs.go b/oas/docs.go index 4e781074f..02a6ecfd9 100644 --- a/oas/docs.go +++ b/oas/docs.go @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ import "github.com/swaggo/swag/v2" const docTemplate = `{ "schemes": {{ marshal .Schemes }}, - "components": {"schemas":{"config.AuditLogConfig":{"description":"AuditLog configures the Spec 107 edition-neutral audit sink\n(internal/audit). nil means \"use the per-edition/per-transport\ndefault\" (EffectiveAuditLog); restart-pinned (bound at sink\nconstruction). See audit_log.go.","properties":{"compress":{"type":"boolean"},"enabled":{"type":"boolean"},"max_age_days":{"type":"integer"},"max_backups":{"type":"integer"},"max_size_mb":{"type":"integer"},"path":{"type":"string"},"stdout":{"type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"},"config.ConcurrencyDefaults":{"description":"ServerConcurrencyDefaults is scope (b) of FR-020: the blanket per-server\ndefault set inherited by every server that does not override a setting.\nAbsent (the default) = no per-server limiting unless a server configures\nit explicitly. File/API-configured only — no env scheme (FR-022).","properties":{"max_concurrent_requests":{"type":"integer"},"queue_size":{"type":"integer"},"queue_timeout":{"type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"config.Config":{"properties":{"activity_cleanup_interval_min":{"description":"Background cleanup interval in minutes (default: 60)","type":"integer"},"activity_max_records":{"description":"Max records before pruning (default: 100000)","type":"integer"},"activity_max_response_size":{"description":"Response truncation limit in bytes (default: 65536)","type":"integer"},"activity_max_size_mb":{"description":"ActivityMaxSizeMB caps the total activity-log size in MB before the\noldest records are pruned. Omit the key for the 256MB default; set it to\n0 to disable the size cap.","type":"integer"},"activity_retention_days":{"description":"Activity logging settings (RFC-003)","type":"integer"},"aggregate_upstream_prompts":{"description":"AggregateUpstreamPrompts, when true, aggregates every connected upstream\nserver's advertised MCP prompts into mcpproxy's own prompts/list\n(exposed as \"\u003cserver\u003e__\u003cprompt\u003e\"). OFF by default: users are safe by\ndefault and opt in deliberately. EnablePrompts still governs the built-in\nprompts + the prompts capability; this flag gates ONLY the upstream\naggregation performed by RefreshPrompts. Hot-reloadable.","type":"boolean"},"allow_private_registry_fetch":{"description":"AllowPrivateRegistryFetch opts out of the registry SSRF guard (MCP-1076,\nCWE-918). By default (false) registry fetches refuse any host that is — or\nresolves to — a non-routable address (loopback, RFC1918/CGNAT private,\nlink-local incl. the 169.254.169.254 cloud-metadata endpoint), so a\nmalicious or typo'd registry source cannot turn the daemon into a\nrequest-forgery vector against internal services.\n\nThis opt-out is BLANKET (all-or-nothing): setting it true disables the\nguard for EVERY non-routable range at once — loopback, RFC1918/CGNAT\nprivate, link-local AND the 169.254.169.254 cloud-metadata endpoint. There\nis no way to allow only loopback; enabling it for a localhost dev registry\nalso re-opens the cloud-metadata SSRF vector. Set true ONLY when you\nintentionally run a trusted registry mirror on an internal/private address,\nideally on a host with no cloud-metadata exposure. The change takes effect\nonly on daemon (re)start or config reload.","type":"boolean"},"allow_server_add":{"type":"boolean"},"allow_server_remove":{"type":"boolean"},"anonymous_profile":{"description":"AnonymousProfile confines every caller whose request authenticates as\ncredential kind \"anonymous\" (no credential, or an unrecognised\nnon-agent token accepted by the require_mcp_auth:false back-compat\nbranch) to the named profile (Spec 108 FR-008). Empty (default) means\nunconfined, legacy anonymous behaviour. A name that does not match any\nconfigured profile resolves anonymous callers to deny-all and is\nreported as a validation warning (data-model.md §1).","type":"string"},"api_key":{"description":"Security settings","type":"string"},"audit_log":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.AuditLogConfig"},"call_tool_timeout":{"type":"string"},"check_server_repo":{"description":"Repository detection settings","type":"boolean"},"code_execution_max_parallel":{"description":"Default concurrency for call_tools() batches (1-32, default: 8)","type":"integer"},"code_execution_max_tool_calls":{"description":"Max tool calls per execution (0 = unlimited, default: 0)","type":"integer"},"code_execution_pool_size":{"description":"JavaScript runtime pool size (default: 10)","type":"integer"},"code_execution_timeout_ms":{"description":"Timeout in milliseconds (default: 120000, max: 600000)","type":"integer"},"data_dir":{"type":"string"},"debug_search":{"type":"boolean"},"direct_tool_response_mode":{"description":"DirectToolResponseMode selects the serialization of the DIRECT\nenumeration surface (Spec 102). Valid values: \"\" (= full), \"full\"\n(default: today's schema-bearing entries), \"deferred\" (description +\ncompact signature, with a minimal permissive input schema; upstream\ninputSchema and outputSchema are stripped and recovered on demand via\ndescribe_tool).\n\nDeliberately NOT an extension of tool_response_mode: reusing that axis\nwould silently change /mcp/all output for every deployment already\nrunning compact, which FR-015 forbids. Serialization-only — it never\nchanges WHICH tools are listed, only how (FR-008). Hot-reloadable.","type":"string"},"disable_management":{"type":"boolean"},"docker_isolation":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.DockerIsolationConfig"},"docker_recovery":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.DockerRecoveryConfig"},"enable_code_execution":{"description":"Code execution settings","type":"boolean"},"enable_prompts":{"description":"Prompts settings","type":"boolean"},"enable_socket":{"description":"Enable Unix socket/named pipe for local IPC (default: true)","type":"boolean"},"enable_tray":{"description":"Deprecated: EnableTray is unused and has no runtime effect. Kept for backward compatibility.","type":"boolean"},"environment":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/secureenv.EnvConfig"},"features":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.FeatureFlags"},"forward_client_headers":{"description":"ForwardClientHeaders is the global switch for client header forwarding\n(Spec 112): copying allowlisted headers from the inbound /mcp request into\nthe upstream tools/call request. nil (absent) means enabled; because every\nper-server forward_headers allowlist is empty by default, the default\nforwards nothing. false disables forwarding for every server. Read via\nIsClientHeaderForwardingEnabled(); MCPPROXY_FORWARD_CLIENT_HEADERS\noverrides it for the process. Distinct from ForwardedHeaders/trusted_proxies\n(Spec 107), which trusts inbound X-Forwarded-*.","type":"boolean"},"forward_proxy_env":{"description":"ForwardProxyEnv opts in to forwarding the ambient HTTP(S)/ALL/NO/FTP proxy\nenvironment variables to spawned stdio upstream servers (MCP-2769). OFF by\ndefault: proxy URLs commonly embed credentials (http://user:pass@proxy), so\nforwarding them to every upstream is a credential-leak risk. When enabled,\nvalues are forwarded with their userinfo (credentials) redacted.","type":"boolean"},"health_check_interval":{"description":"Discovery \u0026 health-check cadence (spec 074, #608). Both are *Duration\ntri-state pointers: nil = inherit the built-in default; a pointer to 0s =\nthe loop is disabled; a positive value = that interval. Defaults live only\nin the resolvers (ResolveHealthCheckInterval / ResolveToolDiscoveryInterval)\nso an unset key behaves exactly as before this feature (SC-005). Validated\nin Validate(): health-check ∈ {0} ∪ [5s,1h]; tool-discovery ∈ {0} ∪ [30s,24h].","type":"string"},"http_idle_timeout":{"description":"HTTPIdleTimeout caps how long an idle keep-alive connection is kept open.\nUnset = 180s. \"0s\" removes the dedicated idle deadline, but net/http then\nfalls back to ReadTimeout — idle is fully unbounded only when\nhttp_read_timeout is also \"0s\". Requires a restart.","type":"string"},"http_read_timeout":{"description":"HTTPReadTimeout caps how long reading a whole request (headers + body)\nmay take. Unset = 120s; \"0s\" disables it. Requires a restart.","type":"string"},"http_write_timeout":{"description":"HTTPWriteTimeout caps how long producing a whole response may take on\nnon-streaming endpoints (REST, Web UI, health). Unset = 120s; \"0s\"\ndisables it globally. MCP and SSE /events routes are exempt by design.","type":"string"},"init_timeout":{"description":"InitTimeout is the global default deadline for an upstream's MCP\n` + "`" + `initialize` + "`" + ` handshake (MCP-3322 / GH #760). *Duration tri-state: nil =\ninherit the built-in 30s default; a positive value = that deadline. A\nper-server InitTimeout overrides this. Resolved by ResolveInitTimeout;\nvalidated to {0} ∪ [1s, 30m] in Validate(). Servers doing legitimate\nfirst-run warmup (cache/index build) before answering ` + "`" + `initialize` + "`" + ` can\nraise this so they are not killed mid-startup.","type":"string"},"instructions":{"description":"Instructions text returned in the MCP initialize response to guide AI agents.\nWhen empty, a built-in default is used that explains retrieve_tools workflow.","type":"string"},"intent_declaration":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.IntentDeclarationConfig"},"listen":{"type":"string"},"logging":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.LogConfig"},"max_concurrent_requests":{"description":"Concurrency limits (spec 093, GH #955). Scope (a) of FR-020: the GLOBAL\nAGGREGATE limiter — one proxy-wide cap on concurrently running upstream\ntool calls, with its own bounded wait queue. Tri-state pointers: absent =\nthe limiter does not exist (default, zero behavior change); an explicit 0\nmax also disables it; positive = that cap. This scope is NEVER a\nper-server inheritance source — per-server values come from\nServerConcurrencyDefaults / the per-server overrides — but a server's\neffective concurrency is bounded by BOTH its own limiter and this one.\nResolved by ResolveGlobalConcurrency; hot-reloadable; overridable via\nMCPPROXY_MAX_CONCURRENT_REQUESTS / _QUEUE_SIZE / _QUEUE_TIMEOUT (FR-022).","type":"integer"},"max_result_size_chars":{"description":"MaxResultSizeChars is advertised on every tool as\n` + "`" + `_meta.anthropic/maxResultSizeChars` + "`" + `; it raises Claude Code's\ninline-response ceiling from 50k to up to 500k chars. Omit the key for\nthe 500000 default; set it to 0 to disable the annotation.","type":"integer"},"mcpServers":{"items":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.ServerConfig"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"oauth_expiry_warning_hours":{"description":"Health status settings","type":"number"},"observability":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.ObservabilityConfig"},"output_sanitisation":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.OutputSanitisationConfig"},"output_validation":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.OutputValidationConfig"},"profiles":{"description":"Profiles are optional named, server-scoped views exposed at /mcp/p/\u003cname\u003e\n(Spec 057). Absent/empty is fully supported — /mcp is unchanged and configs\nwithout this key serialize byte-identically (SC-004).","items":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.ProfileConfig"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"quarantine_enabled":{"description":"QuarantineEnabled controls whether quarantine is active. It gates two\nthings together:\n 1. Server-level auto-quarantine for newly added servers (issue #370).\n When true, servers added via the upstream_servers MCP tool or the\n REST API default to quarantined=true; when false, they default to\n quarantined=false. Explicit per-request values always win.\n 2. Tool-level quarantine (Spec 032): per-tool SHA-256 approval of\n tool descriptions/schemas.\nWhen nil (default), quarantine is enabled (secure by default). Set to\nexplicit false to opt out of both. Per-server SkipQuarantine still\napplies for the tool-level check on individual servers.","type":"boolean"},"queue_size":{"type":"integer"},"queue_timeout":{"type":"string"},"read_only_mode":{"type":"boolean"},"registries":{"description":"Registries configuration for MCP server discovery","items":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.RegistryEntry"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"registries_locked":{"description":"RegistriesLocked is an enterprise stub knob (MCP-866): when true, runtime\nadditions of custom registries (e.g. ` + "`" + `registry add-source` + "`" + `, the REST/MCP\nadd-source surface) are rejected so an administrator can pin the discovery\nsources. Built-in defaults are unaffected. Documented but otherwise inert\nbeyond the add-source rejection.","type":"boolean"},"require_mcp_auth":{"description":"Require authentication on /mcp endpoint (default: false)","type":"boolean"},"reveal_secret_headers":{"description":"RevealSecretHeaders, when true, disables the redaction of the\nsecret-bearing server fields — sensitive header values (Authorization,\nX-API-Key, Cookie, …), env-var secrets, and URL query credentials — in\nresponses from the ` + "`" + `upstream_servers` + "`" + ` MCP tool, the ` + "`" + `/api/v1/servers` + "`" + `\nREST API, and the SSE event stream. It also lets URL secrets echoed\ninto last_error / health.detail through unscrubbed.\n\nDefault false — sensitive values are surfaced masked as\n` + "`" + `••••\u003clast2\u003e (\u003cN\u003e chars)` + "`" + ` (error strings use ` + "`" + `***REDACTED***` + "`" + `) so an\nMCP agent cannot read Bearer tokens / API keys / URL secrets out of\nanother upstream's config (PR #425, issue #872). ${env:…}/${keyring:…}\nreferences are labels, not secrets, and pass through unchanged.\n\nThe Web UI / macOS tray edit forms work without seeing the real\nvalues: PATCH /api/v1/servers/{id} deep-merges (omitted keys are\npreserved, see ` + "`" + `headers_remove` + "`" + ` / ` + "`" + `env_remove` + "`" + ` for explicit\ndeletes), so clients compute a diff and only send the keys that\nactually changed. Redacted-but-unchanged values never round-trip\n— the backend keeps the real string. Set this to true if a\ndownstream tool genuinely needs raw values in the response.","type":"boolean"},"routing_mode":{"description":"Routing mode (Spec 031): how MCP tools are exposed to clients\nValid values: \"retrieve_tools\" (default), \"direct\", \"code_execution\"","type":"string"},"security":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.SecurityConfig"},"sensitive_data_detection":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.SensitiveDataDetectionConfig"},"server_concurrency_defaults":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.ConcurrencyDefaults"},"telemetry":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.TelemetryConfig"},"tls":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.TLSConfig"},"tokenizer":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.TokenizerConfig"},"tool_call_max_records_per_server":{"description":"Calls retained per server (default: 1000)","type":"integer"},"tool_call_max_response_size":{"description":"Bounds for the per-server tool-call history behind GET /api/v1/tool-calls\n(#1176). It is a recent-debugging window, not an audit log — the activity\nlog is the durable record — and it kept every upstream response whole,\nper server, forever. A non-positive value means \"use the default\", not\n\"disable\": this store must never be unbounded again, so there is\ndeliberately no off switch.","type":"integer"},"tool_discovery_interval":{"type":"string"},"tool_response_limit":{"type":"integer"},"tool_response_mode":{"description":"Tool response mode (Spec 085): how retrieve_tools serializes results.\nValid values: \"\" (= full), \"full\" (default: today's schema-bearing\nentries), \"compact\" (signature + first-sentence entries). Orthogonal to\nrouting_mode — routing_mode selects the tool SURFACE, this selects the\nSERIALIZATION within the retrieve_tools surface. Serialization-only: it\nnever affects the query, ranking, or result set. Hot-reloadable.","type":"string"},"tool_response_session_risk_warning":{"description":"ToolResponseSessionRiskWarning controls whether the prose ` + "`" + `warning` + "`" + ` field\nis included in the ` + "`" + `session_risk` + "`" + ` object returned by ` + "`" + `retrieve_tools` + "`" + `.\nThe structured fields (level, lethal_trifecta, has_open_world_tools, etc.)\nare always included. Default: false (quiet for LLM clients) — see issue #406.\nMost tools lack annotations, so the MCP-spec defaults treat them as fully\npermissive across all three risk axes, which makes the prose warning fire\non almost every call and wastes tokens.","type":"boolean"},"tools_limit":{"type":"integer"},"toon_min_savings_pct":{"description":"ToonMinSavingsPct is the minimum byte-savings percentage (validated\n1-90; 0/unset → 15) the complete TOON emission (marker + hint + body)\nmust achieve over the exact passthrough emission for adaptive mode to\nencode a block. Byte savings approximate token savings for the tabular\npayload class; the spec-083 profiler reports true token deltas.\nGlobal-only (no per-server override, FR-001).","type":"integer"},"toon_output":{"description":"ToonOutput selects the TOON encoding mode for call_tool_* result text\nblocks (spec 084): \"off\" (default — responses byte-identical to\npre-feature behavior), \"adaptive\" (encode only tabular-uniform payloads\nthat beat compact JSON by ToonMinSavingsPct), or \"always\"\n(benchmark/debug only — encodes every JSON-parseable block and can\nINCREASE token cost). Per-server override: ServerConfig.ToonOutput.\nResolved by ResolveToonOutput; hot-reloadable.","type":"string"},"top_k":{"description":"Deprecated: TopK is superseded by ToolsLimit and has no runtime effect. Kept for backward compatibility.","type":"integer"},"tray_endpoint":{"description":"Tray endpoint override (unix:// or npipe://)","type":"string"},"trusted_hosts":{"description":"TrustedHosts lists non-loopback Host header values accepted on loopback\nlisteners (GH #898). DNS-rebinding protection rejects requests whose Host\nheader is not a loopback address when mcpproxy listens on loopback; a\nreverse proxy (nginx → 127.0.0.1) forwarding the public domain in Host\ntrips it. Entries are hostnames, case-insensitive; an entry without a\nport matches any port, with a port it must match exactly; a leading dot\n(\".example.com\") is a subdomain wildcard. The single entry \"*\" disables\nHost and Origin validation entirely. The same list also validates the\nOrigin header when present (MCP spec DNS-rebinding defense). Empty\n(default) keeps full protection. Env override: MCPPROXY_TRUSTED_HOSTS\n(comma-separated).","items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"trusted_proxies":{"description":"TrustedProxies lists the CIDRs or IP addresses whose X-Forwarded-For /\nX-Real-IP / X-Forwarded-Proto / X-Forwarded-Host headers are believed\n(Spec 107 FR-027). Empty (default) trusts nobody. Edition-neutral, live\n(hot-reloadable). Env override: MCPPROXY_TRUSTED_PROXIES (comma-separated).\nThe one reader is ForwardedHeaders; validation is validateTrustedProxies.","items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"update_check":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.UpdateCheckConfig"}},"type":"object"},"config.CustomPattern":{"properties":{"category":{"description":"Category (defaults to \"custom\")","type":"string"},"keywords":{"description":"Keywords to match (mutually exclusive with Regex)","items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"name":{"description":"Unique identifier for this pattern","type":"string"},"regex":{"description":"Regex pattern (mutually exclusive with Keywords)","type":"string"},"severity":{"description":"Risk level: critical, high, medium, low","type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"config.DeepScanConfig":{"description":"DeepScan is the opt-in \"deep scan\" layer (Spec 077 US3). It subsumes the\ndeprecated top-level scanner_fetch_package_source / scanner_disable_no_new_privileges\nkeys (migrated on load) and gates the heavy Docker-based scanners + source\nextraction. Disabled by default (FR-006): only the deterministic in-process\nbaseline scanner runs. A deep-scan failure NEVER changes the baseline verdict\n(FR-007/FR-008).","properties":{"disable_no_new_privileges":{"description":"DisableNoNewPrivileges, when true, omits the ` + "`" + `--security-opt\nno-new-privileges` + "`" + ` flag from scanner container runs (snap-docker/AppArmor\nescape hatch). Absorbs the deprecated top-level\nscanner_disable_no_new_privileges. Default false.","type":"boolean"},"enabled":{"description":"Enabled is the master opt-in for the heavy layer (FR-006). Default false.","type":"boolean"},"fetch_package_source":{"description":"FetchPackageSource controls whether the scanner fetches the PUBLISHED\nsource of package-runner servers (npx/uvx) — without executing it — when\nno local source is available. Absorbs the deprecated top-level\nscanner_fetch_package_source. Default (nil) is ENABLED within deep scan.","type":"boolean"},"scanners":{"description":"Scanners optionally restricts which deep scanners may run under the\numbrella (by scanner id). Empty ⇒ all enabled deep scanners are eligible.","items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false}},"type":"object"},"config.DockerIsolationConfig":{"description":"Docker isolation settings","properties":{"cpu_limit":{"description":"CPU limit for containers","type":"string"},"default_images":{"additionalProperties":{"type":"string"},"description":"Map of runtime type to Docker image","type":"object"},"enable_cache_volume":{"description":"Mount shared cache volumes for faster restarts (default: true)","type":"boolean"},"enabled":{"description":"Global enable/disable for Docker isolation (legacy; superseded by Mode)","type":"boolean"},"extra_args":{"description":"Additional docker run arguments","items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"log_driver":{"description":"Docker log driver (default: json-file)","type":"string"},"log_max_files":{"description":"Maximum number of log files (default: 3)","type":"string"},"log_max_size":{"description":"Maximum size of log files (default: 100m)","type":"string"},"memory_limit":{"description":"Memory limit for containers","type":"string"},"mode":{"description":"Isolation mode: \"docker\" | \"sandbox\" | \"none\" (MCP-34.2). Unset per-server inherits the global mode; unset globally falls back to the legacy \"enabled\" flag (true ⇒ docker, false ⇒ none)","type":"string","x-enum-varnames":["IsolationModeDocker","IsolationModeSandbox","IsolationModeNone"]},"network_mode":{"description":"Docker network mode (default: bridge)","type":"string"},"registry":{"description":"Custom registry (defaults to docker.io)","type":"string"},"timeout":{"description":"Container startup timeout","type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"config.DockerRecoveryConfig":{"description":"Docker recovery settings","properties":{"enabled":{"description":"Enable Docker recovery monitoring (default: true)","type":"boolean"},"max_retries":{"description":"Maximum retry attempts (0 = unlimited)","type":"integer"},"notify_on_failure":{"description":"Show notification on recovery failure (default: true)","type":"boolean"},"notify_on_retry":{"description":"Show notification on each retry (default: false)","type":"boolean"},"notify_on_start":{"description":"Show notification when recovery starts (default: true)","type":"boolean"},"notify_on_success":{"description":"Show notification on successful recovery (default: true)","type":"boolean"},"persistent_state":{"description":"Save recovery state across restarts (default: true)","type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"},"config.FeatureFlags":{"description":"Deprecated: Features flags are unused and have no runtime effect. Kept for backward compatibility.","properties":{"enable_async_storage":{"type":"boolean"},"enable_caching":{"type":"boolean"},"enable_contract_tests":{"type":"boolean"},"enable_debug_logging":{"description":"Development features","type":"boolean"},"enable_docker_isolation":{"type":"boolean"},"enable_event_bus":{"type":"boolean"},"enable_health_checks":{"type":"boolean"},"enable_metrics":{"type":"boolean"},"enable_oauth":{"description":"Security features","type":"boolean"},"enable_observability":{"description":"Observability features","type":"boolean"},"enable_quarantine":{"type":"boolean"},"enable_runtime":{"description":"Runtime features","type":"boolean"},"enable_search":{"description":"Storage features","type":"boolean"},"enable_sse":{"type":"boolean"},"enable_tracing":{"type":"boolean"},"enable_tray":{"type":"boolean"},"enable_web_ui":{"description":"UI features","type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"},"config.IntentDeclarationConfig":{"description":"Intent declaration settings (Spec 018)","properties":{"strict_server_validation":{"description":"StrictServerValidation controls whether server annotation mismatches\ncause rejection (true) or just warnings (false).\nDefault: true (reject mismatches)","type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"},"config.IsolationConfig":{"description":"Per-server isolation settings","properties":{"enabled":{"description":"Enable Docker isolation for this server (nil = inherit global; legacy, superseded by Mode)","type":"boolean"},"extra_args":{"description":"Additional docker run arguments for this server","items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"image":{"description":"Custom Docker image (overrides default)","type":"string"},"log_driver":{"description":"Docker log driver override for this server","type":"string"},"log_max_files":{"description":"Maximum number of log files override","type":"string"},"log_max_size":{"description":"Maximum size of log files override","type":"string"},"mode":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.IsolationMode"},"network_mode":{"description":"Custom network mode for this server","type":"string"},"working_dir":{"description":"Custom working directory in container","type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"config.IsolationMode":{"description":"Isolation mode: \"docker\" | \"sandbox\" | \"none\" (MCP-34.2). Unset per-server inherits the global mode; unset globally falls back to the legacy \"enabled\" flag (true ⇒ docker, false ⇒ none)","type":"string","x-enum-varnames":["IsolationModeDocker","IsolationModeSandbox","IsolationModeNone"]},"config.LogConfig":{"description":"Logging configuration","properties":{"compress":{"type":"boolean"},"enable_console":{"type":"boolean"},"enable_file":{"type":"boolean"},"filename":{"type":"string"},"json_format":{"type":"boolean"},"level":{"type":"string"},"log_dir":{"description":"Custom log directory","type":"string"},"max_age":{"description":"days","type":"integer"},"max_backups":{"description":"number of backup files","type":"integer"},"max_size":{"description":"MB","type":"integer"}},"type":"object"},"config.MetricsExporterConfig":{"description":"Metrics gates the Prometheus /metrics scrape endpoint (MCP-32). Disabled\nby default — operators opt in for k8s/enterprise deployments.","properties":{"enabled":{"description":"Enabled exposes /metrics on the existing HTTP listener when true.\nThe endpoint is admin-authenticated (SEC-07): scrapers must present the\nglobal API key, via X-API-Key or an Authorization: Bearer header.","type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"},"config.OAuthConfig":{"description":"OAuth configuration (keep even when empty to signal OAuth requirement)","properties":{"client_id":{"type":"string"},"client_secret":{"type":"string"},"extra_params":{"additionalProperties":{"type":"string"},"description":"Additional OAuth parameters (e.g., RFC 8707 resource)","type":"object"},"pkce_enabled":{"type":"boolean"},"redirect_uri":{"type":"string"},"scopes":{"items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false}},"type":"object"},"config.ObservabilityConfig":{"description":"Observability settings (Spec 069): usage aggregate cache/persistence cadence.","properties":{"metrics":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.MetricsExporterConfig"},"tracing":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.TracingExporterConfig"},"usage_cache_ttl":{"description":"UsageCacheTTL bounds the freshness of the usage endpoint's read cache for\nwide windows (FR-005). Default 5s.","type":"string"},"usage_persist_interval":{"description":"UsagePersistInterval is how often the actor-owned usage aggregate snapshot\nis flushed to storage. Default 30s.","type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"config.OutputSanitisationConfig":{"description":"Output sanitisation settings (Spec 054 Track B)","properties":{"max_redactions":{"description":"cap on redactions per response; default 100","type":"integer"},"response_action":{"description":"\"spotlight\" | \"redact\" | \"block\"; default \"spotlight\"","type":"string"},"spotlight_untrusted":{"description":"wrap untrusted output in spotlight markers; default true","type":"boolean"},"strip_classes":{"description":"classes to strip: ansi/c0c1/bidi/zero_width","items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"strip_control_chars":{"description":"strip control-character classes; default false","type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"},"config.OutputValidationConfig":{"description":"Output-schema validation settings (Spec 056)","properties":{"max_bytes":{"description":"structured payload byte cap; default 5\u003c\u003c20","type":"integer"},"max_depth":{"description":"nesting depth cap; default 64","type":"integer"},"missing_structured_content":{"description":"\"allow\" | \"block\"; default \"allow\"","type":"string"},"mode":{"description":"\"off\" | \"warn\" | \"strict\"; default \"warn\"","type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"config.ProfileConfig":{"properties":{"code_execution":{"description":"CodeExecution: nil = inherit the global enable_code_execution gate;\nnon-nil narrows it (a profile can only narrow, never widen, FR-006).","type":"boolean"},"description":{"description":"\u003c= 500 chars (FR-001)","type":"string"},"management_tools":{"description":"ManagementTools: nil = legacy/inherit (FR-016); non-nil sets the\nprofile-level visibility of upstream_servers/quarantine_security.","type":"boolean"},"max_tier":{"description":"MaxTier caps the tier a tool may run at under this profile: \"\" (no\ncap) | \"read\" | \"write\" | \"destructive\" (FR-001).","type":"string"},"name":{"description":"slug (Spec 057 rules unchanged)","type":"string"},"servers":{"description":"references to mcpServers[].name","items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"switchable_to":{"description":"SwitchableTo is the list of profile names a session under this\nprofile may ` + "`" + `set_profile` + "`" + ` into (FR-022). nil = legacy/none (research\nD6); a non-nil EMPTY list is an explicit \"none\" and must round-trip as\n` + "`" + `[]` + "`" + `, never be dropped by omitempty — hence the pointer (see the\nMarshalJSON note below, and profiles_v3_test.go's switchable_to round\ntrip case).","items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"title":{"description":"display only, \u003c= 80 chars (FR-001)","type":"string"},"tools":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.ProfileToolRules"},"unannotated":{"description":"Unannotated is this profile's handling of a tool whose effective\nannotations carry no tier hint: \"\" (unset, see EffectiveUnannotated) |\n\"deny\" | \"as_write\" | \"as_read\" (FR-001, FR-003).","type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"config.ProfileToolRules":{"description":"Tools holds the allow/deny/classify rule set (FR-001, FR-004, FR-005).","properties":{"allow":{"items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"classify":{"additionalProperties":{"type":"string"},"type":"object"},"deny":{"items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false}},"type":"object"},"config.RegistryEntry":{"properties":{"count":{"description":"number or string","type":"string"},"description":{"type":"string"},"id":{"type":"string"},"name":{"type":"string"},"protocol":{"type":"string"},"provenance":{"description":"Provenance is the trust tag for this registry (MCP-866):\nRegistryProvenanceOfficial for built-in defaults, RegistryProvenanceCustom\nfor user-added registries. It is authoritatively (re)computed by the\nregistries merge from whether the ID is a shipped default — a user cannot\nclaim \"official\" by writing it into their config.","type":"string"},"requires_key":{"description":"RequiresKey marks a registry that needs an API key to be queried. When\ntrue and no key is configured, the registry is skipped/marked unavailable\nrather than failing the whole search (FR-008).","type":"boolean"},"servers_url":{"type":"string"},"tags":{"items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"url":{"type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"config.SecurityConfig":{"description":"Security scanner settings (Spec 039)","properties":{"auto_baseline_scan":{"description":"AutoBaselineScan is the kill-switch for the AUTOMATIC, informational\nPass-1 baseline scan: the free in-process TPA scan mcpproxy runs for every\nnewly admitted server (any trust mode) and, once per installation, over\npre-existing servers that have never been scanned.\n\nInformational ONLY: the resulting verdict populates the security badge and\nthe scan summary, and NEVER gates quarantine or approval. The\ntrust_mode:\"scan\" admission gate is a separate path and is unaffected by\nthis flag.\n\nDefault (nil) is ENABLED. Set to false to suppress every automatic scan\n(manual scans keep working). Env override: MCPPROXY_AUTO_BASELINE_SCAN,\nwhich wins over this field on every path.","type":"boolean"},"deep_scan":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.DeepScanConfig"},"integrity_check_interval":{"type":"string"},"integrity_check_on_restart":{"type":"boolean"},"runtime_read_only":{"type":"boolean"},"runtime_tmpfs_size":{"type":"string"},"scan_timeout_default":{"type":"string"},"scanner_disable_no_new_privileges":{"description":"Deprecated (Spec 077 US3): migrated on load into DeepScan.DisableNoNewPrivileges\n(see migrateDeepScanConfig). Retained only so existing configs that still carry\nthe top-level key parse; consumers MUST read the effective value via\nSecurityConfig.IsDisableNoNewPrivileges. Cleared after migration.\n\nScannerDisableNoNewPrivileges, when true, omits the\n` + "`" + `--security-opt no-new-privileges` + "`" + ` flag from scanner container runs.\n\nBackground: snap-installed Docker on Ubuntu confines dockerd under the\n` + "`" + `snap.docker.dockerd` + "`" + ` AppArmor profile. When runc tries to transition\nthe container into the inner ` + "`" + `docker-default` + "`" + ` profile to exec the\nentrypoint, AppArmor refuses the transition because NO_NEW_PRIVS\nforbids privilege/profile changes on exec — the result is EPERM\n(\"operation not permitted\") and every scanner fails immediately.\n\nSet this to true ONLY on hosts hitting that incompatibility. Scanner\ncontainers still run with read-only rootfs, tmpfs /tmp, no-network by\ndefault, and read-only source mounts, so the marginal isolation loss\nis small. The preferred fix remains replacing snap docker with a\ndistro-packaged docker.","type":"boolean"},"scanner_fetch_package_source":{"description":"Deprecated (Spec 077 US3): migrated on load into DeepScan.FetchPackageSource\n(see migrateDeepScanConfig). Retained only so existing configs that still carry\nthe top-level key parse; consumers MUST read the effective value via\nSecurityConfig.EffectiveFetchPackageSource. Cleared after migration.\n\nScannerFetchPackageSource controls whether the scanner fetches the\nPUBLISHED source of package-runner servers (npx/uvx) — without executing\nit — when no local source is available (no Docker container, no local\npackage cache, no working_dir). This is the primary quarantine/scan\ntarget: a quarantined-on-add server is never run locally, so without this\nthe scan degrades to tool-definitions-only (no real source-level\nanalysis). See MCP-2206.\n\nFetching uses ` + "`" + `npm pack --ignore-scripts` + "`" + ` (npm) and ` + "`" + `uv pip download` + "`" + ` /\n` + "`" + `pip download` + "`" + ` with ` + "`" + `--only-binary=:all:` + "`" + ` (Python), which only download +\nunpack archives and NEVER run install, build, or setup.py — a scanner must\nnot execute the untrusted code it is scanning. The Python\n` + "`" + `--only-binary=:all:` + "`" + ` flag is required because downloading an sdist would\ninvoke its build backend (setup.py); packages with no wheel fall back to\ntool-definitions-only instead. Extraction is hardened against path\ntraversal and decompression bombs.\n\nDefault (nil) is ENABLED. Set to false on air-gapped deployments to\nforbid the scanner's network egress; such servers then fall back to the\ntool-definitions-only scan with no regression.","type":"boolean"},"scanner_registry_url":{"type":"string"},"tpa_bundle_path":{"description":"TPABundlePath is the filesystem path to the tpa-db scanner-bundle.json\nthe offline TPA scanner runs (spec 086 FR-019: the signature-DB location\nMUST be configuration-driven, not hardcoded). Empty (the default) runs the\ncorpus embedded in this build.\n\nEnv override: MCPPROXY_TPA_BUNDLE_PATH. Hot-reloadable — the path is\nre-read on every config.reloaded event via\nscanner.Service.ApplySecurityConfig, so a corpus refresh needs no restart.\nA configured bundle that fails to read/parse/version-check/compile is\nREFUSED and the previously active corpus stays live (fail-closed, never\nfail-empty); the reason is logged and surfaced in the security overview's\nsignature_bundle.load_error.","type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"config.SensitiveDataDetectionConfig":{"description":"Sensitive data detection settings (Spec 026)","properties":{"categories":{"additionalProperties":{"type":"boolean"},"description":"Enable/disable specific detection categories","type":"object"},"custom_patterns":{"description":"User-defined detection patterns","items":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.CustomPattern"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"enabled":{"description":"Enable sensitive data detection (default: true)","type":"boolean"},"entropy_threshold":{"description":"Shannon entropy threshold for high-entropy detection (default: 4.5)","type":"number"},"max_payload_size_kb":{"description":"Max size to scan before truncating (default: 1024)","type":"integer"},"scan_requests":{"description":"Scan tool call arguments (default: true)","type":"boolean"},"scan_responses":{"description":"Scan tool responses (default: true)","type":"boolean"},"sensitive_keywords":{"description":"Keywords to flag","items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false}},"type":"object"},"config.ServerConfig":{"properties":{"args":{"items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"auto_approve_tool_changes":{"description":"AutoApproveToolChanges is the per-server intent to auto-approve tool\nchanges/additions (disabling per-server rug-pull protection). Supersedes\nskip_quarantine. MCP-2930 only ACCEPTS, persists, and migrates this flag — it\nis NOT yet consulted at runtime; auto-approval is still governed by\nSkipQuarantine until the trust-baseline behavior change (MCP-2931) migrates the\nruntime consumers onto it.\nTri-state pointer (mirrors QuarantineEnabled): nil = unset (inherit/migrate\nfrom legacy skip_quarantine), explicit true/false = honored as-is so an\nexplicit auto_approve_tool_changes:false overrides a legacy skip_quarantine:true.\nRead via IsAutoApproveToolChanges().","type":"boolean"},"command":{"type":"string"},"created":{"type":"string"},"disabled_tools":{"description":"Denylist: these tools are hidden; mutually exclusive with enabled_tools","items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"enabled":{"type":"boolean"},"enabled_tools":{"description":"Allowlist: only these tools are exposed; mutually exclusive with disabled_tools","items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"env":{"additionalProperties":{"type":"string"},"type":"object"},"expose_prompts":{"description":"ExposePrompts overrides whether this server's advertised MCP prompts are\naggregated into mcpproxy's prompts/list. nil (default) inherits the\ndefault-aggregate behavior (included if the server advertises\nCapabilities.Prompts); false excludes it regardless of capability.","type":"boolean"},"forward_headers":{"description":"ForwardHeaders lists inbound MCP-client header NAMES (never values) that\nare copied into this server's upstream tools/call requests (Spec 112).\nExact names, case-insensitive, at most 32, no wildcards. Empty forwards\nnothing. Only HTTP-based transports (http, streamable-http) forward; the\ndeny list (Authorization, Host, hop-by-hop, ...) is enforced at runtime\nregardless of what is configured here.","items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"headers":{"additionalProperties":{"type":"string"},"description":"For HTTP servers","type":"object"},"health_check_interval":{"description":"Per-server discovery \u0026 health-check overrides (spec 074). Same *Duration\ntri-state as the global keys: nil = inherit the global value (or default),\npointer to 0s = disabled for this server, positive = that interval.\nHealthCheckInterval is fully wired into the per-server health loop;\nToolDiscoveryInterval is accepted/validated and round-trips for\nforward-compat, but the periodic index sweep is governed by the global\ncadence in this iteration (see spec 074 plan §C).","type":"string"},"init_timeout":{"description":"InitTimeout overrides the global init_timeout for this server's MCP\n` + "`" + `initialize` + "`" + ` handshake deadline (MCP-3322 / GH #760). *Duration tri-state:\nnil = inherit the global value (or 30s default), positive = that deadline.\nResolved by Config.ResolveInitTimeout; validated to {0} ∪ [1s, 30m]. Raise\nthis for upstreams that do legitimate first-run warmup (e.g. caching many\nchannels/users) before responding to ` + "`" + `initialize` + "`" + `.","type":"string"},"isolation":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.IsolationConfig"},"launcher_wait_timeout":{"description":"LauncherWaitTimeout caps how long mcpproxy will wait for a locally-launched\nHTTP/SSE upstream's URL to become reachable after Spawn(). Only consulted\nwhen the server is configured with both Command and an HTTP/SSE URL — i.e.,\nmcpproxy starts the process AND connects via network. Stdio servers ignore\nthis field. Zero or unset → 30s default.","type":"string"},"max_concurrent_requests":{"description":"Per-server concurrency overrides — scope (c) of FR-020 (spec 093, #955).\nTri-state per setting, exactly like HealthCheckInterval: absent = inherit\nthe per-server default set (server_concurrency_defaults), explicit 0 =\ndisable that setting for this server (0 max = no per-server limiter at\nall; 0 queue_size = no pending capacity, shed immediately at the cap),\npositive = override. The global aggregate limiter is never inherited from\nhere — it applies on top, so effective concurrency is min(per-server,\nglobal). Resolved by Config.ResolveServerConcurrency.","type":"integer"},"name":{"type":"string"},"oauth":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.OAuthConfig"},"protocol":{"description":"stdio, http, sse, streamable-http, auto","type":"string"},"quarantined":{"description":"Security quarantine status","type":"boolean"},"queue_size":{"type":"integer"},"queue_timeout":{"type":"string"},"reconnect_on_use":{"description":"Attempt reconnection when a tool call targets a disconnected server","type":"boolean"},"shared":{"description":"Server edition: shared with all users","type":"boolean"},"skip_quarantine":{"description":"SkipQuarantine is DEPRECATED (MCP-2930): use AutoApproveToolChanges instead.\nKept for back-compat parsing; on config load a legacy skip_quarantine:true is\nmigrated to auto_approve_tool_changes:true only when the new field is unset\n(see normalizeServerQuarantineFlags).","type":"boolean"},"source_registry_id":{"description":"SourceRegistryID records which registry this server was added from (empty\nfor manually-configured servers). MCP-866: surfaced in the approval /\nquarantine view so a reviewer can see a server's origin.","type":"string"},"source_registry_provenance":{"description":"SourceRegistryProvenance records the source registry's provenance at add\ntime (RegistryProvenanceOfficial / RegistryProvenanceCustom). It is purely\ninformational (MCP-1072) — surfaced so a reviewer can see a server's origin\n— and no longer gates quarantine or skip_quarantine.","type":"string"},"tool_discovery_interval":{"type":"string"},"toon_output":{"description":"ToonOutput overrides the global toon_output mode for this server's\ntools (spec 084, FR-001). Plain string, not a pointer: \"\"/absent =\ninherit the global value; \"off\"|\"adaptive\"|\"always\" = override (\"off\"\nis the explicit force-off). Resolved by Config.ResolveToonOutput.","type":"string"},"trust_mode":{"description":"TrustMode is the per-server trust tier: auto|scan|manual. Supersedes\nauto_approve_tool_changes (spec 086). An empty value is derived from the\nlegacy fields at load via normalizeServerQuarantineFlags; the single\nresolution point is EffectiveTrustMode(), which treats an empty or\nunrecognized value as manual (secure by default). Read via\nEffectiveTrustMode(), never the raw string.","type":"string"},"updated":{"type":"string"},"url":{"type":"string"},"working_dir":{"description":"Working directory for stdio servers","type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"config.TLSConfig":{"description":"TLS configuration","properties":{"certs_dir":{"description":"Directory for certificates","type":"string"},"enabled":{"description":"Enable HTTPS","type":"boolean"},"hsts":{"description":"Enable HTTP Strict Transport Security","type":"boolean"},"require_client_cert":{"description":"Enable mTLS","type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"},"config.TelemetryConfig":{"description":"Telemetry settings (Spec 036)","properties":{"anonymous_id":{"description":"Auto-generated UUIDv4","type":"string"},"anonymous_id_created_at":{"description":"Spec 042 (Tier 2) additions — all default-zero, all backwards-compatible.","type":"string"},"enabled":{"description":"Default: true (opt-out)","type":"boolean"},"endpoint":{"description":"Override for testing","type":"string"},"last_reported_version":{"description":"Upgrade funnel","type":"string"},"last_startup_outcome":{"description":"success|port_conflict|db_locked|...","type":"string"},"notice_shown":{"description":"First-run notice flag","type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"},"config.TokenizerConfig":{"description":"Tokenizer configuration for token counting","properties":{"default_model":{"description":"Default model for tokenization (e.g., \"gpt-4\")","type":"string"},"enabled":{"description":"Enable token counting","type":"boolean"},"encoding":{"description":"Default encoding (e.g., \"cl100k_base\")","type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"config.TracingExporterConfig":{"description":"Tracing gates the OpenTelemetry OTLP trace exporter (MCP-32). Disabled by\ndefault.","properties":{"enabled":{"description":"Enabled turns on OTLP trace export for tool calls and upstream hops.","type":"boolean"},"endpoint":{"description":"Endpoint is the collector address as host:port (no scheme), e.g.\n\"localhost:4318\" for http or \"localhost:4317\" for grpc.","type":"string"},"protocol":{"description":"Protocol selects the OTLP transport: \"http\" or \"grpc\".","type":"string"},"sample_rate":{"description":"SampleRate is the head-based trace sampling ratio in [0,1]. Default 0.1.\nOmit the key for the 0.1 default; set it to 0 to sample nothing.","type":"number"}},"type":"object"},"config.UpdateCheckConfig":{"description":"Update-check settings (Spec 079 FR-012): config-file control of the\nbackground upgrade-awareness checker (internal/updatecheck). nil =\nenabled on the stable channel (existing default behavior). The existing\nenvironment switches keep working and WIN over these keys (FR-014):\nMCPPROXY_DISABLE_AUTO_UPDATE=true force-disables even when\nenabled=true, and MCPPROXY_ALLOW_PRERELEASE_UPDATES=true force-selects\nthe rc channel even when channel=stable.","properties":{"channel":{"description":"Channel selects which releases are offered as updates: \"stable\"\n(default; prereleases never offered) or \"rc\" (prereleases included).\nEmpty resolves to stable. Validated in ValidateDetailed.\n\nNOTE: for a RELEASED build the running binary's own version is\nauthoritative and overrides this field — a stable build is never\noffered an RC (even with channel=rc), and an RC build always tracks the\nrc channel. This field only takes effect on dev/unstamped builds. See\ninternal/updatecheck.Checker.IncludePrereleases.","type":"string"},"enabled":{"description":"Enabled gates all update checking. Tri-state: nil/absent = enabled\n(default true, matching pre-079 behavior). When false, no network\ncheck is performed and no upgrade nudge appears on any surface\n(FR-015) — /api/v1/info omits the update object entirely.","type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"},"configimport.FailedServer":{"properties":{"details":{"type":"string"},"error":{"type":"string"},"name":{"type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"configimport.ImportSummary":{"properties":{"failed":{"type":"integer"},"imported":{"type":"integer"},"skipped":{"type":"integer"},"total":{"type":"integer"}},"type":"object"},"configimport.SkippedServer":{"properties":{"name":{"type":"string"},"reason":{"description":"\"already_exists\", \"filtered_out\", \"invalid_name\", \"self_reference\"","type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"connect.ConnectResult":{"description":"The full result; its action mirrors the top-level one","properties":{"action":{"description":"\"created\", \"updated\", \"already_exists\", \"removed\", \"not_found\"","type":"string"},"backup_path":{"type":"string"},"client":{"type":"string"},"config_path":{"type":"string"},"credential":{"description":"Credential is the masked client credential the write embedded\n(` + "`" + `mcp_cli_••••` + "`" + `); the real secret is never returned (FR-024). Empty for a\nkeyless entry, a disconnect and every refusal.","type":"string"},"credential_revoked":{"description":"CredentialRevoked names the credential an undo revoked because the\nrestored config no longer holds it (plan D16).","type":"string"},"display_path":{"description":"DisplayPath is ConfigPath with the home directory shortened to \"~\"\n(FR-037). Populated for every result whose ConfigPath is known.","type":"string"},"keyless":{"description":"Keyless is true when the entry was written with no credential.","type":"boolean"},"message":{"type":"string"},"mode":{"type":"string"},"profile":{"description":"Profile and Mode are the binding of the credential this write minted or\nkept. Profile \"\" means the built-in All servers scope.","type":"string"},"reload_hint":{"description":"ReloadHint is this client's instruction for making the write take\neffect (FR-037/FR-042), e.g. \"Restart Cursor to load MCPProxy\". Empty\nfor an unknown client.","type":"string"},"rotation":{"description":"Rotation is \"finalized\" when the write replaced an active credential's\nsecret (staged rotation, FR-021a), empty otherwise.","type":"string"},"server_name":{"type":"string"},"success":{"type":"boolean"},"token_name":{"description":"TokenName is the client credential's token name (` + "`" + `client-\u003cid\u003e` + "`" + `).","type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.APIResponse":{"allOf":[{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/data"}],"properties":{"data":{"type":"object"},"error":{"type":"string"},"request_id":{"type":"string"},"success":{"type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.ActivityDetailResponse":{"properties":{"activity":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ActivityRecord"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.ActivityListResponse":{"properties":{"activities":{"items":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ActivityRecord"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"limit":{"type":"integer"},"offset":{"type":"integer"},"total":{"type":"integer"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.ActivityPerServer":{"properties":{"calls":{"description":"Calls counted per storage.CountsAsCall","type":"integer"},"errors":{"description":"Of those calls, how many failed","type":"integer"},"last_call_at":{"description":"LastCallAt is RFC3339, or \"\" if the server had no call in the period\n(PerServer only lists servers that did, so this is always set).","type":"string"},"name":{"description":"Server name","type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.ActivityRecord":{"properties":{"agent_name":{"description":"Agent token name when auth_type is \"agent\"","type":"string"},"arguments":{"description":"Tool call arguments","type":"object"},"auth_type":{"description":"\"admin\", \"agent\", \"user\" or \"admin_user\"; empty without an auth context or on another caller's row for a scoped caller","type":"string"},"block_reason":{"description":"Typed cause of a profile policy refusal","type":"string"},"client_id":{"description":"Client id from the client-credential binding","type":"string"},"client_name":{"description":"Self-reported clientInfo.name (advisory)","type":"string"},"detection_types":{"description":"List of detection types found","items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"duration_ms":{"description":"Execution duration in milliseconds","type":"integer"},"error_message":{"description":"Error details if status is \"error\"","type":"string"},"has_sensitive_data":{"description":"Sensitive data detection fields (Spec 026)","type":"boolean"},"id":{"description":"Unique identifier (ULID format)","type":"string"},"max_severity":{"description":"Highest severity level detected (critical, high, medium, low)","type":"string"},"metadata":{"description":"Additional context-specific data","type":"object"},"parent_id":{"description":"Correlation id of the parent call (the code_execution whose sandbox issued this sub-call)","type":"string"},"profile":{"description":"Scope attribution (Spec 108 FR-029): the profile, client and token in\neffect when the call ran. Stamped at write time, never rewritten. For a\nscoped (non-admin) caller the profile/profile_source/client_id/token_name\nof a row it did not make are blanked (binding disclosure is admin-only);\nclient_name is self-reported and stays. Absent on records written before\nSpec 108 and on records with no MCP/REST request context.","type":"string"},"profile_source":{"description":"pin|binding|url|session|anonymous|none","type":"string"},"request_bytes":{"description":"Byte sizes measured pre-truncation, mirroring storage.ActivityRecord\n(Spec 069 A1). They are the only cost signal a bodies-off export carries:\nwith payloads suppressed there is no text left to measure, so a consumer\naccounting for a record it cannot read has nothing else to go on. They are\nbyte LENGTHS, not token counts — the basis for an explicit estimate, never\na measured figure (spec 103, contracts/replay-input.md).\n\nZero means UNKNOWN, not free: legacy records predate the measurement and\ncode-execution sub-calls record both as zero. Hence omitempty — an absent\nkey tells a consumer to fall to exclusion accounting, whereas a present\nzero would read as a costless call and silently understate the workload.","type":"integer"},"request_id":{"description":"HTTP request ID for correlation","type":"string"},"response":{"description":"Tool response (potentially truncated)","type":"string"},"response_bytes":{"description":"Raw upstream response size in bytes before truncation","type":"integer"},"response_truncated":{"description":"True if response was truncated","type":"boolean"},"server_name":{"description":"Name of upstream MCP server","type":"string"},"session_id":{"description":"MCP transport session ID (regenerated on every reconnect)","type":"string"},"source":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ActivitySource"},"status":{"description":"Result status: \"success\", \"error\", \"blocked\", \"rejected\"","type":"string"},"timestamp":{"description":"When activity occurred","type":"string"},"token_name":{"description":"Agent/client token name","type":"string"},"tool_name":{"description":"Name of tool called","type":"string"},"type":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ActivityType"},"work_session_id":{"description":"Spec 082: one client, one project, across reconnects","type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.ActivitySource":{"description":"How activity was triggered: \"mcp\", \"cli\", \"api\"","type":"string","x-enum-varnames":["ActivitySourceMCP","ActivitySourceCLI","ActivitySourceAPI"]},"contracts.ActivitySummaryResponse":{"properties":{"blocked_count":{"description":"Count of blocked activities","type":"integer"},"call_count":{"description":"CallCount is how many of those records are CALLS THE USER MADE, as\ndefined once in storage.CountsAsCall and shared with the usage aggregate\nbehind the Usage tab (audit finding F1, #1046). TotalCount answers \"how\nmany rows does the Activity Log have\"; CallCount answers \"how many calls\nwere there\". They are different questions — quarantine auto-approvals,\nsystem start, security scans and management chatter are events, not calls\n— and printing either one under the other's label is how the same instance\ncame to report 51 calls on one screen and 19 on another.","type":"integer"},"call_error_count":{"description":"CallErrorCount is the failures within CallCount, so an error RATE computed\nfrom this response has one denominator. It is not ErrorCount: a policy\nblock is a failed call but carries status \"blocked\", and a shed call is an\nerror in neither sense because it never ran.","type":"integer"},"end_time":{"description":"End of the period (RFC3339)","type":"string"},"error_count":{"description":"Count of error activities","type":"integer"},"other_count":{"description":"OtherCount is every record whose status is outside the four-value\nvocabulary above, so that\n\n\tsuccess + error + blocked + rejected + other == total\n\nholds by construction. The status field is a CLOSED vocabulary for tool\ncalls, but the activity log is wider than tool calls: a quarantine change\nstores its ACTION there (\"approved\", \"auto_approved\"), a policy decision\nstores its DECISION (\"allow\"). Those rows were counted in the total and in\nnone of the four buckets, so the Activity Log's own status tiles summed to\nless than the denominator printed beside them — 15+4+0+0 under a \"42\"\n(audit finding F2, #1046). The residual now has a name and a tile.","type":"integer"},"per_server":{"description":"PerServer covers EVERY server with at least one call in the period\n(unlike TopServers, which is capped at 5 and carries no error counts).\nSpec 109 FR-013: the server-card stats line and the macOS Servers rows\nread this — one ` + "`" + `GET /activity/summary` + "`" + ` response per page load — rather\nthan issuing a per-server activity query each. Computed in the same\ncounting pass as the totals above, from the same CountsAsCall/\nIsManagementBuiltin definitions TopServers already uses.","items":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ActivityPerServer"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"period":{"description":"Time period (1h, 24h, 7d, 30d)","type":"string"},"rejected_count":{"description":"RejectedCount is the number of calls shed by a concurrency limiter before\nthey reached an upstream (spec 093). Counted separately from errors: it is\nproxy backpressure, not an upstream fault, and it is the signal an\noperator right-sizes max_concurrent_requests against.","type":"integer"},"start_time":{"description":"Start of the period (RFC3339)","type":"string"},"success_count":{"description":"Count of successful activities","type":"integer"},"top_servers":{"description":"Top servers by activity count","items":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ActivityTopServer"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"top_tools":{"description":"Top tools by activity count","items":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ActivityTopTool"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"total_count":{"description":"Total activity count","type":"integer"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.ActivityTopServer":{"properties":{"count":{"description":"Activity count","type":"integer"},"name":{"description":"Server name","type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.ActivityTopTool":{"properties":{"count":{"description":"Activity count","type":"integer"},"server":{"description":"Server name","type":"string"},"tool":{"description":"Tool name","type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.ActivityType":{"description":"Type of activity","type":"string","x-enum-varnames":["ActivityTypeToolCall","ActivityTypePolicyDecision","ActivityTypeQuarantineChange","ActivityTypeServerChange"]},"contracts.AddFromRegistryRequest":{"properties":{"enabled":{"description":"defaults to true when nil","type":"boolean"},"env":{"additionalProperties":{"type":"string"},"description":"overrides + required-input values","type":"object"},"name":{"description":"optional name override","type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.AddRegistrySourceRequest":{"properties":{"id":{"description":"derived from the host when empty","type":"string"},"name":{"description":"defaults to the id","type":"string"},"protocol":{"description":"defaults to modelcontextprotocol/registry","type":"string"},"url":{"description":"required https registry URL","type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.AttentionFix":{"properties":{"label":{"type":"string"},"target":{"type":"string"},"verb":{"type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.AttentionItem":{"properties":{"detail":{"type":"string"},"fix":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.AttentionFix"},"id":{"description":"kind:type:subject[:state]","type":"string"},"kind":{"type":"string"},"rank":{"type":"integer"},"since":{"type":"string"},"subject":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.AttentionSubject"},"summary":{"type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.AttentionSubject":{"properties":{"id":{"type":"string"},"name":{"type":"string"},"type":{"description":"server|tool|client|setting","type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.ConfigApplyResult":{"properties":{"applied_immediately":{"type":"boolean"},"changed_fields":{"items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"requires_restart":{"type":"boolean"},"restart_reason":{"type":"string"},"success":{"type":"boolean"},"validation_errors":{"items":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ValidationError"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false}},"type":"object"},"contracts.DCRStatus":{"properties":{"attempted":{"type":"boolean"},"error":{"type":"string"},"status_code":{"type":"integer"},"success":{"type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.DeepScanDescriptor":{"description":"DeepScan reports the opt-in \"deep scan\" layer status (Spec 077 US3),\nSEPARATELY from the baseline verdict above. Always emitted on a computed\nsummary — when deep scan is off (the default) it reports enabled=false\nplus any enabled-but-skipped Docker scanners. It never influences Status.","properties":{"available":{"type":"boolean"},"enabled":{"type":"boolean"},"ran":{"type":"boolean"},"scanners_failed":{"items":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.DeepScanScannerFailure"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"skipped_scanners":{"description":"SkippedScanners lists Docker scanners the user enabled that are skipped\nbecause security.deep_scan.enabled is false (informational).","items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false}},"type":"object"},"contracts.DeepScanScannerFailure":{"properties":{"id":{"type":"string"},"reason":{"type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.DeprecatedConfigWarning":{"properties":{"field":{"type":"string"},"message":{"type":"string"},"replacement":{"type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.Diagnostic":{"description":"Spec 044 — structured diagnostic error and stable error code. Both\nare populated when the server is in a failed state and the error\nhas been classified by internal/diagnostics. 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Both\nare projected from config.ServerConfig so the approval/quarantine view\ncan render an \"added from \u003cregistry\u003e · unverified\" origin badge. Optional\nand omitted when empty — clients that pre-date this treat them as absent.","type":"string"},"source_registry_provenance":{"type":"string"},"status":{"type":"string"},"token_expires_at":{"description":"When the OAuth token expires (ISO 8601)","type":"string"},"tool_count":{"type":"integer"},"tool_list_token_size":{"description":"Token size for this server's tools","type":"integer"},"trust_mode":{"description":"TrustMode mirrors config.ServerConfig.TrustMode (spec 086): the per-server\ntrust tier (\"auto\"/\"scan\"/\"manual\"). Surfaced on the GET path so clients can\nread back the persisted mode; PATCH/POST accept it via AddServerRequest.\nOmitted when empty (server predates the field / relies on legacy flags).","type":"string"},"updated":{"type":"string"},"url":{"type":"string"},"user_logged_out":{"description":"True if user explicitly logged out (prevents auto-reconnection)","type":"boolean"},"working_dir":{"type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.ServerActionResponse":{"properties":{"action":{"type":"string"},"async":{"type":"boolean"},"server":{"type":"string"},"success":{"type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.ServerStats":{"properties":{"connected_servers":{"type":"integer"},"docker_containers":{"type":"integer"},"quarantined_servers":{"type":"integer"},"token_metrics":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ServerTokenMetrics"},"total_servers":{"type":"integer"},"total_tools":{"type":"integer"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.ServerTokenMetrics":{"properties":{"average_query_result_size":{"description":"Typical retrieve_tools output (tokens)","type":"integer"},"estimated":{"description":"Estimated (Spec 109-k FR-070-ish, url-filter-contract.md / audit F-Token):\ntrue while AverageQueryResultSize is a synthetic simulation (a sample of\nthe first ` + "`" + `tools_limit` + "`" + ` tools' schemas — no real retrieve_tools call has\ncompleted yet in this runtime's usage aggregate); false once at least one\nreal retrieve_tools call has, at which point AverageQueryResultSize is\nderived from the real observed average response size instead. The Web\nUI and macOS render an \"estimate\" label while this is true.","type":"boolean"},"per_server_tool_list_sizes":{"additionalProperties":{"type":"integer"},"description":"Token size per server","type":"object"},"saved_tokens":{"description":"Difference","type":"integer"},"saved_tokens_percentage":{"description":"Percentage saved","type":"number"},"total_server_tool_list_size":{"description":"All upstream tools combined (tokens)","type":"integer"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.SuccessResponse":{"properties":{"data":{"type":"object"},"success":{"type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.Tier":{"description":"Tier is computed by AnnotationTier (Spec 109 FR-028/X11) from\nAnnotations — read|write|destructive|unannotated. Set by every producer\nof a Tool (enrichServerTools, the global tools handler); never left for\na consuming surface to compute.","type":"string","x-enum-varnames":["TierRead","TierWrite","TierDestructive","TierUnannotated","TierUnknown"]},"contracts.TokenMetrics":{"description":"Token usage metrics (nil for older records)","properties":{"encoding":{"description":"Encoding used (e.g., cl100k_base)","type":"string"},"estimated_cost":{"description":"Optional cost estimate","type":"number"},"input_tokens":{"description":"Tokens in the request","type":"integer"},"model":{"description":"Model used for tokenization","type":"string"},"output_tokens":{"description":"Tokens in the response","type":"integer"},"total_tokens":{"description":"Total tokens (input + output)","type":"integer"},"truncated_tokens":{"description":"Tokens removed by truncation","type":"integer"},"was_truncated":{"description":"Whether response was truncated","type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.Tool":{"properties":{"access":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ToolAccess"},"annotations":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ToolAnnotation"},"approval_status":{"type":"string"},"config_denied":{"description":"ConfigDenied is true when the tool is denied by the server's static\nenabled_tools / disabled_tools config. The user cannot override this toggle.","type":"boolean"},"description":{"type":"string"},"disabled":{"description":"Disabled mirrors ToolApprovalRecord.Disabled so per-tool enable state is\navailable without a second round-trip to the approvals endpoint. Absent\nin the JSON when false (default) to keep responses compact.","type":"boolean"},"hash":{"description":"Hash is the tool's current stored hash rendered in the preflight pin\nformat \"sha256/v{N}:{hex}\" (Spec 098 FR-011), where N is the approval\nrecord's HashSchemaVersion. It is the authoring surface for\n` + "`" + `POST /api/v1/preflight` + "`" + ` pins and ` + "`" + `mcpproxy tools preflight --pin` + "`" + `:\ncopy the value straight into a pin.\n\nDisclosure is OPERATOR TIER ONLY — same rule as the preflight per-tool\nresult. The field is omitted for agent-token callers and for tools with\nno stored hash (no approval record yet, or a record written before\nhashes existed).","type":"string"},"held_reason":{"description":"HeldReason, HeldVerdict and HeldSignals mirror the same-named fields on\nstorage.ToolApprovalRecord: the offline-scan evidence that made\ntrust_mode: scan hold this tool for review (spec 086 FR-018). HeldSignals\nnames the matched deterministic check ids, e.g.\n\"tpa.TPA-2026-0001.hidden_instruction\", so a reviewer can see WHY the tool\nis held. All three are omitted for tools that are not held by the scan gate\n(including every record written before the field existed).","type":"string"},"held_signals":{"items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"held_verdict":{"type":"string"},"last_used":{"type":"string"},"name":{"type":"string"},"profile_tier":{"description":"ProfileTier and Access are present only in a view-as listing (a tools\nlisting with ?client= or ?profile=, Spec 108 FR-032). ProfileTier is the\ntool's tier under the viewed subject's profile (Tier above stays the\nintrinsic tier); Access is the subject's verdict for the tool. Absent\notherwise, so an ordinary listing is byte-identical to before.","type":"string","x-enum-varnames":["TierRead","TierWrite","TierDestructive","TierUnannotated","TierUnknown"]},"schema":{"type":"object"},"server_name":{"type":"string"},"tier":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.Tier"},"usage":{"type":"integer"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.ToolAccess":{"properties":{"callable":{"type":"boolean"},"reason":{"type":"string"},"visible":{"type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.ToolAnnotation":{"description":"Tool behavior hints snapshot","properties":{"destructiveHint":{"type":"boolean"},"idempotentHint":{"type":"boolean"},"openWorldHint":{"type":"boolean"},"readOnlyHint":{"type":"boolean"},"title":{"type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.ToolCallRecord":{"description":"The new tool call record","properties":{"annotations":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ToolAnnotation"},"arguments":{"description":"Tool arguments","type":"object"},"arguments_truncated":{"description":"ArgumentsTruncated marks Arguments as a placeholder rather than the\narguments the tool was called with. Replaying such a record without\nsupplying arguments explicitly is refused.","type":"boolean"},"config_path":{"description":"Active config file path","type":"string"},"duration":{"description":"Duration in nanoseconds","type":"integer"},"error":{"description":"Error message (failure only)","type":"string"},"execution_type":{"description":"\"direct\" or \"code_execution\"","type":"string"},"id":{"description":"Unique identifier","type":"string"},"mcp_client_name":{"description":"MCP client name from InitializeRequest","type":"string"},"mcp_client_version":{"description":"MCP client version","type":"string"},"mcp_session_id":{"description":"MCP session identifier","type":"string"},"metrics":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.TokenMetrics"},"parent_call_id":{"description":"Links nested calls to parent code_execution","type":"string"},"request_id":{"description":"Request correlation ID","type":"string"},"response":{"description":"Tool response (success only)","type":"object"},"response_bytes":{"description":"Marshalled response size before truncation","type":"integer"},"response_truncated":{"description":"ResponseTruncated and ResponseBytes describe a STORAGE-side cut (#1176):\nthe caller received the response whole, and only the persisted copy was\nshortened to tool_call_max_response_size. When ResponseTruncated is true\nthe Response object carries {truncated, original_bytes, preview, note}\ninstead of the upstream result, and ResponseBytes is its size before the\ncut.","type":"boolean"},"server_id":{"description":"Server identity hash","type":"string"},"server_name":{"description":"Human-readable server name","type":"string"},"timestamp":{"description":"When the call was made","type":"string"},"tool_name":{"description":"Tool name (without server prefix)","type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.UpdateInfo":{"description":"Update information (if available)","properties":{"available":{"description":"Whether an update is available","type":"boolean"},"behind_summary":{"description":"Spec 079 FR-002 — how far behind the running build is. All four are\nadditive (FR-021) and absent when the delta could not be resolved, in\nwhich case every surface renders its pre-delta wording.","type":"string"},"check_error":{"description":"Error message if update check failed","type":"string"},"checked_at":{"description":"When the update check was performed","type":"string"},"install_channel":{"description":"Detected install channel (homebrew, dmg, deb, rpm, docker, go-install, windows-installer, tarball, unknown) — Spec 079 FR-008","type":"string"},"is_prerelease":{"description":"Whether the latest version is a prerelease","type":"boolean"},"latest_version":{"description":"Latest version available (e.g., \"v1.2.3\")","type":"string"},"nudges_suppressed":{"description":"UI surfaces must stay quiet (CI / non-interactive context); machine-readable fields still report the facts — Spec 079 FR-019","type":"boolean"},"release_url":{"description":"URL to the release page","type":"string"},"releases_behind":{"description":"Releases on the offered channel between the running and offered versions","type":"integer"},"releases_behind_saturated":{"description":"ReleasesBehind is a lower bound: the running build predates the scanned release window","type":"boolean"},"update_command":{"description":"One-line update command for the channel; only set when an update is available and the channel has one — Spec 079 FR-009","type":"string"},"weeks_behind":{"description":"Whole weeks between the two releases' publish dates; 0 is a real value, absent means unknown","type":"integer"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.UpdatePolicy":{"description":"UpdatePolicy is the effective, hot-reloadable update policy (Spec 092\nFR-015). Always present: the ` + "`" + `update` + "`" + ` object above is omitted both when\nupdate checking is disabled AND when no check has produced a result\nyet, so its absence cannot tell a client whether it is allowed to run\nits own (e.g. Sparkle feed) check. This field states the answer.","properties":{"channel":{"description":"Channel is the tracked release channel: \"stable\" or \"rc\".","type":"string"},"enabled":{"description":"Enabled is the effective automatic-check kill switch: update_check.enabled\nwith MCPPROXY_DISABLE_AUTO_UPDATE=true winning over it. A user-initiated\n\"Check for Updates\" stays available regardless.","type":"boolean"},"nudges_suppressed":{"description":"NudgesSuppressed asks UI surfaces to stay quiet (CI / non-interactive)\nwhile machine-readable fields keep reporting the facts.","type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.UpstreamError":{"properties":{"error_message":{"type":"string"},"server_name":{"type":"string"},"timestamp":{"type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.UsageAggregateResponse":{"properties":{"freshness_ms":{"description":"age of the underlying snapshot in ms","type":"integer"},"generated_at":{"type":"string"},"other":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.UsageOtherBucket"},"timeline":{"items":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.UsageTimeBucket"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"token_source":{"description":"\"bytes\" (size-based proxy, FR-006)","type":"string"},"tokens_saved":{"description":"echoed from ServerTokenMetrics (FR-007)","type":"integer"},"tokens_saved_estimated":{"description":"TokensSavedEstimated echoes ServerTokenMetrics.Estimated (Spec 109-k):\ntrue while TokensSaved is a synthetic simulation rather than derived\nfrom a real retrieve_tools call. Dropped (false, the zero value) for a\nscoped caller along with TokensSaved itself, above.","type":"boolean"},"tokens_saved_percentage":{"type":"number"},"tools":{"items":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.UsageToolStat"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"total_calls":{"description":"TotalCalls and TotalErrors are the headline counts for the window: the sum\nof the timeline this same response carries, so the tiles and the histogram\nunder them cannot disagree. They are NOT the sum of Tools — that list is\nlifetime-cumulative, upstream-only and truncated to top-N, and summing it\nclient-side is what made the Usage tab print a third number for the same\n24 hours (audit finding F1, #1046). The population is\nstorage.CountsAsCall, shared with ActivitySummaryResponse.CallCount.\n\nTwo bounds on how exactly this matches the Activity Log's own count.\nBoth are bounded and disclosed, unlike the population mismatch they\nreplace, which was unbounded and silent:\n\n - Window granularity is the timeline's: whole hour buckets, so the span\n is the requested window rounded up to a bucket edge.\n - This response is served from a snapshot behind a short read cache\n (observability.usage_cache_ttl, 5s by default) so the endpoint never\n scans the activity log per request, while the summary endpoint counts\n live. Calls that land inside that window appear on the Activity Log\n first. FreshnessMs and GeneratedAt say how old the figures are, and\n the Usage tab prints it (\"Updated 3s ago\").","type":"integer"},"total_errors":{"type":"integer"},"window":{"type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.UsageOtherBucket":{"description":"present only when the list was truncated to top-N","properties":{"calls":{"type":"integer"},"tools_folded":{"type":"integer"},"total_resp_bytes":{"type":"integer"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.UsageTimeBucket":{"properties":{"calls":{"type":"integer"},"errors":{"type":"integer"},"start":{"type":"string"},"total_resp_bytes":{"type":"integer"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.UsageToolStat":{"properties":{"avg_req_bytes":{"description":"null when no sized request calls","type":"integer"},"avg_resp_bytes":{"description":"null when sized_calls == 0 (only legacy 0-byte calls)","type":"integer"},"blocked":{"type":"integer"},"calls":{"type":"integer"},"error_rate":{"type":"number"},"errors":{"type":"integer"},"last_used":{"type":"string"},"p50_exceeds":{"type":"boolean"},"p50_ms":{"description":"P50Ms and P95Ms are read off a fixed latency histogram, so they are BUCKET\nBOUNDS, not measured durations: the true percentile is at or below the\nvalue, and a client must render it as a bound (\"≤ 5 ms\"). P50Exceeds /\nP95Exceeds flip that reading for the unbounded overflow bucket, where the\nvalue is the last bound and the truth is above it (\"\u003e 10 s\").","type":"integer"},"p95_exceeds":{"type":"boolean"},"p95_ms":{"type":"integer"},"rejected":{"description":"spec 093: shed by a concurrency limit; never executed, so excluded from calls/latency","type":"integer"},"server":{"type":"string"},"sized_calls":{"description":"calls with known response size (basis for avg_resp_bytes)","type":"integer"},"tool":{"type":"string"},"total_req_bytes":{"type":"integer"},"total_resp_bytes":{"type":"integer"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.ValidateConfigResponse":{"properties":{"errors":{"items":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ValidationError"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"valid":{"type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.ValidationError":{"properties":{"field":{"type":"string"},"message":{"type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.ViewAsCounts":{"description":"Counts is present only for a NON-administrator profile view-as (Spec 108\nFR-032): the response then lists only the visible rows, and this is the\nonly trace of the rest, with no per-server, per-tier or per-reason\nbreakdown.","properties":{"hidden":{"type":"integer"},"visible":{"type":"integer"}},"type":"object"},"data":{"properties":{"data":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.InfoResponse"}},"type":"object"},"httpapi.AccessExplanationData":{"properties":{"first_failure":{"type":"string","x-enum-varnames":["StepCredential","StepProfile","StepServerInScope","StepToolRule","StepTierCap","StepTokenPermission","StepGlobalGate","StepServerState","StepToolApproval"]},"fixes":{"items":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/runtime.Fix"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"profile":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/runtime.ExplainProfileView"},"steps":{"items":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/runtime.ExplainStepView"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"subject":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/runtime.ExplainSubjectView"},"tool":{"type":"string"},"verdict":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/profile.ExplainVerdict"}},"type":"object"},"httpapi.AddServerRequest":{"properties":{"args":{"items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"auto_approve_tool_changes":{"description":"AutoApproveToolChanges is the per-server intent to auto-approve\nnew/changed tools past the trust baseline (MCP-2930). Tri-state *bool:\na nil pointer means \"leave unchanged\" on PATCH; a present value\n(including false) is applied. Mirrors config.ServerConfig's *bool\nsemantics — do NOT collapse to a plain bool, or an omitted field would\nsilently reset a previously-set value.","type":"boolean"},"command":{"type":"string"},"enabled":{"type":"boolean"},"env":{"additionalProperties":{"type":"string"},"type":"object"},"expose_prompts":{"description":"ExposePrompts is the per-server override for prompt aggregation (F9):\nwhether this server's advertised MCP prompts are merged into mcpproxy's\nprompts/list. Tri-state *bool mirroring config.ServerConfig.ExposePrompts —\na nil pointer means \"leave unchanged\" on PATCH (and \"inherit the default\naggregate behavior\" on create); a present value (including false) is applied.","type":"boolean"},"forward_headers":{"description":"ForwardHeaders is the per-server allowlist of inbound MCP client header\nNAMES forwarded to this server on tools/call (Spec 112). Names only, never\nvalues. On PATCH a nil slice (field omitted) leaves the stored allowlist\nunchanged and an empty array ([]) clears it. Invalid, denied, duplicate\nand static-header-colliding names are rejected with 400.","items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"headers":{"additionalProperties":{"type":"string"},"type":"object"},"init_timeout":{"description":"InitTimeout is the per-server MCP ` + "`" + `initialize` + "`" + ` handshake deadline override\n(MCP-3322 / GH #760), serialized as a duration string (e.g. \"120s\"). A nil\npointer means \"leave unchanged\" on PATCH; a present value is applied.\nMirrors config.ServerConfig.InitTimeout's *Duration tri-state.","type":"string"},"isolation":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/httpapi.IsolationRequest"},"max_concurrent_requests":{"description":"MaxConcurrentRequests / QueueSize / QueueTimeout are the per-server\nconcurrency overrides (spec 093 / GH #955, FR-020 scope (c)). Each is\ntri-state: a nil pointer means \"leave unchanged\" on PATCH and \"inherit\nserver_concurrency_defaults\" on create; an explicit 0 disables that\nsetting for this server; a positive value overrides it. Do NOT collapse\nthem to plain values — an omitted field would then silently reset a\nconfigured limit.","type":"integer"},"name":{"type":"string"},"protocol":{"type":"string"},"quarantined":{"type":"boolean"},"queue_size":{"type":"integer"},"queue_timeout":{"type":"string"},"reconnect_on_use":{"type":"boolean"},"trust_mode":{"description":"TrustMode is the per-server trust tier (spec 086): \"auto\", \"scan\", or\n\"manual\". Empty means \"leave unchanged\" on PATCH (and inherit the migrated\ndefault on create). A non-empty value is applied to ServerConfig.TrustMode\nand resolved by EffectiveTrustMode (an unrecognized value fails closed to\nmanual). This is the REST seam for changing the trust tier via\nPOST/PATCH /api/v1/servers.","type":"string"},"url":{"type":"string"},"working_dir":{"type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"httpapi.BindingGuardResponse":{"properties":{"bindings":{"items":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/httpapi.GuardBinding"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"code":{"description":"binding_bypassable_without_auth","type":"string"},"error":{"description":"Human-readable, byte-stable refusal text","type":"string"},"fixes":{"items":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/httpapi.GuardFixOption"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"request_id":{"type":"string"},"success":{"description":"Always false","type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"},"httpapi.BulkAssignRequest":{"properties":{"from_profile":{"type":"string"},"mode":{"type":"string"},"to_profile":{"type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"httpapi.BulkAssignResponse":{"properties":{"moved":{"items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"skipped":{"items":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/httpapi.BulkAssignSkipped"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false}},"type":"object"},"httpapi.BulkAssignSkipped":{"properties":{"client_id":{"type":"string"},"code":{"type":"string"},"error":{"type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"httpapi.CanonicalConfigPath":{"properties":{"description":{"description":"Brief description","type":"string"},"exists":{"description":"Whether the file exists","type":"boolean"},"format":{"description":"Format identifier (e.g., \"claude_desktop\")","type":"string"},"name":{"description":"Display name (e.g., \"Claude Desktop\")","type":"string"},"os":{"description":"Operating system (darwin, windows, linux)","type":"string"},"path":{"description":"Full path to the config file","type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"httpapi.CanonicalConfigPathsResponse":{"properties":{"os":{"description":"Current operating system","type":"string"},"paths":{"description":"List of canonical config paths","items":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/httpapi.CanonicalConfigPath"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false}},"type":"object"},"httpapi.ClientBindingErrorResponse":{"properties":{"code":{"type":"string"},"error":{"type":"string"},"field":{"type":"string"},"request_id":{"type":"string"},"success":{"description":"Always false","type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"},"httpapi.ClientBindingResponse":{"properties":{"client":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/httpapi.clientPresence"},"warnings":{"items":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/httpapi.ClientWarning"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false}},"type":"object"},"httpapi.ClientSnippet":{"properties":{"generic_http":{"type":"string"},"header_name":{"type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"httpapi.ClientWarning":{"properties":{"action":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/runtime.WarningAction"},"bindings":{"items":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/runtime.BindingRef"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"client_id":{"type":"string"},"code":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/profile.WarningCode"},"fixes":{"items":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/runtime.GuardFix"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"message":{"type":"string"},"severity":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/profile.WarningSeverity"}},"type":"object"},"httpapi.ConnectConflictResponse":{"properties":{"action":{"description":"already_exists | precondition_failed","type":"string"},"data":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/connect.ConnectResult"},"error":{"description":"Human-readable message","type":"string"},"success":{"description":"Always false","type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"},"httpapi.ConnectRequest":{"properties":{"force":{"description":"Overwrite existing entry","type":"boolean"},"keyless":{"type":"boolean"},"mode":{"type":"string"},"precondition_token":{"description":"PreconditionToken is the opaque token from the preview this write was\nconfirmed against (Spec 091 FR-005). When present, the core rechecks it\nat write time and responds 409 with action \"precondition_failed\" —\nwriting nothing — if the config or the entry MCPProxy would write has\ndrifted since; the caller then re-previews instead of retrying. Absent\nmeans exactly the pre-091 behavior. A replace-classified flow sends this\nTOGETHER with force=true: the token, not the absence of force, is the\noverwrite safety.","type":"string"},"profile":{"description":"Profile, Mode and Keyless are the client-credential intent (Spec 108\nFR-024). Profile names the profile the client's credential binds to;\n\"\" is the built-in All servers scope. Omitted means \"not specified\": a\nfresh credential defaults to All servers and a reconnect keeps the\nclient's existing binding (a reconnect never silently widens a locked\nclient). Mode is locked|switchable (default locked for a named profile,\nswitchable for All servers). Keyless writes a credential-less entry and\nis only possible while require_mcp_auth is off; it cannot carry a\nprofile or mode.","type":"string"},"server_name":{"description":"Defaults to \"mcpproxy\"","type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"httpapi.CreateClientRequest":{"properties":{"display_name":{"type":"string"},"expires_in":{"description":"ExpiresIn is a duration like 30d or 720h; default and cap are 365 days.","type":"string"},"id":{"type":"string"},"mode":{"type":"string"},"profile":{"type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"httpapi.CreateClientResponse":{"properties":{"client":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/httpapi.clientPresence"},"credential":{"type":"string"},"snippet":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/httpapi.ClientSnippet"}},"type":"object"},"httpapi.EffectiveToolsData":{"properties":{"counts":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/runtime.EffectiveCounts"},"profile":{"type":"string"},"stale_classification_reasons":{"additionalProperties":{"type":"string"},"description":"StaleClassificationReasons maps each stale classify entry to why it no\nlonger applies: profile.StaleClassificationAnnotated or\nprofile.StaleClassificationMissing. It is computed over the UNFILTERED\ntool set, so a server or reason filter never changes it. Administrators\nonly.","type":"object"},"stale_classifications":{"description":"StaleClassifications lists classify entries for tools that are now\nannotated or no longer exist (FR-005). Administrators only.","items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"tools":{"items":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/runtime.EffectiveTool"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false}},"type":"object"},"httpapi.EnvFieldPreview":{"properties":{"empty_or_placeholder":{"type":"boolean"},"name":{"type":"string"},"secret_like":{"type":"boolean"},"value_present":{"type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"},"httpapi.FinalizeClientResponse":{"properties":{"client":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/httpapi.clientPresence"},"rotation":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/httpapi.RotationState"}},"type":"object"},"httpapi.ForgetClientResponse":{"properties":{"disconnect_error":{"type":"string"},"disconnected":{"type":"boolean"},"revoked":{"type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"httpapi.GuardBinding":{"properties":{"client_id":{"type":"string"},"mode":{"type":"string"},"profile":{"type":"string"},"token_name":{"type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"httpapi.GuardFixOption":{"properties":{"kind":{"type":"string"},"target":{"type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"httpapi.HeaderFieldPreview":{"properties":{"empty_or_placeholder":{"type":"boolean"},"name":{"type":"string"},"secret_like":{"type":"boolean"},"value_present":{"type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"},"httpapi.ImportFromPathRequest":{"properties":{"format":{"description":"Optional format hint","type":"string"},"path":{"description":"File path to import from","type":"string"},"rename":{"additionalProperties":{"type":"string"},"description":"Rename maps a server name → new name. Applied after parsing so the\ncaller can disambiguate cross-source name collisions (Spec 046 v2 —\ne.g. \"mcpproxy\" → \"mcpproxy_claude_code\"). Keys are matched against\neither the raw source name (OriginalName) or the sanitized name shown\nin the preview (Server.Name); these differ for names that need\nsanitizing (e.g. \"Figma Desktop\" → \"Figma_Desktop\"). Keys not present\nin the imported set are ignored.","type":"object"},"server_names":{"description":"Optional: import only these servers","items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false}},"type":"object"},"httpapi.ImportRequest":{"properties":{"allow_paste_fallback":{"description":"AllowPasteFallback opts into detecting a bare URL or a single command\nline (FR-064) when Format/format detection would otherwise fail — see\nconfigimport.ImportOptions.AllowPasteFallback for why this must stay\nopt-in (review round 4 F-E). Only the interactive Paste tab sets this;\nevery other caller of this endpoint (the general \"Import config\"\npanel, or a direct API call) leaves it false and gets a clear\n\"unable to detect configuration format\" error for a plain one-liner\ninstead of it being silently guessed at and, on apply, added as a\nreal server with no confirmation step.","type":"boolean"},"content":{"description":"Raw JSON or TOML content","type":"string"},"env_override":{"additionalProperties":{"type":"string"},"description":"EnvOverride/HeaderOverride (Spec 109 FR-064/065, PR review round 4\nF-A/F-D fix): the Paste tab's per-field Value/Secret edits — a plain\nvalue the user typed, or a keyring ref path if they chose Secret —\nkeyed by field name. Applied to the matching imported server's\nEnv/Headers ONLY when preview=false, directly on the server this\nrequest's own raw Content parses to server-side. 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A present object is\napplied field-by-field ON TOP of the persisted overrides, so omitting a\nfield leaves it alone; clear an individual override by sending it\nexplicitly (` + "`" + `\"enabled\": null` + "`" + `, ` + "`" + `\"image\": \"\"` + "`" + `).","properties":{"enabled":{"description":"Enabled exists ONLY to detect and reject an echoed-back read. It is the\neffective state on the read surface and is never writable; see validate().","type":"boolean"},"enabled_override":{"description":"EnabledOverride is the tri-state per-server override — the RAW value, the\nsame one reads return as ` + "`" + `enabled_override` + "`" + `. It has THREE meaningful wire\nstates, and collapsing them is what silently un-isolated servers\n(GH #1142):\n - absent → leave the persisted override untouched\n - null → clear the override, back to inheriting the global\n - true / false → set an explicit opt-in / opt-out","type":"boolean"},"extra_args":{"items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"image":{"type":"string"},"mode_override":{"description":"ModeOverride sets ` + "`" + `isolation.mode` + "`" + ` (\"docker\" | \"sandbox\" | \"none\").\nnil leaves the persisted value alone; an empty string clears it. An\nunrecognized value is rejected with a 400 rather than persisted.","type":"string"},"network_mode":{"type":"string"},"working_dir":{"type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"httpapi.OnboardingMarkRequest":{"properties":{"connect_step_status":{"description":"ConnectStepStatus is one of: \"\", \"completed\", \"skipped\". Empty\npreserves the existing value. 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The REST connect endpoint\n(POST /api/v1/connect/{client}) already records this itself on success;\nthis field exists so ` + "`" + `mcpproxy connect` + "`" + ` — which writes the client's\nconfig file directly, without going through that endpoint, so the\ncommand still works when no daemon is running — can relay the same\nevent to a daemon that IS running, keeping ClientConnectedAt in sync\nacross both surfaces. 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Engaged is true once\nthe wizard was shown and the user completed or skipped it.","properties":{"client_connected_at":{"additionalProperties":{"type":"string"},"description":"ClientConnectedAt records, per client id from the fixed connect client\nregistry (internal/connect.GetAllClients — never user input), the last\ntime a connect write succeeded for that client (Spec 109-b FR-042).\nWritten by the connect success path through UpdateOnboardingState so a\nconcurrent onboarding/mark write can never drop it. 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Once true, the wizard does not auto-show again, even if\nstate regresses (e.g. user disconnects all clients).","type":"boolean"},"engaged_at":{"description":"EngagedAt is the timestamp of completion or explicit skip.","type":"string"},"first_shown_at":{"description":"FirstShownAt is the timestamp of first wizard render.","type":"string"},"server_step_status":{"description":"ServerStepStatus is one of: \"\", \"completed\", \"skipped\".","type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"telemetry.FeedbackContext":{"properties":{"arch":{"type":"string"},"connected_server_count":{"type":"integer"},"edition":{"type":"string"},"os":{"type":"string"},"routing_mode":{"type":"string"},"server_count":{"type":"integer"},"version":{"type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"telemetry.FeedbackRequest":{"properties":{"category":{"description":"bug, feature, other","type":"string"},"context":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/telemetry.FeedbackContext"},"email":{"type":"string"},"message":{"type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"telemetry.FeedbackResponse":{"properties":{"error":{"type":"string"},"issue_url":{"type":"string"},"success":{"type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"}},"securitySchemes":{"ApiKeyAuth":{"description":"API key authentication via query parameter. Use ?apikey=your-key","in":"query","name":"apikey","type":"apiKey"}}}, + "components": {"schemas":{"config.AuditLogConfig":{"description":"AuditLog configures the Spec 107 edition-neutral audit sink\n(internal/audit). nil means \"use the per-edition/per-transport\ndefault\" (EffectiveAuditLog); restart-pinned (bound at sink\nconstruction). See audit_log.go.","properties":{"compress":{"type":"boolean"},"enabled":{"type":"boolean"},"max_age_days":{"type":"integer"},"max_backups":{"type":"integer"},"max_size_mb":{"type":"integer"},"path":{"type":"string"},"stdout":{"type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"},"config.ConcurrencyDefaults":{"description":"ServerConcurrencyDefaults is scope (b) of FR-020: the blanket per-server\ndefault set inherited by every server that does not override a setting.\nAbsent (the default) = no per-server limiting unless a server configures\nit explicitly. File/API-configured only — no env scheme (FR-022).","properties":{"max_concurrent_requests":{"type":"integer"},"queue_size":{"type":"integer"},"queue_timeout":{"type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"config.Config":{"properties":{"activity_cleanup_interval_min":{"description":"Background cleanup interval in minutes (default: 60)","type":"integer"},"activity_max_records":{"description":"Max records before pruning (default: 100000)","type":"integer"},"activity_max_response_size":{"description":"Response truncation limit in bytes (default: 65536)","type":"integer"},"activity_max_size_mb":{"description":"ActivityMaxSizeMB caps the total activity-log size in MB before the\noldest records are pruned. Omit the key for the 256MB default; set it to\n0 to disable the size cap.","type":"integer"},"activity_retention_days":{"description":"Activity logging settings (RFC-003)","type":"integer"},"aggregate_upstream_prompts":{"description":"AggregateUpstreamPrompts, when true, aggregates every connected upstream\nserver's advertised MCP prompts into mcpproxy's own prompts/list\n(exposed as \"\u003cserver\u003e__\u003cprompt\u003e\"). OFF by default: users are safe by\ndefault and opt in deliberately. EnablePrompts still governs the built-in\nprompts + the prompts capability; this flag gates ONLY the upstream\naggregation performed by RefreshPrompts. Hot-reloadable.","type":"boolean"},"allow_private_registry_fetch":{"description":"AllowPrivateRegistryFetch opts out of the registry SSRF guard (MCP-1076,\nCWE-918). By default (false) registry fetches refuse any host that is — or\nresolves to — a non-routable address (loopback, RFC1918/CGNAT private,\nlink-local incl. the 169.254.169.254 cloud-metadata endpoint), so a\nmalicious or typo'd registry source cannot turn the daemon into a\nrequest-forgery vector against internal services.\n\nThis opt-out is BLANKET (all-or-nothing): setting it true disables the\nguard for EVERY non-routable range at once — loopback, RFC1918/CGNAT\nprivate, link-local AND the 169.254.169.254 cloud-metadata endpoint. There\nis no way to allow only loopback; enabling it for a localhost dev registry\nalso re-opens the cloud-metadata SSRF vector. Set true ONLY when you\nintentionally run a trusted registry mirror on an internal/private address,\nideally on a host with no cloud-metadata exposure. The change takes effect\nonly on daemon (re)start or config reload.","type":"boolean"},"allow_server_add":{"type":"boolean"},"allow_server_remove":{"type":"boolean"},"anonymous_profile":{"description":"AnonymousProfile confines every caller whose request authenticates as\ncredential kind \"anonymous\" (no credential, or an unrecognised\nnon-agent token accepted by the require_mcp_auth:false back-compat\nbranch) to the named profile (Spec 108 FR-008). Empty (default) means\nunconfined, legacy anonymous behaviour. A name that does not match any\nconfigured profile resolves anonymous callers to deny-all and is\nreported as a validation warning (data-model.md §1).","type":"string"},"api_key":{"description":"Security settings","type":"string"},"audit_log":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.AuditLogConfig"},"call_tool_timeout":{"type":"string"},"check_server_repo":{"description":"Repository detection settings","type":"boolean"},"code_execution_max_parallel":{"description":"Default concurrency for call_tools() batches (1-32, default: 8)","type":"integer"},"code_execution_max_tool_calls":{"description":"Max tool calls per execution (0 = unlimited, default: 0)","type":"integer"},"code_execution_pool_size":{"description":"JavaScript runtime pool size (default: 10)","type":"integer"},"code_execution_timeout_ms":{"description":"Timeout in milliseconds (default: 120000, max: 600000)","type":"integer"},"data_dir":{"type":"string"},"debug_search":{"type":"boolean"},"direct_tool_response_mode":{"description":"DirectToolResponseMode selects the serialization of the DIRECT\nenumeration surface (Spec 102). Valid values: \"\" (= full), \"full\"\n(default: today's schema-bearing entries), \"deferred\" (description +\ncompact signature, with a minimal permissive input schema; upstream\ninputSchema and outputSchema are stripped and recovered on demand via\ndescribe_tool).\n\nDeliberately NOT an extension of tool_response_mode: reusing that axis\nwould silently change /mcp/all output for every deployment already\nrunning compact, which FR-015 forbids. Serialization-only — it never\nchanges WHICH tools are listed, only how (FR-008). Hot-reloadable.","type":"string"},"disable_management":{"type":"boolean"},"docker_isolation":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.DockerIsolationConfig"},"docker_recovery":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.DockerRecoveryConfig"},"enable_code_execution":{"description":"Code execution settings","type":"boolean"},"enable_prompts":{"description":"Prompts settings","type":"boolean"},"enable_socket":{"description":"Enable Unix socket/named pipe for local IPC (default: true)","type":"boolean"},"enable_tray":{"description":"Deprecated: EnableTray is unused and has no runtime effect. Kept for backward compatibility.","type":"boolean"},"environment":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/secureenv.EnvConfig"},"features":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.FeatureFlags"},"forward_client_headers":{"description":"ForwardClientHeaders is the global switch for client header forwarding\n(Spec 112): copying allowlisted headers from the inbound /mcp request into\nthe upstream tools/call request. nil (absent) means enabled; because every\nper-server forward_headers allowlist is empty by default, the default\nforwards nothing. false disables forwarding for every server. Read via\nIsClientHeaderForwardingEnabled(); MCPPROXY_FORWARD_CLIENT_HEADERS\noverrides it for the process. Distinct from ForwardedHeaders/trusted_proxies\n(Spec 107), which trusts inbound X-Forwarded-*.","type":"boolean"},"forward_proxy_env":{"description":"ForwardProxyEnv opts in to forwarding the ambient HTTP(S)/ALL/NO/FTP proxy\nenvironment variables to spawned stdio upstream servers (MCP-2769). OFF by\ndefault: proxy URLs commonly embed credentials (http://user:pass@proxy), so\nforwarding them to every upstream is a credential-leak risk. When enabled,\nvalues are forwarded with their userinfo (credentials) redacted.","type":"boolean"},"health_check_interval":{"description":"Discovery \u0026 health-check cadence (spec 074, #608). Both are *Duration\ntri-state pointers: nil = inherit the built-in default; a pointer to 0s =\nthe loop is disabled; a positive value = that interval. Defaults live only\nin the resolvers (ResolveHealthCheckInterval / ResolveToolDiscoveryInterval)\nso an unset key behaves exactly as before this feature (SC-005). Validated\nin Validate(): health-check ∈ {0} ∪ [5s,1h]; tool-discovery ∈ {0} ∪ [30s,24h].","type":"string"},"http_idle_timeout":{"description":"HTTPIdleTimeout caps how long an idle keep-alive connection is kept open.\nUnset = 180s. \"0s\" removes the dedicated idle deadline, but net/http then\nfalls back to ReadTimeout — idle is fully unbounded only when\nhttp_read_timeout is also \"0s\". Requires a restart.","type":"string"},"http_read_timeout":{"description":"HTTPReadTimeout caps how long reading a whole request (headers + body)\nmay take. Unset = 120s; \"0s\" disables it. Requires a restart.","type":"string"},"http_write_timeout":{"description":"HTTPWriteTimeout caps how long producing a whole response may take on\nnon-streaming endpoints (REST, Web UI, health). Unset = 120s; \"0s\"\ndisables it globally. MCP and SSE /events routes are exempt by design.","type":"string"},"init_timeout":{"description":"InitTimeout is the global default deadline for an upstream's MCP\n` + "`" + `initialize` + "`" + ` handshake (MCP-3322 / GH #760). *Duration tri-state: nil =\ninherit the built-in 30s default; a positive value = that deadline. A\nper-server InitTimeout overrides this. Resolved by ResolveInitTimeout;\nvalidated to {0} ∪ [1s, 30m] in Validate(). Servers doing legitimate\nfirst-run warmup (cache/index build) before answering ` + "`" + `initialize` + "`" + ` can\nraise this so they are not killed mid-startup.","type":"string"},"instructions":{"description":"Instructions text returned in the MCP initialize response to guide AI agents.\nWhen empty, a built-in default is used that explains retrieve_tools workflow.","type":"string"},"intent_declaration":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.IntentDeclarationConfig"},"listen":{"type":"string"},"logging":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.LogConfig"},"max_concurrent_requests":{"description":"Concurrency limits (spec 093, GH #955). Scope (a) of FR-020: the GLOBAL\nAGGREGATE limiter — one proxy-wide cap on concurrently running upstream\ntool calls, with its own bounded wait queue. Tri-state pointers: absent =\nthe limiter does not exist (default, zero behavior change); an explicit 0\nmax also disables it; positive = that cap. This scope is NEVER a\nper-server inheritance source — per-server values come from\nServerConcurrencyDefaults / the per-server overrides — but a server's\neffective concurrency is bounded by BOTH its own limiter and this one.\nResolved by ResolveGlobalConcurrency; hot-reloadable; overridable via\nMCPPROXY_MAX_CONCURRENT_REQUESTS / _QUEUE_SIZE / _QUEUE_TIMEOUT (FR-022).","type":"integer"},"max_result_size_chars":{"description":"MaxResultSizeChars is advertised on every tool as\n` + "`" + `_meta.anthropic/maxResultSizeChars` + "`" + `; it raises Claude Code's\ninline-response ceiling from 50k to up to 500k chars. Omit the key for\nthe 500000 default; set it to 0 to disable the annotation.","type":"integer"},"mcpServers":{"items":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.ServerConfig"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"oauth_expiry_warning_hours":{"description":"Health status settings","type":"number"},"observability":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.ObservabilityConfig"},"output_sanitisation":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.OutputSanitisationConfig"},"output_validation":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.OutputValidationConfig"},"profiles":{"description":"Profiles are optional named, server-scoped views exposed at /mcp/p/\u003cname\u003e\n(Spec 057). Absent/empty is fully supported — /mcp is unchanged and configs\nwithout this key serialize byte-identically (SC-004).","items":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.ProfileConfig"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"quarantine_enabled":{"description":"QuarantineEnabled controls whether quarantine is active. It gates two\nthings together:\n 1. Server-level auto-quarantine for newly added servers (issue #370).\n When true, servers added via the upstream_servers MCP tool or the\n REST API default to quarantined=true; when false, they default to\n quarantined=false. Explicit per-request values always win.\n 2. Tool-level quarantine (Spec 032): per-tool SHA-256 approval of\n tool descriptions/schemas.\nWhen nil (default), quarantine is enabled (secure by default). Set to\nexplicit false to opt out of both. Per-server SkipQuarantine still\napplies for the tool-level check on individual servers.","type":"boolean"},"queue_size":{"type":"integer"},"queue_timeout":{"type":"string"},"read_only_mode":{"type":"boolean"},"registries":{"description":"Registries configuration for MCP server discovery","items":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.RegistryEntry"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"registries_locked":{"description":"RegistriesLocked is an enterprise stub knob (MCP-866): when true, runtime\nadditions of custom registries (e.g. ` + "`" + `registry add-source` + "`" + `, the REST/MCP\nadd-source surface) are rejected so an administrator can pin the discovery\nsources. Built-in defaults are unaffected. Documented but otherwise inert\nbeyond the add-source rejection.","type":"boolean"},"require_mcp_auth":{"description":"Require authentication on /mcp endpoint (default: false)","type":"boolean"},"reveal_secret_headers":{"description":"RevealSecretHeaders, when true, disables the redaction of the\nsecret-bearing server fields — sensitive header values (Authorization,\nX-API-Key, Cookie, …), env-var secrets, and URL query credentials — in\nresponses from the ` + "`" + `upstream_servers` + "`" + ` MCP tool, the ` + "`" + `/api/v1/servers` + "`" + `\nREST API, and the SSE event stream. It also lets URL secrets echoed\ninto last_error / health.detail through unscrubbed.\n\nDefault false — sensitive values are surfaced masked as\n` + "`" + `••••\u003clast2\u003e (\u003cN\u003e chars)` + "`" + ` (error strings use ` + "`" + `***REDACTED***` + "`" + `) so an\nMCP agent cannot read Bearer tokens / API keys / URL secrets out of\nanother upstream's config (PR #425, issue #872). ${env:…}/${keyring:…}\nreferences are labels, not secrets, and pass through unchanged.\n\nThe Web UI / macOS tray edit forms work without seeing the real\nvalues: PATCH /api/v1/servers/{id} deep-merges (omitted keys are\npreserved, see ` + "`" + `headers_remove` + "`" + ` / ` + "`" + `env_remove` + "`" + ` for explicit\ndeletes), so clients compute a diff and only send the keys that\nactually changed. Redacted-but-unchanged values never round-trip\n— the backend keeps the real string. Set this to true if a\ndownstream tool genuinely needs raw values in the response.","type":"boolean"},"routing_mode":{"description":"Routing mode (Spec 031): how MCP tools are exposed to clients\nValid values: \"retrieve_tools\" (default), \"direct\", \"code_execution\"","type":"string"},"security":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.SecurityConfig"},"sensitive_data_detection":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.SensitiveDataDetectionConfig"},"server_concurrency_defaults":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.ConcurrencyDefaults"},"telemetry":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.TelemetryConfig"},"tls":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.TLSConfig"},"tokenizer":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.TokenizerConfig"},"tool_call_max_records_per_server":{"description":"Calls retained per server (default: 1000)","type":"integer"},"tool_call_max_response_size":{"description":"Bounds for the per-server tool-call history behind GET /api/v1/tool-calls\n(#1176). It is a recent-debugging window, not an audit log — the activity\nlog is the durable record — and it kept every upstream response whole,\nper server, forever. A non-positive value means \"use the default\", not\n\"disable\": this store must never be unbounded again, so there is\ndeliberately no off switch.","type":"integer"},"tool_discovery_interval":{"type":"string"},"tool_response_limit":{"type":"integer"},"tool_response_mode":{"description":"Tool response mode (Spec 085): how retrieve_tools serializes results.\nValid values: \"\" (= full), \"full\" (default: today's schema-bearing\nentries), \"compact\" (signature + first-sentence entries). Orthogonal to\nrouting_mode — routing_mode selects the tool SURFACE, this selects the\nSERIALIZATION within the retrieve_tools surface. Serialization-only: it\nnever affects the query, ranking, or result set. Hot-reloadable.","type":"string"},"tool_response_session_risk_warning":{"description":"ToolResponseSessionRiskWarning controls whether the prose ` + "`" + `warning` + "`" + ` field\nis included in the ` + "`" + `session_risk` + "`" + ` object returned by ` + "`" + `retrieve_tools` + "`" + `.\nThe structured fields (level, lethal_trifecta, has_open_world_tools, etc.)\nare always included. Default: false (quiet for LLM clients) — see issue #406.\nMost tools lack annotations, so the MCP-spec defaults treat them as fully\npermissive across all three risk axes, which makes the prose warning fire\non almost every call and wastes tokens.","type":"boolean"},"tools_limit":{"type":"integer"},"toon_min_savings_pct":{"description":"ToonMinSavingsPct is the minimum byte-savings percentage (validated\n1-90; 0/unset → 15) the complete TOON emission (marker + hint + body)\nmust achieve over the exact passthrough emission for adaptive mode to\nencode a block. Byte savings approximate token savings for the tabular\npayload class; the spec-083 profiler reports true token deltas.\nGlobal-only (no per-server override, FR-001).","type":"integer"},"toon_output":{"description":"ToonOutput selects the TOON encoding mode for call_tool_* result text\nblocks (spec 084): \"off\" (default — responses byte-identical to\npre-feature behavior), \"adaptive\" (encode only tabular-uniform payloads\nthat beat compact JSON by ToonMinSavingsPct), or \"always\"\n(benchmark/debug only — encodes every JSON-parseable block and can\nINCREASE token cost). Per-server override: ServerConfig.ToonOutput.\nResolved by ResolveToonOutput; hot-reloadable.","type":"string"},"top_k":{"description":"Deprecated: TopK is superseded by ToolsLimit and has no runtime effect. Kept for backward compatibility.","type":"integer"},"tray_endpoint":{"description":"Tray endpoint override (unix:// or npipe://)","type":"string"},"trusted_hosts":{"description":"TrustedHosts lists non-loopback Host header values accepted on loopback\nlisteners (GH #898). DNS-rebinding protection rejects requests whose Host\nheader is not a loopback address when mcpproxy listens on loopback; a\nreverse proxy (nginx → 127.0.0.1) forwarding the public domain in Host\ntrips it. Entries are hostnames, case-insensitive; an entry without a\nport matches any port, with a port it must match exactly; a leading dot\n(\".example.com\") is a subdomain wildcard. The single entry \"*\" disables\nHost and Origin validation entirely. The same list also validates the\nOrigin header when present (MCP spec DNS-rebinding defense). Empty\n(default) keeps full protection. Env override: MCPPROXY_TRUSTED_HOSTS\n(comma-separated).","items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"trusted_proxies":{"description":"TrustedProxies lists the CIDRs or IP addresses whose X-Forwarded-For /\nX-Real-IP / X-Forwarded-Proto / X-Forwarded-Host headers are believed\n(Spec 107 FR-027). Empty (default) trusts nobody. Edition-neutral, live\n(hot-reloadable). Env override: MCPPROXY_TRUSTED_PROXIES (comma-separated).\nThe one reader is ForwardedHeaders; validation is validateTrustedProxies.","items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"update_check":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.UpdateCheckConfig"}},"type":"object"},"config.CustomPattern":{"properties":{"category":{"description":"Category (defaults to \"custom\")","type":"string"},"keywords":{"description":"Keywords to match (mutually exclusive with Regex)","items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"name":{"description":"Unique identifier for this pattern","type":"string"},"regex":{"description":"Regex pattern (mutually exclusive with Keywords)","type":"string"},"severity":{"description":"Risk level: critical, high, medium, low","type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"config.DeepScanConfig":{"description":"DeepScan is the opt-in \"deep scan\" layer (Spec 077 US3). It subsumes the\ndeprecated top-level scanner_fetch_package_source / scanner_disable_no_new_privileges\nkeys (migrated on load) and gates the heavy Docker-based scanners + source\nextraction. Disabled by default (FR-006): only the deterministic in-process\nbaseline scanner runs. A deep-scan failure NEVER changes the baseline verdict\n(FR-007/FR-008).","properties":{"disable_no_new_privileges":{"description":"DisableNoNewPrivileges, when true, omits the ` + "`" + `--security-opt\nno-new-privileges` + "`" + ` flag from scanner container runs (snap-docker/AppArmor\nescape hatch). Absorbs the deprecated top-level\nscanner_disable_no_new_privileges. Default false.","type":"boolean"},"enabled":{"description":"Enabled is the master opt-in for the heavy layer (FR-006). Default false.","type":"boolean"},"fetch_package_source":{"description":"FetchPackageSource controls whether the scanner fetches the PUBLISHED\nsource of package-runner servers (npx/uvx) — without executing it — when\nno local source is available. Absorbs the deprecated top-level\nscanner_fetch_package_source. Default (nil) is ENABLED within deep scan.","type":"boolean"},"scanners":{"description":"Scanners optionally restricts which deep scanners may run under the\numbrella (by scanner id). Empty ⇒ all enabled deep scanners are eligible.","items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false}},"type":"object"},"config.DockerIsolationConfig":{"description":"Docker isolation settings","properties":{"cpu_limit":{"description":"CPU limit for containers","type":"string"},"default_images":{"additionalProperties":{"type":"string"},"description":"Map of runtime type to Docker image","type":"object"},"enable_cache_volume":{"description":"Mount shared cache volumes for faster restarts (default: true)","type":"boolean"},"enabled":{"description":"Global enable/disable for Docker isolation (legacy; superseded by Mode)","type":"boolean"},"extra_args":{"description":"Additional docker run arguments","items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"log_driver":{"description":"Docker log driver (default: json-file)","type":"string"},"log_max_files":{"description":"Maximum number of log files (default: 3)","type":"string"},"log_max_size":{"description":"Maximum size of log files (default: 100m)","type":"string"},"memory_limit":{"description":"Memory limit for containers","type":"string"},"mode":{"description":"Isolation mode: \"docker\" | \"sandbox\" | \"none\" (MCP-34.2). Unset per-server inherits the global mode; unset globally falls back to the legacy \"enabled\" flag (true ⇒ docker, false ⇒ none)","type":"string","x-enum-varnames":["IsolationModeDocker","IsolationModeSandbox","IsolationModeNone"]},"network_mode":{"description":"Docker network mode (default: bridge)","type":"string"},"registry":{"description":"Custom registry (defaults to docker.io)","type":"string"},"timeout":{"description":"Container startup timeout","type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"config.DockerRecoveryConfig":{"description":"Docker recovery settings","properties":{"enabled":{"description":"Enable Docker recovery monitoring (default: true)","type":"boolean"},"max_retries":{"description":"Maximum retry attempts (0 = unlimited)","type":"integer"},"notify_on_failure":{"description":"Show notification on recovery failure (default: true)","type":"boolean"},"notify_on_retry":{"description":"Show notification on each retry (default: false)","type":"boolean"},"notify_on_start":{"description":"Show notification when recovery starts (default: true)","type":"boolean"},"notify_on_success":{"description":"Show notification on successful recovery (default: true)","type":"boolean"},"persistent_state":{"description":"Save recovery state across restarts (default: true)","type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"},"config.FeatureFlags":{"description":"Deprecated: Features flags are unused and have no runtime effect. Kept for backward compatibility.","properties":{"enable_async_storage":{"type":"boolean"},"enable_caching":{"type":"boolean"},"enable_contract_tests":{"type":"boolean"},"enable_debug_logging":{"description":"Development features","type":"boolean"},"enable_docker_isolation":{"type":"boolean"},"enable_event_bus":{"type":"boolean"},"enable_health_checks":{"type":"boolean"},"enable_metrics":{"type":"boolean"},"enable_oauth":{"description":"Security features","type":"boolean"},"enable_observability":{"description":"Observability features","type":"boolean"},"enable_quarantine":{"type":"boolean"},"enable_runtime":{"description":"Runtime features","type":"boolean"},"enable_search":{"description":"Storage features","type":"boolean"},"enable_sse":{"type":"boolean"},"enable_tracing":{"type":"boolean"},"enable_tray":{"type":"boolean"},"enable_web_ui":{"description":"UI features","type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"},"config.IntentDeclarationConfig":{"description":"Intent declaration settings (Spec 018)","properties":{"strict_server_validation":{"description":"StrictServerValidation controls whether server annotation mismatches\ncause rejection (true) or just warnings (false).\nDefault: true (reject mismatches)","type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"},"config.IsolationConfig":{"description":"Per-server isolation settings","properties":{"enabled":{"description":"Enable Docker isolation for this server (nil = inherit global; legacy, superseded by Mode)","type":"boolean"},"extra_args":{"description":"Additional docker run arguments for this server","items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"image":{"description":"Custom Docker image (overrides default)","type":"string"},"log_driver":{"description":"Docker log driver override for this server","type":"string"},"log_max_files":{"description":"Maximum number of log files override","type":"string"},"log_max_size":{"description":"Maximum size of log files override","type":"string"},"mode":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.IsolationMode"},"network_mode":{"description":"Custom network mode for this server","type":"string"},"working_dir":{"description":"Custom working directory in container","type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"config.IsolationMode":{"description":"Isolation mode: \"docker\" | \"sandbox\" | \"none\" (MCP-34.2). Unset per-server inherits the global mode; unset globally falls back to the legacy \"enabled\" flag (true ⇒ docker, false ⇒ none)","type":"string","x-enum-varnames":["IsolationModeDocker","IsolationModeSandbox","IsolationModeNone"]},"config.LogConfig":{"description":"Logging configuration","properties":{"compress":{"type":"boolean"},"enable_console":{"type":"boolean"},"enable_file":{"type":"boolean"},"filename":{"type":"string"},"json_format":{"type":"boolean"},"level":{"type":"string"},"log_dir":{"description":"Custom log directory","type":"string"},"max_age":{"description":"days","type":"integer"},"max_backups":{"description":"number of backup files","type":"integer"},"max_size":{"description":"MB","type":"integer"}},"type":"object"},"config.MetricsExporterConfig":{"description":"Metrics gates the Prometheus /metrics scrape endpoint (MCP-32). Disabled\nby default — operators opt in for k8s/enterprise deployments.","properties":{"enabled":{"description":"Enabled exposes /metrics on the existing HTTP listener when true.\nThe endpoint is admin-authenticated (SEC-07): scrapers must present the\nglobal API key, via X-API-Key or an Authorization: Bearer header.","type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"},"config.OAuthConfig":{"description":"OAuth configuration (keep even when empty to signal OAuth requirement)","properties":{"client_id":{"type":"string"},"client_secret":{"type":"string"},"extra_params":{"additionalProperties":{"type":"string"},"description":"Additional OAuth parameters (e.g., RFC 8707 resource)","type":"object"},"pkce_enabled":{"type":"boolean"},"redirect_uri":{"type":"string"},"scopes":{"items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false}},"type":"object"},"config.ObservabilityConfig":{"description":"Observability settings (Spec 069): usage aggregate cache/persistence cadence.","properties":{"metrics":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.MetricsExporterConfig"},"tracing":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.TracingExporterConfig"},"usage_cache_ttl":{"description":"UsageCacheTTL bounds the freshness of the usage endpoint's read cache for\nwide windows (FR-005). Default 5s.","type":"string"},"usage_persist_interval":{"description":"UsagePersistInterval is how often the actor-owned usage aggregate snapshot\nis flushed to storage. Default 30s.","type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"config.OutputSanitisationConfig":{"description":"Output sanitisation settings (Spec 054 Track B)","properties":{"max_redactions":{"description":"cap on redactions per response; default 100","type":"integer"},"response_action":{"description":"\"spotlight\" | \"redact\" | \"block\"; default \"spotlight\"","type":"string"},"spotlight_untrusted":{"description":"wrap untrusted output in spotlight markers; default true","type":"boolean"},"strip_classes":{"description":"classes to strip: ansi/c0c1/bidi/zero_width","items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"strip_control_chars":{"description":"strip control-character classes; default false","type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"},"config.OutputValidationConfig":{"description":"Output-schema validation settings (Spec 056)","properties":{"max_bytes":{"description":"structured payload byte cap; default 5\u003c\u003c20","type":"integer"},"max_depth":{"description":"nesting depth cap; default 64","type":"integer"},"missing_structured_content":{"description":"\"allow\" | \"block\"; default \"allow\"","type":"string"},"mode":{"description":"\"off\" | \"warn\" | \"strict\"; default \"warn\"","type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"config.ProfileConfig":{"properties":{"code_execution":{"description":"CodeExecution: nil = inherit the global enable_code_execution gate;\nnon-nil narrows it (a profile can only narrow, never widen, FR-006).","type":"boolean"},"description":{"description":"\u003c= 500 chars (FR-001)","type":"string"},"management_tools":{"description":"ManagementTools: nil = legacy/inherit (FR-016); non-nil sets the\nprofile-level visibility of upstream_servers/quarantine_security.","type":"boolean"},"max_tier":{"description":"MaxTier caps the tier a tool may run at under this profile: \"\" (no\ncap) | \"read\" | \"write\" | \"destructive\" (FR-001).","type":"string"},"name":{"description":"slug (Spec 057 rules unchanged)","type":"string"},"servers":{"description":"references to mcpServers[].name","items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"switchable_to":{"description":"SwitchableTo is the list of profile names a session under this\nprofile may ` + "`" + `set_profile` + "`" + ` into (FR-022). nil = legacy/none (research\nD6); a non-nil EMPTY list is an explicit \"none\" and must round-trip as\n` + "`" + `[]` + "`" + `, never be dropped by omitempty — hence the pointer (see the\nMarshalJSON note below, and profiles_v3_test.go's switchable_to round\ntrip case).","items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"title":{"description":"display only, \u003c= 80 chars (FR-001)","type":"string"},"tools":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.ProfileToolRules"},"unannotated":{"description":"Unannotated is this profile's handling of a tool whose effective\nannotations carry no tier hint: \"\" (unset, see EffectiveUnannotated) |\n\"deny\" | \"as_write\" | \"as_read\" (FR-001, FR-003).","type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"config.ProfileToolRules":{"description":"Tools holds the allow/deny/classify rule set (FR-001, FR-004, FR-005).","properties":{"allow":{"items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"classify":{"additionalProperties":{"type":"string"},"type":"object"},"deny":{"items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false}},"type":"object"},"config.RegistryEntry":{"properties":{"count":{"description":"number or string","type":"string"},"description":{"type":"string"},"id":{"type":"string"},"name":{"type":"string"},"protocol":{"type":"string"},"provenance":{"description":"Provenance is the trust tag for this registry (MCP-866):\nRegistryProvenanceOfficial for built-in defaults, RegistryProvenanceCustom\nfor user-added registries. It is authoritatively (re)computed by the\nregistries merge from whether the ID is a shipped default — a user cannot\nclaim \"official\" by writing it into their config.","type":"string"},"requires_key":{"description":"RequiresKey marks a registry that needs an API key to be queried. When\ntrue and no key is configured, the registry is skipped/marked unavailable\nrather than failing the whole search (FR-008).","type":"boolean"},"servers_url":{"type":"string"},"tags":{"items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"url":{"type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"config.SecurityConfig":{"description":"Security scanner settings (Spec 039)","properties":{"auto_baseline_scan":{"description":"AutoBaselineScan is the kill-switch for the AUTOMATIC, informational\nPass-1 baseline scan: the free in-process TPA scan mcpproxy runs for every\nnewly admitted server (any trust mode) and, once per installation, over\npre-existing servers that have never been scanned.\n\nInformational ONLY: the resulting verdict populates the security badge and\nthe scan summary, and NEVER gates quarantine or approval. The\ntrust_mode:\"scan\" admission gate is a separate path and is unaffected by\nthis flag.\n\nDefault (nil) is ENABLED. Set to false to suppress every automatic scan\n(manual scans keep working). Env override: MCPPROXY_AUTO_BASELINE_SCAN,\nwhich wins over this field on every path.","type":"boolean"},"deep_scan":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.DeepScanConfig"},"integrity_check_interval":{"type":"string"},"integrity_check_on_restart":{"type":"boolean"},"runtime_read_only":{"type":"boolean"},"runtime_tmpfs_size":{"type":"string"},"scan_timeout_default":{"type":"string"},"scanner_disable_no_new_privileges":{"description":"Deprecated (Spec 077 US3): migrated on load into DeepScan.DisableNoNewPrivileges\n(see migrateDeepScanConfig). Retained only so existing configs that still carry\nthe top-level key parse; consumers MUST read the effective value via\nSecurityConfig.IsDisableNoNewPrivileges. Cleared after migration.\n\nScannerDisableNoNewPrivileges, when true, omits the\n` + "`" + `--security-opt no-new-privileges` + "`" + ` flag from scanner container runs.\n\nBackground: snap-installed Docker on Ubuntu confines dockerd under the\n` + "`" + `snap.docker.dockerd` + "`" + ` AppArmor profile. When runc tries to transition\nthe container into the inner ` + "`" + `docker-default` + "`" + ` profile to exec the\nentrypoint, AppArmor refuses the transition because NO_NEW_PRIVS\nforbids privilege/profile changes on exec — the result is EPERM\n(\"operation not permitted\") and every scanner fails immediately.\n\nSet this to true ONLY on hosts hitting that incompatibility. Scanner\ncontainers still run with read-only rootfs, tmpfs /tmp, no-network by\ndefault, and read-only source mounts, so the marginal isolation loss\nis small. The preferred fix remains replacing snap docker with a\ndistro-packaged docker.","type":"boolean"},"scanner_fetch_package_source":{"description":"Deprecated (Spec 077 US3): migrated on load into DeepScan.FetchPackageSource\n(see migrateDeepScanConfig). Retained only so existing configs that still carry\nthe top-level key parse; consumers MUST read the effective value via\nSecurityConfig.EffectiveFetchPackageSource. Cleared after migration.\n\nScannerFetchPackageSource controls whether the scanner fetches the\nPUBLISHED source of package-runner servers (npx/uvx) — without executing\nit — when no local source is available (no Docker container, no local\npackage cache, no working_dir). This is the primary quarantine/scan\ntarget: a quarantined-on-add server is never run locally, so without this\nthe scan degrades to tool-definitions-only (no real source-level\nanalysis). See MCP-2206.\n\nFetching uses ` + "`" + `npm pack --ignore-scripts` + "`" + ` (npm) and ` + "`" + `uv pip download` + "`" + ` /\n` + "`" + `pip download` + "`" + ` with ` + "`" + `--only-binary=:all:` + "`" + ` (Python), which only download +\nunpack archives and NEVER run install, build, or setup.py — a scanner must\nnot execute the untrusted code it is scanning. The Python\n` + "`" + `--only-binary=:all:` + "`" + ` flag is required because downloading an sdist would\ninvoke its build backend (setup.py); packages with no wheel fall back to\ntool-definitions-only instead. Extraction is hardened against path\ntraversal and decompression bombs.\n\nDefault (nil) is ENABLED. Set to false on air-gapped deployments to\nforbid the scanner's network egress; such servers then fall back to the\ntool-definitions-only scan with no regression.","type":"boolean"},"scanner_registry_url":{"type":"string"},"tpa_bundle_path":{"description":"TPABundlePath is the filesystem path to the tpa-db scanner-bundle.json\nthe offline TPA scanner runs (spec 086 FR-019: the signature-DB location\nMUST be configuration-driven, not hardcoded). Empty (the default) runs the\ncorpus embedded in this build.\n\nEnv override: MCPPROXY_TPA_BUNDLE_PATH. Hot-reloadable — the path is\nre-read on every config.reloaded event via\nscanner.Service.ApplySecurityConfig, so a corpus refresh needs no restart.\nA configured bundle that fails to read/parse/version-check/compile is\nREFUSED and the previously active corpus stays live (fail-closed, never\nfail-empty); the reason is logged and surfaced in the security overview's\nsignature_bundle.load_error.","type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"config.SensitiveDataDetectionConfig":{"description":"Sensitive data detection settings (Spec 026)","properties":{"categories":{"additionalProperties":{"type":"boolean"},"description":"Enable/disable specific detection categories","type":"object"},"custom_patterns":{"description":"User-defined detection patterns","items":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.CustomPattern"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"enabled":{"description":"Enable sensitive data detection (default: true)","type":"boolean"},"entropy_threshold":{"description":"Shannon entropy threshold for high-entropy detection (default: 4.5)","type":"number"},"max_payload_size_kb":{"description":"Max size to scan before truncating (default: 1024)","type":"integer"},"scan_requests":{"description":"Scan tool call arguments (default: true)","type":"boolean"},"scan_responses":{"description":"Scan tool responses (default: true)","type":"boolean"},"sensitive_keywords":{"description":"Keywords to flag","items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false}},"type":"object"},"config.ServerConfig":{"properties":{"args":{"items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"auto_approve_tool_changes":{"description":"AutoApproveToolChanges is the per-server intent to auto-approve tool\nchanges/additions (disabling per-server rug-pull protection). Supersedes\nskip_quarantine. MCP-2930 only ACCEPTS, persists, and migrates this flag — it\nis NOT yet consulted at runtime; auto-approval is still governed by\nSkipQuarantine until the trust-baseline behavior change (MCP-2931) migrates the\nruntime consumers onto it.\nTri-state pointer (mirrors QuarantineEnabled): nil = unset (inherit/migrate\nfrom legacy skip_quarantine), explicit true/false = honored as-is so an\nexplicit auto_approve_tool_changes:false overrides a legacy skip_quarantine:true.\nRead via IsAutoApproveToolChanges().","type":"boolean"},"command":{"type":"string"},"created":{"type":"string"},"disabled_tools":{"description":"Denylist: these tools are hidden; mutually exclusive with enabled_tools","items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"enabled":{"type":"boolean"},"enabled_tools":{"description":"Allowlist: only these tools are exposed; mutually exclusive with disabled_tools","items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"env":{"additionalProperties":{"type":"string"},"type":"object"},"expose_prompts":{"description":"ExposePrompts overrides whether this server's advertised MCP prompts are\naggregated into mcpproxy's prompts/list. nil (default) inherits the\ndefault-aggregate behavior (included if the server advertises\nCapabilities.Prompts); false excludes it regardless of capability.","type":"boolean"},"forward_headers":{"description":"ForwardHeaders lists inbound MCP-client header NAMES (never values) that\nare copied into this server's upstream tools/call requests (Spec 112).\nExact names, case-insensitive, at most 32, no wildcards. Empty forwards\nnothing. Only HTTP-based transports (http, streamable-http) forward; the\ndeny list (Authorization, Host, hop-by-hop, ...) is enforced at runtime\nregardless of what is configured here.","items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"headers":{"additionalProperties":{"type":"string"},"description":"For HTTP servers","type":"object"},"health_check_interval":{"description":"Per-server discovery \u0026 health-check overrides (spec 074). Same *Duration\ntri-state as the global keys: nil = inherit the global value (or default),\npointer to 0s = disabled for this server, positive = that interval.\nHealthCheckInterval is fully wired into the per-server health loop;\nToolDiscoveryInterval is accepted/validated and round-trips for\nforward-compat, but the periodic index sweep is governed by the global\ncadence in this iteration (see spec 074 plan §C).","type":"string"},"init_timeout":{"description":"InitTimeout overrides the global init_timeout for this server's MCP\n` + "`" + `initialize` + "`" + ` handshake deadline (MCP-3322 / GH #760). *Duration tri-state:\nnil = inherit the global value (or 30s default), positive = that deadline.\nResolved by Config.ResolveInitTimeout; validated to {0} ∪ [1s, 30m]. Raise\nthis for upstreams that do legitimate first-run warmup (e.g. caching many\nchannels/users) before responding to ` + "`" + `initialize` + "`" + `.","type":"string"},"isolation":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.IsolationConfig"},"launcher_wait_timeout":{"description":"LauncherWaitTimeout caps how long mcpproxy will wait for a locally-launched\nHTTP/SSE upstream's URL to become reachable after Spawn(). Only consulted\nwhen the server is configured with both Command and an HTTP/SSE URL — i.e.,\nmcpproxy starts the process AND connects via network. Stdio servers ignore\nthis field. Zero or unset → 30s default.","type":"string"},"max_concurrent_requests":{"description":"Per-server concurrency overrides — scope (c) of FR-020 (spec 093, #955).\nTri-state per setting, exactly like HealthCheckInterval: absent = inherit\nthe per-server default set (server_concurrency_defaults), explicit 0 =\ndisable that setting for this server (0 max = no per-server limiter at\nall; 0 queue_size = no pending capacity, shed immediately at the cap),\npositive = override. The global aggregate limiter is never inherited from\nhere — it applies on top, so effective concurrency is min(per-server,\nglobal). Resolved by Config.ResolveServerConcurrency.","type":"integer"},"name":{"type":"string"},"oauth":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.OAuthConfig"},"protocol":{"description":"stdio, http, sse, streamable-http, auto","type":"string"},"quarantined":{"description":"Security quarantine status","type":"boolean"},"queue_size":{"type":"integer"},"queue_timeout":{"type":"string"},"reconnect_on_use":{"description":"Attempt reconnection when a tool call targets a disconnected server","type":"boolean"},"shared":{"description":"Server edition: shared with all users","type":"boolean"},"skip_quarantine":{"description":"SkipQuarantine is DEPRECATED (MCP-2930): use AutoApproveToolChanges instead.\nKept for back-compat parsing; on config load a legacy skip_quarantine:true is\nmigrated to auto_approve_tool_changes:true only when the new field is unset\n(see normalizeServerQuarantineFlags).","type":"boolean"},"source_registry_id":{"description":"SourceRegistryID records which registry this server was added from (empty\nfor manually-configured servers). MCP-866: surfaced in the approval /\nquarantine view so a reviewer can see a server's origin.","type":"string"},"source_registry_provenance":{"description":"SourceRegistryProvenance records the source registry's provenance at add\ntime (RegistryProvenanceOfficial / RegistryProvenanceCustom). It is purely\ninformational (MCP-1072) — surfaced so a reviewer can see a server's origin\n— and no longer gates quarantine or skip_quarantine.","type":"string"},"tool_discovery_interval":{"type":"string"},"toon_output":{"description":"ToonOutput overrides the global toon_output mode for this server's\ntools (spec 084, FR-001). Plain string, not a pointer: \"\"/absent =\ninherit the global value; \"off\"|\"adaptive\"|\"always\" = override (\"off\"\nis the explicit force-off). Resolved by Config.ResolveToonOutput.","type":"string"},"trust_mode":{"description":"TrustMode is the per-server trust tier: auto|scan|manual. Supersedes\nauto_approve_tool_changes (spec 086). An empty value is derived from the\nlegacy fields at load via normalizeServerQuarantineFlags; the single\nresolution point is EffectiveTrustMode(), which treats an empty or\nunrecognized value as manual (secure by default). Read via\nEffectiveTrustMode(), never the raw string.","type":"string"},"updated":{"type":"string"},"url":{"type":"string"},"working_dir":{"description":"Working directory for stdio servers","type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"config.TLSConfig":{"description":"TLS configuration","properties":{"certs_dir":{"description":"Directory for certificates","type":"string"},"enabled":{"description":"Enable HTTPS","type":"boolean"},"hsts":{"description":"Enable HTTP Strict Transport Security","type":"boolean"},"require_client_cert":{"description":"Enable mTLS","type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"},"config.TelemetryConfig":{"description":"Telemetry settings (Spec 036)","properties":{"anonymous_id":{"description":"Auto-generated UUIDv4","type":"string"},"anonymous_id_created_at":{"description":"Spec 042 (Tier 2) additions — all default-zero, all backwards-compatible.","type":"string"},"enabled":{"description":"Default: true (opt-out)","type":"boolean"},"endpoint":{"description":"Override for testing","type":"string"},"last_reported_version":{"description":"Upgrade funnel","type":"string"},"last_startup_outcome":{"description":"success|port_conflict|db_locked|...","type":"string"},"notice_shown":{"description":"First-run notice flag","type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"},"config.TokenizerConfig":{"description":"Tokenizer configuration for token counting","properties":{"default_model":{"description":"Default model for tokenization (e.g., \"gpt-4\")","type":"string"},"enabled":{"description":"Enable token counting","type":"boolean"},"encoding":{"description":"Default encoding (e.g., \"cl100k_base\")","type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"config.TracingExporterConfig":{"description":"Tracing gates the OpenTelemetry OTLP trace exporter (MCP-32). Disabled by\ndefault.","properties":{"enabled":{"description":"Enabled turns on OTLP trace export for tool calls and upstream hops.","type":"boolean"},"endpoint":{"description":"Endpoint is the collector address as host:port (no scheme), e.g.\n\"localhost:4318\" for http or \"localhost:4317\" for grpc.","type":"string"},"protocol":{"description":"Protocol selects the OTLP transport: \"http\" or \"grpc\".","type":"string"},"sample_rate":{"description":"SampleRate is the head-based trace sampling ratio in [0,1]. Default 0.1.\nOmit the key for the 0.1 default; set it to 0 to sample nothing.","type":"number"}},"type":"object"},"config.UpdateCheckConfig":{"description":"Update-check settings (Spec 079 FR-012): config-file control of the\nbackground upgrade-awareness checker (internal/updatecheck). nil =\nenabled on the stable channel (existing default behavior). The existing\nenvironment switches keep working and WIN over these keys (FR-014):\nMCPPROXY_DISABLE_AUTO_UPDATE=true force-disables even when\nenabled=true, and MCPPROXY_ALLOW_PRERELEASE_UPDATES=true force-selects\nthe rc channel even when channel=stable.","properties":{"channel":{"description":"Channel selects which releases are offered as updates: \"stable\"\n(default; prereleases never offered) or \"rc\" (prereleases included).\nEmpty resolves to stable. Validated in ValidateDetailed.\n\nNOTE: for a RELEASED build the running binary's own version is\nauthoritative and overrides this field — a stable build is never\noffered an RC (even with channel=rc), and an RC build always tracks the\nrc channel. This field only takes effect on dev/unstamped builds. See\ninternal/updatecheck.Checker.IncludePrereleases.","type":"string"},"enabled":{"description":"Enabled gates all update checking. Tri-state: nil/absent = enabled\n(default true, matching pre-079 behavior). When false, no network\ncheck is performed and no upgrade nudge appears on any surface\n(FR-015) — /api/v1/info omits the update object entirely.","type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"},"configimport.FailedServer":{"properties":{"details":{"type":"string"},"error":{"type":"string"},"name":{"type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"configimport.ImportSummary":{"properties":{"failed":{"type":"integer"},"imported":{"type":"integer"},"skipped":{"type":"integer"},"total":{"type":"integer"}},"type":"object"},"configimport.SkippedServer":{"properties":{"name":{"type":"string"},"reason":{"description":"\"already_exists\", \"filtered_out\", \"invalid_name\", \"self_reference\"","type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"connect.ConnectResult":{"description":"The full result; its action mirrors the top-level one","properties":{"action":{"description":"\"created\", \"updated\", \"already_exists\", \"removed\", \"not_found\"","type":"string"},"backup_path":{"type":"string"},"client":{"type":"string"},"config_path":{"type":"string"},"credential":{"description":"Credential is the masked client credential the write embedded\n(` + "`" + `mcp_cli_••••` + "`" + `); the real secret is never returned (FR-024). Empty for a\nkeyless entry, a disconnect and every refusal.","type":"string"},"credential_revoked":{"description":"CredentialRevoked names the credential an undo revoked because the\nrestored config no longer holds it (plan D16).","type":"string"},"display_path":{"description":"DisplayPath is ConfigPath with the home directory shortened to \"~\"\n(FR-037). Populated for every result whose ConfigPath is known.","type":"string"},"keyless":{"description":"Keyless is true when the entry was written with no credential.","type":"boolean"},"message":{"type":"string"},"mode":{"type":"string"},"profile":{"description":"Profile and Mode are the binding of the credential this write minted or\nkept. Profile \"\" means the built-in All servers scope.","type":"string"},"reload_hint":{"description":"ReloadHint is this client's instruction for making the write take\neffect (FR-037/FR-042), e.g. \"Restart Cursor to load MCPProxy\". Empty\nfor an unknown client.","type":"string"},"rotation":{"description":"Rotation is \"finalized\" when the write replaced an active credential's\nsecret (staged rotation, FR-021a), empty otherwise.","type":"string"},"server_name":{"type":"string"},"success":{"type":"boolean"},"token_name":{"description":"TokenName is the client credential's token name (` + "`" + `client-\u003cid\u003e` + "`" + `).","type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.APIResponse":{"allOf":[{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/data"}],"properties":{"data":{"type":"object"},"error":{"type":"string"},"request_id":{"type":"string"},"success":{"type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.ActivityDetailResponse":{"properties":{"activity":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ActivityRecord"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.ActivityListResponse":{"properties":{"activities":{"items":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ActivityRecord"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"limit":{"type":"integer"},"offset":{"type":"integer"},"total":{"type":"integer"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.ActivityPerServer":{"properties":{"calls":{"description":"Calls counted per storage.CountsAsCall","type":"integer"},"errors":{"description":"Of those calls, how many failed","type":"integer"},"last_call_at":{"description":"LastCallAt is RFC3339, or \"\" if the server had no call in the period\n(PerServer only lists servers that did, so this is always set).","type":"string"},"name":{"description":"Server name","type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.ActivityRecord":{"properties":{"agent_name":{"description":"Agent token name when auth_type is \"agent\"","type":"string"},"arguments":{"description":"Tool call arguments","type":"object"},"auth_type":{"description":"\"admin\", \"agent\", \"user\" or \"admin_user\"; empty without an auth context or on another caller's row for a scoped caller","type":"string"},"block_reason":{"description":"Typed cause of a profile policy refusal","type":"string"},"client_id":{"description":"Client id from the client-credential binding","type":"string"},"client_name":{"description":"Self-reported clientInfo.name (advisory)","type":"string"},"detection_types":{"description":"List of detection types found","items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"duration_ms":{"description":"Execution duration in milliseconds","type":"integer"},"error_message":{"description":"Error details if status is \"error\"","type":"string"},"has_sensitive_data":{"description":"Sensitive data detection fields (Spec 026)","type":"boolean"},"id":{"description":"Unique identifier (ULID format)","type":"string"},"max_severity":{"description":"Highest severity level detected (critical, high, medium, low)","type":"string"},"metadata":{"description":"Additional context-specific data","type":"object"},"parent_id":{"description":"Correlation id of the parent call (the code_execution whose sandbox issued this sub-call)","type":"string"},"profile":{"description":"Scope attribution (Spec 108 FR-029): the profile, client and token in\neffect when the call ran. Stamped at write time, never rewritten. For a\nscoped (non-admin) caller the profile/profile_source/client_id/token_name\nof a row it did not make are blanked (binding disclosure is admin-only);\nclient_name is self-reported and stays. Absent on records written before\nSpec 108 and on records with no MCP/REST request context.","type":"string"},"profile_source":{"description":"pin|binding|url|session|anonymous|none","type":"string"},"request_bytes":{"description":"Byte sizes measured pre-truncation, mirroring storage.ActivityRecord\n(Spec 069 A1). They are the only cost signal a bodies-off export carries:\nwith payloads suppressed there is no text left to measure, so a consumer\naccounting for a record it cannot read has nothing else to go on. They are\nbyte LENGTHS, not token counts — the basis for an explicit estimate, never\na measured figure (spec 103, contracts/replay-input.md).\n\nZero means UNKNOWN, not free: legacy records predate the measurement and\ncode-execution sub-calls record both as zero. Hence omitempty — an absent\nkey tells a consumer to fall to exclusion accounting, whereas a present\nzero would read as a costless call and silently understate the workload.","type":"integer"},"request_id":{"description":"HTTP request ID for correlation","type":"string"},"response":{"description":"Tool response (potentially truncated)","type":"string"},"response_bytes":{"description":"Raw upstream response size in bytes before truncation","type":"integer"},"response_truncated":{"description":"True if response was truncated","type":"boolean"},"server_name":{"description":"Name of upstream MCP server","type":"string"},"session_id":{"description":"MCP transport session ID (regenerated on every reconnect)","type":"string"},"source":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ActivitySource"},"status":{"description":"Result status: \"success\", \"error\", \"blocked\", \"rejected\"","type":"string"},"timestamp":{"description":"When activity occurred","type":"string"},"token_name":{"description":"Agent/client token name","type":"string"},"tool_name":{"description":"Name of tool called","type":"string"},"type":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ActivityType"},"work_session_id":{"description":"Spec 082: one client, one project, across reconnects","type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.ActivitySource":{"description":"How activity was triggered: \"mcp\", \"cli\", \"api\"","type":"string","x-enum-varnames":["ActivitySourceMCP","ActivitySourceCLI","ActivitySourceAPI"]},"contracts.ActivitySummaryResponse":{"properties":{"blocked_count":{"description":"Count of blocked activities","type":"integer"},"call_count":{"description":"CallCount is how many of those records are CALLS THE USER MADE, as\ndefined once in storage.CountsAsCall and shared with the usage aggregate\nbehind the Usage tab (audit finding F1, #1046). TotalCount answers \"how\nmany rows does the Activity Log have\"; CallCount answers \"how many calls\nwere there\". They are different questions — quarantine auto-approvals,\nsystem start, security scans and management chatter are events, not calls\n— and printing either one under the other's label is how the same instance\ncame to report 51 calls on one screen and 19 on another.","type":"integer"},"call_error_count":{"description":"CallErrorCount is the failures within CallCount, so an error RATE computed\nfrom this response has one denominator. It is not ErrorCount: a policy\nblock is a failed call but carries status \"blocked\", and a shed call is an\nerror in neither sense because it never ran.","type":"integer"},"end_time":{"description":"End of the period (RFC3339)","type":"string"},"error_count":{"description":"Count of error activities","type":"integer"},"other_count":{"description":"OtherCount is every record whose status is outside the four-value\nvocabulary above, so that\n\n\tsuccess + error + blocked + rejected + other == total\n\nholds by construction. The status field is a CLOSED vocabulary for tool\ncalls, but the activity log is wider than tool calls: a quarantine change\nstores its ACTION there (\"approved\", \"auto_approved\"), a policy decision\nstores its DECISION (\"allow\"). Those rows were counted in the total and in\nnone of the four buckets, so the Activity Log's own status tiles summed to\nless than the denominator printed beside them — 15+4+0+0 under a \"42\"\n(audit finding F2, #1046). 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That failure is surfaced via DeepScan instead.","type":"integer"},"scanners_total":{"type":"integer"},"status":{"description":"\"clean\", \"warnings\", \"dangerous\", \"failed\", \"not_scanned\", \"scanning\"","type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.Server":{"properties":{"args":{"items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"authenticated":{"description":"OAuth authentication status","type":"boolean"},"auto_approve_tool_changes":{"description":"AutoApproveToolChanges mirrors config.ServerConfig.AutoApproveToolChanges\n(MCP-2930): the per-server intent to auto-approve new/changed tools past\nthe trust baseline. Tri-state *bool — nil means \"never set\" (omitted from\nthe payload), so the Web UI toggle (MCP-2932) can distinguish unset from\nan explicit false. Read-only on the GET path; PATCH/POST accept it via\nAddServerRequest.","type":"boolean"},"command":{"type":"string"},"connected":{"type":"boolean"},"connected_at":{"type":"string"},"connecting":{"type":"boolean"},"created":{"type":"string"},"diagnostic":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.Diagnostic"},"enabled":{"type":"boolean"},"env":{"additionalProperties":{"type":"string"},"type":"object"},"error_code":{"type":"string"},"expose_prompts":{"description":"ExposePrompts mirrors config.ServerConfig.ExposePrompts (F9): the per-server\nprompt-aggregation override. Tri-state *bool — nil/omitted means \"inherit\ndefault aggregation\". Surfaced on GET so a caller that PATCHed the override\ncan read it back; PATCH/POST accept it via AddServerRequest.","type":"boolean"},"forward_headers":{"description":"ForwardHeaders mirrors config.ServerConfig.ForwardHeaders (Spec 112): the\nallowlist of inbound MCP client header NAMES forwarded to this server on\ntools/call. Names only, never values. Omitted when empty.","items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"headers":{"additionalProperties":{"type":"string"},"type":"object"},"health":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.HealthStatus"},"id":{"type":"string"},"init_timeout":{"description":"InitTimeout mirrors config.ServerConfig.InitTimeout (MCP-3322 / GH #760):\nthe per-server MCP ` + "`" + `initialize` + "`" + ` handshake deadline override. Serialized as\na duration string (e.g. \"120s\"); nil/omitted means \"inherit the global\ndefault\". Surfaced on the GET path so clients can read back a configured\noverride; PATCH/POST accept it via AddServerRequest.","type":"string"},"isolation":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.IsolationConfig"},"isolation_defaults":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.IsolationDefaults"},"isolation_effective":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.IsolationEffective"},"last_error":{"type":"string"},"last_reconnect_at":{"type":"string"},"last_retry_time":{"type":"string"},"max_concurrent_requests":{"description":"Spec 093 (GH #955) — per-server concurrency overrides, scope (c) of\nFR-020. Each setting is tri-state: nil (omitted) means \"inherit\nserver_concurrency_defaults\", 0 disables that setting for this server,\npositive overrides it. Surfaced on the GET path so a caller can read back\nwhat it set; PATCH/POST accept them via AddServerRequest. The effective\nconcurrency for a server is additionally bounded by the global aggregate\nlimiter, which is NOT an inheritance source for these fields.","type":"integer"},"name":{"type":"string"},"oauth":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.OAuthConfig"},"oauth_status":{"description":"OAuth status: \"authenticated\", \"expired\", \"error\", \"none\"","type":"string"},"protocol":{"type":"string"},"quarantine":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.QuarantineStats"},"quarantined":{"type":"boolean"},"queue_size":{"type":"integer"},"queue_timeout":{"type":"string"},"reconnect_count":{"type":"integer"},"reconnect_on_use":{"description":"Attempt reconnection when a tool call targets this disconnected server","type":"boolean"},"retry_count":{"type":"integer"},"retry_stopped":{"description":"RetryStopped reports that automatic reconnection has been given up for\ngood because the failure is deterministic and unrecoverable — a missing\nbinary, an image without the interpreter, an unparseable config (GH\n#1145). It is NOT ordinary exponential backoff, which keeps retrying;\nnothing will happen until the user fixes the config or restarts the\nserver. RetryStoppedCode is the stable MCPX_* code that proved it and\nRetryStoppedReason the catalog message explaining how to fix it. All three\nare omitted for servers that are healthy or still retrying.","type":"boolean"},"retry_stopped_code":{"type":"string"},"retry_stopped_reason":{"type":"string"},"security_scan":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.SecurityScanSummary"},"should_retry":{"type":"boolean"},"source_registry_id":{"description":"MCP-901 — registry provenance of an upstream that was added from a\nregistry. SourceRegistryID names the source registry (empty for\nmanually-configured servers); SourceRegistryProvenance is the trust tag\nrecorded at add time (\"official/trusted\" or \"custom/unverified\"). Both\nare projected from config.ServerConfig so the approval/quarantine view\ncan render an \"added from \u003cregistry\u003e · unverified\" origin badge. Optional\nand omitted when empty — clients that pre-date this treat them as absent.","type":"string"},"source_registry_provenance":{"type":"string"},"status":{"type":"string"},"token_expires_at":{"description":"When the OAuth token expires (ISO 8601)","type":"string"},"tool_count":{"type":"integer"},"tool_list_token_size":{"description":"Token size for this server's tools","type":"integer"},"trust_mode":{"description":"TrustMode mirrors config.ServerConfig.TrustMode (spec 086): the per-server\ntrust tier (\"auto\"/\"scan\"/\"manual\"). 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The Web\nUI and macOS render an \"estimate\" label while this is true.","type":"boolean"},"per_server_tool_list_sizes":{"additionalProperties":{"type":"integer"},"description":"Token size per server","type":"object"},"saved_tokens":{"description":"Difference","type":"integer"},"saved_tokens_percentage":{"description":"Percentage saved","type":"number"},"total_server_tool_list_size":{"description":"All upstream tools combined (tokens)","type":"integer"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.SuccessResponse":{"properties":{"data":{"type":"object"},"success":{"type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.Tier":{"description":"Tier is computed by AnnotationTier (Spec 109 FR-028/X11) from\nAnnotations — read|write|destructive|unannotated. Set by every producer\nof a Tool (enrichServerTools, the global tools handler); never left for\na consuming surface to compute.","type":"string","x-enum-varnames":["TierRead","TierWrite","TierDestructive","TierUnannotated","TierUnknown"]},"contracts.TokenMetrics":{"description":"Token usage metrics (nil for older records)","properties":{"encoding":{"description":"Encoding used (e.g., cl100k_base)","type":"string"},"estimated_cost":{"description":"Optional cost estimate","type":"number"},"input_tokens":{"description":"Tokens in the request","type":"integer"},"model":{"description":"Model used for tokenization","type":"string"},"output_tokens":{"description":"Tokens in the response","type":"integer"},"total_tokens":{"description":"Total tokens (input + output)","type":"integer"},"truncated_tokens":{"description":"Tokens removed by truncation","type":"integer"},"was_truncated":{"description":"Whether response was truncated","type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.Tool":{"properties":{"access":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ToolAccess"},"annotations":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ToolAnnotation"},"approval_status":{"type":"string"},"config_denied":{"description":"ConfigDenied is true when the tool is denied by the server's static\nenabled_tools / disabled_tools config. The user cannot override this toggle.","type":"boolean"},"description":{"type":"string"},"disabled":{"description":"Disabled mirrors ToolApprovalRecord.Disabled so per-tool enable state is\navailable without a second round-trip to the approvals endpoint. Absent\nin the JSON when false (default) to keep responses compact.","type":"boolean"},"hash":{"description":"Hash is the tool's current stored hash rendered in the preflight pin\nformat \"sha256/v{N}:{hex}\" (Spec 098 FR-011), where N is the approval\nrecord's HashSchemaVersion. It is the authoring surface for\n` + "`" + `POST /api/v1/preflight` + "`" + ` pins and ` + "`" + `mcpproxy tools preflight --pin` + "`" + `:\ncopy the value straight into a pin.\n\nDisclosure is OPERATOR TIER ONLY — same rule as the preflight per-tool\nresult. The field is omitted for agent-token callers and for tools with\nno stored hash (no approval record yet, or a record written before\nhashes existed).","type":"string"},"held_reason":{"description":"HeldReason, HeldVerdict and HeldSignals mirror the same-named fields on\nstorage.ToolApprovalRecord: the offline-scan evidence that made\ntrust_mode: scan hold this tool for review (spec 086 FR-018). HeldSignals\nnames the matched deterministic check ids, e.g.\n\"tpa.TPA-2026-0001.hidden_instruction\", so a reviewer can see WHY the tool\nis held. All three are omitted for tools that are not held by the scan gate\n(including every record written before the field existed).","type":"string"},"held_signals":{"items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"held_verdict":{"type":"string"},"last_used":{"type":"string"},"name":{"type":"string"},"profile_tier":{"description":"ProfileTier and Access are present only in a view-as listing (a tools\nlisting with ?client= or ?profile=, Spec 108 FR-032). ProfileTier is the\ntool's tier under the viewed subject's profile (Tier above stays the\nintrinsic tier); Access is the subject's verdict for the tool. Absent\notherwise, so an ordinary listing is byte-identical to before.","type":"string","x-enum-varnames":["TierRead","TierWrite","TierDestructive","TierUnannotated","TierUnknown"]},"schema":{"type":"object"},"server_name":{"type":"string"},"tier":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.Tier"},"usage":{"type":"integer"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.ToolAccess":{"properties":{"callable":{"type":"boolean"},"reason":{"type":"string"},"visible":{"type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.ToolAnnotation":{"description":"Tool behavior hints snapshot","properties":{"destructiveHint":{"type":"boolean"},"idempotentHint":{"type":"boolean"},"openWorldHint":{"type":"boolean"},"readOnlyHint":{"type":"boolean"},"title":{"type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.ToolCallRecord":{"description":"The new tool call record","properties":{"annotations":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ToolAnnotation"},"arguments":{"description":"Tool arguments","type":"object"},"arguments_truncated":{"description":"ArgumentsTruncated marks Arguments as a placeholder rather than the\narguments the tool was called with. Replaying such a record without\nsupplying arguments explicitly is refused.","type":"boolean"},"config_path":{"description":"Active config file path","type":"string"},"duration":{"description":"Duration in nanoseconds","type":"integer"},"error":{"description":"Error message (failure only)","type":"string"},"execution_type":{"description":"\"direct\" or \"code_execution\"","type":"string"},"id":{"description":"Unique identifier","type":"string"},"mcp_client_name":{"description":"MCP client name from InitializeRequest","type":"string"},"mcp_client_version":{"description":"MCP client version","type":"string"},"mcp_session_id":{"description":"MCP session identifier","type":"string"},"metrics":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.TokenMetrics"},"parent_call_id":{"description":"Links nested calls to parent code_execution","type":"string"},"request_id":{"description":"Request correlation ID","type":"string"},"response":{"description":"Tool response (success only)","type":"object"},"response_bytes":{"description":"Marshalled response size before truncation","type":"integer"},"response_truncated":{"description":"ResponseTruncated and ResponseBytes describe a STORAGE-side cut (#1176):\nthe caller received the response whole, and only the persisted copy was\nshortened to tool_call_max_response_size. When ResponseTruncated is true\nthe Response object carries {truncated, original_bytes, preview, note}\ninstead of the upstream result, and ResponseBytes is its size before the\ncut.","type":"boolean"},"server_id":{"description":"Server identity hash","type":"string"},"server_name":{"description":"Human-readable server name","type":"string"},"timestamp":{"description":"When the call was made","type":"string"},"tool_name":{"description":"Tool name (without server prefix)","type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.UpdateInfo":{"description":"Update information (if available)","properties":{"available":{"description":"Whether an update is available","type":"boolean"},"behind_summary":{"description":"Spec 079 FR-002 — how far behind the running build is. All four are\nadditive (FR-021) and absent when the delta could not be resolved, in\nwhich case every surface renders its pre-delta wording.","type":"string"},"check_error":{"description":"Error message if update check failed","type":"string"},"checked_at":{"description":"When the update check was performed","type":"string"},"install_channel":{"description":"Detected install channel (homebrew, dmg, deb, rpm, docker, go-install, windows-installer, tarball, unknown) — Spec 079 FR-008","type":"string"},"is_prerelease":{"description":"Whether the latest version is a prerelease","type":"boolean"},"latest_version":{"description":"Latest version available (e.g., \"v1.2.3\")","type":"string"},"nudges_suppressed":{"description":"UI surfaces must stay quiet (CI / non-interactive context); machine-readable fields still report the facts — Spec 079 FR-019","type":"boolean"},"release_url":{"description":"URL to the release page","type":"string"},"releases_behind":{"description":"Releases on the offered channel between the running and offered versions","type":"integer"},"releases_behind_saturated":{"description":"ReleasesBehind is a lower bound: the running build predates the scanned release window","type":"boolean"},"update_command":{"description":"One-line update command for the channel; only set when an update is available and the channel has one — Spec 079 FR-009","type":"string"},"weeks_behind":{"description":"Whole weeks between the two releases' publish dates; 0 is a real value, absent means unknown","type":"integer"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.UpdatePolicy":{"description":"UpdatePolicy is the effective, hot-reloadable update policy (Spec 092\nFR-015). Always present: the ` + "`" + `update` + "`" + ` object above is omitted both when\nupdate checking is disabled AND when no check has produced a result\nyet, so its absence cannot tell a client whether it is allowed to run\nits own (e.g. Sparkle feed) check. This field states the answer.","properties":{"channel":{"description":"Channel is the tracked release channel: \"stable\" or \"rc\".","type":"string"},"enabled":{"description":"Enabled is the effective automatic-check kill switch: update_check.enabled\nwith MCPPROXY_DISABLE_AUTO_UPDATE=true winning over it. A user-initiated\n\"Check for Updates\" stays available regardless.","type":"boolean"},"nudges_suppressed":{"description":"NudgesSuppressed asks UI surfaces to stay quiet (CI / non-interactive)\nwhile machine-readable fields keep reporting the facts.","type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.UpstreamError":{"properties":{"error_message":{"type":"string"},"server_name":{"type":"string"},"timestamp":{"type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.UsageAggregateResponse":{"properties":{"freshness_ms":{"description":"age of the underlying snapshot in ms","type":"integer"},"generated_at":{"type":"string"},"other":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.UsageOtherBucket"},"timeline":{"items":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.UsageTimeBucket"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"token_source":{"description":"\"bytes\" (size-based proxy, FR-006)","type":"string"},"tokens_saved":{"description":"echoed from ServerTokenMetrics (FR-007)","type":"integer"},"tokens_saved_estimated":{"description":"TokensSavedEstimated echoes ServerTokenMetrics.Estimated (Spec 109-k):\ntrue while TokensSaved is a synthetic simulation rather than derived\nfrom a real retrieve_tools call. Dropped (false, the zero value) for a\nscoped caller along with TokensSaved itself, above.","type":"boolean"},"tokens_saved_percentage":{"type":"number"},"tools":{"items":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.UsageToolStat"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"total_calls":{"description":"TotalCalls and TotalErrors are the headline counts for the window: the sum\nof the timeline this same response carries, so the tiles and the histogram\nunder them cannot disagree. They are NOT the sum of Tools — that list is\nlifetime-cumulative, upstream-only and truncated to top-N, and summing it\nclient-side is what made the Usage tab print a third number for the same\n24 hours (audit finding F1, #1046). The population is\nstorage.CountsAsCall, shared with ActivitySummaryResponse.CallCount.\n\nTwo bounds on how exactly this matches the Activity Log's own count.\nBoth are bounded and disclosed, unlike the population mismatch they\nreplace, which was unbounded and silent:\n\n - Window granularity is the timeline's: whole hour buckets, so the span\n is the requested window rounded up to a bucket edge.\n - This response is served from a snapshot behind a short read cache\n (observability.usage_cache_ttl, 5s by default) so the endpoint never\n scans the activity log per request, while the summary endpoint counts\n live. Calls that land inside that window appear on the Activity Log\n first. 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P50Exceeds /\nP95Exceeds flip that reading for the unbounded overflow bucket, where the\nvalue is the last bound and the truth is above it (\"\u003e 10 s\").","type":"integer"},"p95_exceeds":{"type":"boolean"},"p95_ms":{"type":"integer"},"rejected":{"description":"spec 093: shed by a concurrency limit; never executed, so excluded from calls/latency","type":"integer"},"server":{"type":"string"},"sized_calls":{"description":"calls with known response size (basis for avg_resp_bytes)","type":"integer"},"tool":{"type":"string"},"total_req_bytes":{"type":"integer"},"total_resp_bytes":{"type":"integer"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.ValidateConfigResponse":{"properties":{"errors":{"items":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ValidationError"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"valid":{"type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.ValidationError":{"properties":{"field":{"type":"string"},"message":{"type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"contracts.ViewAsCounts":{"description":"Counts is present only for a NON-administrator profile view-as (Spec 108\nFR-032): the response then lists only the visible rows, and this is the\nonly trace of the rest, with no per-server, per-tier or per-reason\nbreakdown.","properties":{"hidden":{"type":"integer"},"visible":{"type":"integer"}},"type":"object"},"data":{"properties":{"data":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.InfoResponse"}},"type":"object"},"httpapi.AccessExplanationData":{"properties":{"first_failure":{"type":"string","x-enum-varnames":["StepCredential","StepProfile","StepServerInScope","StepToolRule","StepTierCap","StepTokenPermission","StepGlobalGate","StepServerState","StepToolApproval"]},"fixes":{"items":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/runtime.Fix"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"profile":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/runtime.ExplainProfileView"},"steps":{"items":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/runtime.ExplainStepView"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"subject":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/runtime.ExplainSubjectView"},"tool":{"type":"string"},"verdict":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/profile.ExplainVerdict"}},"type":"object"},"httpapi.AddServerRequest":{"properties":{"args":{"items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"auto_approve_tool_changes":{"description":"AutoApproveToolChanges is the per-server intent to auto-approve\nnew/changed tools past the trust baseline (MCP-2930). Tri-state *bool:\na nil pointer means \"leave unchanged\" on PATCH; a present value\n(including false) is applied. Mirrors config.ServerConfig's *bool\nsemantics — do NOT collapse to a plain bool, or an omitted field would\nsilently reset a previously-set value.","type":"boolean"},"command":{"type":"string"},"enabled":{"type":"boolean"},"env":{"additionalProperties":{"type":"string"},"type":"object"},"expose_prompts":{"description":"ExposePrompts is the per-server override for prompt aggregation (F9):\nwhether this server's advertised MCP prompts are merged into mcpproxy's\nprompts/list. Tri-state *bool mirroring config.ServerConfig.ExposePrompts —\na nil pointer means \"leave unchanged\" on PATCH (and \"inherit the default\naggregate behavior\" on create); a present value (including false) is applied.","type":"boolean"},"forward_headers":{"description":"ForwardHeaders is the per-server allowlist of inbound MCP client header\nNAMES forwarded to this server on tools/call (Spec 112). Names only, never\nvalues. On PATCH a nil slice (field omitted) leaves the stored allowlist\nunchanged and an empty array ([]) clears it. Invalid, denied, duplicate\nand static-header-colliding names are rejected with 400.","items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"headers":{"additionalProperties":{"type":"string"},"type":"object"},"init_timeout":{"description":"InitTimeout is the per-server MCP ` + "`" + `initialize` + "`" + ` handshake deadline override\n(MCP-3322 / GH #760), serialized as a duration string (e.g. \"120s\"). A nil\npointer means \"leave unchanged\" on PATCH; a present value is applied.\nMirrors config.ServerConfig.InitTimeout's *Duration tri-state.","type":"string"},"isolation":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/httpapi.IsolationRequest"},"max_concurrent_requests":{"description":"MaxConcurrentRequests / QueueSize / QueueTimeout are the per-server\nconcurrency overrides (spec 093 / GH #955, FR-020 scope (c)). Each is\ntri-state: a nil pointer means \"leave unchanged\" on PATCH and \"inherit\nserver_concurrency_defaults\" on create; an explicit 0 disables that\nsetting for this server; a positive value overrides it. Do NOT collapse\nthem to plain values — an omitted field would then silently reset a\nconfigured limit.","type":"integer"},"name":{"type":"string"},"protocol":{"type":"string"},"quarantined":{"type":"boolean"},"queue_size":{"type":"integer"},"queue_timeout":{"type":"string"},"reconnect_on_use":{"type":"boolean"},"trust_mode":{"description":"TrustMode is the per-server trust tier (spec 086): \"auto\", \"scan\", or\n\"manual\". Empty means \"leave unchanged\" on PATCH (and inherit the migrated\ndefault on create). A non-empty value is applied to ServerConfig.TrustMode\nand resolved by EffectiveTrustMode (an unrecognized value fails closed to\nmanual). This is the REST seam for changing the trust tier via\nPOST/PATCH /api/v1/servers.","type":"string"},"url":{"type":"string"},"working_dir":{"type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"httpapi.BindingGuardResponse":{"properties":{"bindings":{"items":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/httpapi.GuardBinding"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"code":{"description":"binding_bypassable_without_auth","type":"string"},"error":{"description":"Human-readable, byte-stable refusal text","type":"string"},"fixes":{"items":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/httpapi.GuardFixOption"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"request_id":{"type":"string"},"success":{"description":"Always false","type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"},"httpapi.BulkAssignRequest":{"properties":{"from_profile":{"type":"string"},"mode":{"type":"string"},"to_profile":{"type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"httpapi.BulkAssignResponse":{"properties":{"moved":{"items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"skipped":{"items":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/httpapi.BulkAssignSkipped"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false}},"type":"object"},"httpapi.BulkAssignSkipped":{"properties":{"client_id":{"type":"string"},"code":{"type":"string"},"error":{"type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"httpapi.CanonicalConfigPath":{"properties":{"description":{"description":"Brief description","type":"string"},"exists":{"description":"Whether the file exists","type":"boolean"},"format":{"description":"Format identifier (e.g., \"claude_desktop\")","type":"string"},"name":{"description":"Display name (e.g., \"Claude Desktop\")","type":"string"},"os":{"description":"Operating system (darwin, windows, linux)","type":"string"},"path":{"description":"Full path to the config file","type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"httpapi.CanonicalConfigPathsResponse":{"properties":{"os":{"description":"Current operating system","type":"string"},"paths":{"description":"List of canonical config paths","items":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/httpapi.CanonicalConfigPath"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false}},"type":"object"},"httpapi.ClientBindingErrorResponse":{"properties":{"code":{"type":"string"},"error":{"type":"string"},"field":{"type":"string"},"request_id":{"type":"string"},"success":{"description":"Always false","type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"},"httpapi.ClientBindingResponse":{"properties":{"client":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/httpapi.clientPresence"},"warnings":{"items":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/httpapi.ClientWarning"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false}},"type":"object"},"httpapi.ClientSnippet":{"properties":{"generic_http":{"type":"string"},"header_name":{"type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"httpapi.ClientWarning":{"properties":{"action":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/runtime.WarningAction"},"bindings":{"items":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/runtime.BindingRef"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"client_id":{"type":"string"},"code":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/profile.WarningCode"},"fixes":{"items":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/runtime.GuardFix"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"message":{"type":"string"},"severity":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/profile.WarningSeverity"}},"type":"object"},"httpapi.ConnectConflictResponse":{"properties":{"action":{"description":"already_exists | precondition_failed","type":"string"},"data":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/connect.ConnectResult"},"error":{"description":"Human-readable message","type":"string"},"success":{"description":"Always false","type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"},"httpapi.ConnectRequest":{"properties":{"force":{"description":"Overwrite existing entry","type":"boolean"},"keyless":{"type":"boolean"},"mode":{"type":"string"},"precondition_token":{"description":"PreconditionToken is the opaque token from the preview this write was\nconfirmed against (Spec 091 FR-005). 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Keyless writes a credential-less entry and\nis only possible while require_mcp_auth is off; it cannot carry a\nprofile or mode.","type":"string"},"server_name":{"description":"Defaults to \"mcpproxy\"","type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"httpapi.CreateClientRequest":{"properties":{"display_name":{"type":"string"},"expires_in":{"description":"ExpiresIn is a duration like 30d or 720h; default and cap are 365 days.","type":"string"},"id":{"type":"string"},"mode":{"type":"string"},"profile":{"type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"httpapi.CreateClientResponse":{"properties":{"client":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/httpapi.clientPresence"},"credential":{"type":"string"},"snippet":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/httpapi.ClientSnippet"}},"type":"object"},"httpapi.EffectiveToolsData":{"properties":{"counts":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/runtime.EffectiveCounts"},"profile":{"type":"string"},"stale_classification_reasons":{"additionalProperties":{"type":"string"},"description":"StaleClassificationReasons maps each stale classify entry to why it no\nlonger applies: profile.StaleClassificationAnnotated or\nprofile.StaleClassificationMissing. It is computed over the UNFILTERED\ntool set, so a server or reason filter never changes it. Administrators\nonly.","type":"object"},"stale_classifications":{"description":"StaleClassifications lists classify entries for tools that are now\nannotated or no longer exist (FR-005). Administrators only.","items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"tools":{"items":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/runtime.EffectiveTool"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false}},"type":"object"},"httpapi.EnvFieldPreview":{"properties":{"empty_or_placeholder":{"type":"boolean"},"name":{"type":"string"},"secret_like":{"type":"boolean"},"value_present":{"type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"},"httpapi.FinalizeClientResponse":{"properties":{"client":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/httpapi.clientPresence"},"rotation":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/httpapi.RotationState"}},"type":"object"},"httpapi.ForgetClientResponse":{"properties":{"disconnect_error":{"type":"string"},"disconnected":{"type":"boolean"},"revoked":{"type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"httpapi.GuardBinding":{"properties":{"client_id":{"type":"string"},"mode":{"type":"string"},"profile":{"type":"string"},"token_name":{"type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"httpapi.GuardFixOption":{"properties":{"kind":{"type":"string"},"target":{"type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"httpapi.HeaderFieldPreview":{"properties":{"empty_or_placeholder":{"type":"boolean"},"name":{"type":"string"},"secret_like":{"type":"boolean"},"value_present":{"type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"},"httpapi.ImportFromPathRequest":{"properties":{"format":{"description":"Optional format hint","type":"string"},"path":{"description":"File path to import from","type":"string"},"rename":{"additionalProperties":{"type":"string"},"description":"Rename maps a server name → new name. Applied after parsing so the\ncaller can disambiguate cross-source name collisions (Spec 046 v2 —\ne.g. \"mcpproxy\" → \"mcpproxy_claude_code\"). Keys are matched against\neither the raw source name (OriginalName) or the sanitized name shown\nin the preview (Server.Name); these differ for names that need\nsanitizing (e.g. \"Figma Desktop\" → \"Figma_Desktop\"). Keys not present\nin the imported set are ignored.","type":"object"},"server_names":{"description":"Optional: import only these servers","items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false}},"type":"object"},"httpapi.ImportRequest":{"properties":{"allow_paste_fallback":{"description":"AllowPasteFallback opts into detecting a bare URL or a single command\nline (FR-064) when Format/format detection would otherwise fail — see\nconfigimport.ImportOptions.AllowPasteFallback for why this must stay\nopt-in (review round 4 F-E). Only the interactive Paste tab sets this;\nevery other caller of this endpoint (the general \"Import config\"\npanel, or a direct API call) leaves it false and gets a clear\n\"unable to detect configuration format\" error for a plain one-liner\ninstead of it being silently guessed at and, on apply, added as a\nreal server with no confirmation step.","type":"boolean"},"content":{"description":"Raw JSON or TOML content","type":"string"},"env_override":{"additionalProperties":{"type":"string"},"description":"EnvOverride/HeaderOverride (Spec 109 FR-064/065, PR review round 4\nF-A/F-D fix): the Paste tab's per-field Value/Secret edits — a plain\nvalue the user typed, or a keyring ref path if they chose Secret —\nkeyed by field name. Applied to the matching imported server's\nEnv/Headers ONLY when preview=false, directly on the server this\nrequest's own raw Content parses to server-side. 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Summary and Tags\nare built from the already-redacted URL/Command/Args above, so a\nsecret embedded in argv or a URL query never reaches Summary either.\nEnv/Headers never carry the raw value — only its presence and two\nbooleans a surface uses to default the Value/Secret toggle (FR-065).","type":"string"},"tags":{"items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"url":{"type":"string"},"warnings":{"items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false}},"type":"object"},"httpapi.IsolationRequest":{"description":"Isolation carries per-server Docker isolation overrides (enabled,\nmode_override, image, network_mode, extra_args, working_dir). A nil\npointer means \"do not touch isolation config\". A present object is\napplied field-by-field ON TOP of the persisted overrides, so omitting a\nfield leaves it alone; clear an individual override by sending it\nexplicitly (` + "`" + `\"enabled\": null` + "`" + `, ` + "`" + `\"image\": \"\"` + "`" + `).","properties":{"enabled":{"description":"Enabled exists ONLY to detect and reject an echoed-back read. It is the\neffective state on the read surface and is never writable; see validate().","type":"boolean"},"enabled_override":{"description":"EnabledOverride is the tri-state per-server override — the RAW value, the\nsame one reads return as ` + "`" + `enabled_override` + "`" + `. It has THREE meaningful wire\nstates, and collapsing them is what silently un-isolated servers\n(GH #1142):\n - absent → leave the persisted override untouched\n - null → clear the override, back to inheriting the global\n - true / false → set an explicit opt-in / opt-out","type":"boolean"},"extra_args":{"items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"image":{"type":"string"},"mode_override":{"description":"ModeOverride sets ` + "`" + `isolation.mode` + "`" + ` (\"docker\" | \"sandbox\" | \"none\").\nnil leaves the persisted value alone; an empty string clears it. An\nunrecognized value is rejected with a 400 rather than persisted.","type":"string"},"network_mode":{"type":"string"},"working_dir":{"type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"httpapi.OnboardingMarkRequest":{"properties":{"connect_step_status":{"description":"ConnectStepStatus is one of: \"\", \"completed\", \"skipped\". Empty\npreserves the existing value. The stored enum is wider (Spec 080\nFR-001): a \"skipped\" request for a previously untouched connect step\nis upgraded server-side to \"completed_external\" when the install\nshows positive evidence of an external connection (Spec 080 FR-002).\n\"completed_external\" is NOT accepted from clients — it must never be\npersisted without that server-verified evidence (edge case: \"never\nguess completed_external without positive evidence\").","type":"string"},"connected_client_id":{"description":"ConnectedClientID records a successful connect write for this client id\n(Spec 109-b FR-042, review round 6). The REST connect endpoint\n(POST /api/v1/connect/{client}) already records this itself on success;\nthis field exists so ` + "`" + `mcpproxy connect` + "`" + ` — which writes the client's\nconfig file directly, without going through that endpoint, so the\ncommand still works when no daemon is running — can relay the same\nevent to a daemon that IS running, keeping ClientConnectedAt in sync\nacross both surfaces. Must be a known id from the fixed connect client\nregistry (internal/connect.GetAllClients); any other value is rejected,\nmatching the field's \"bounded by the registry\" invariant\n(data-model.md §7).","type":"string"},"disconnected_client_id":{"description":"DisconnectedClientID relays a successful local CLI disconnect to a running\ndaemon, which cannot observe the CLI's direct config-file edit itself.\nLike ConnectedClientID, it is bounded to the fixed client registry.","type":"string"},"engaged":{"description":"Engaged marks the wizard as engaged (completed or explicitly skipped).\nOnce true, the wizard does not auto-show again.","type":"boolean"},"mark_shown":{"description":"MarkShown records the wizard's first display time if not already set.","type":"boolean"},"server_step_status":{"description":"ServerStepStatus is one of: \"\", \"completed\", \"skipped\". Empty\npreserves the existing value.","type":"string"}},"type":"object"},"httpapi.OnboardingStateResponse":{"properties":{"configured_server_count":{"description":"ConfiguredServerCount is the number of upstream MCP servers configured\nin mcpproxy (counts both enabled and disabled).","type":"integer"},"connected_client_count":{"description":"ConnectedClientCount is the number of supported clients currently\npointing at mcpproxy.","type":"integer"},"connected_client_ids":{"description":"ConnectedClientIDs are the identifiers of supported clients currently\npointing at mcpproxy. Drawn exclusively from the fixed adapter table —\nuser-entered values never appear here.","items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"first_mcp_client_ever":{"description":"FirstMCPClientEver is true once any MCP client has successfully completed\nan ` + "`" + `initialize` + "`" + ` round-trip with this mcpproxy. Sourced from the Spec 044\nactivation bucket. Drives the Verify tab's \"green check\" state.","type":"boolean"},"has_configured_server":{"description":"HasConfiguredServer is true if at least one upstream MCP server is\nconfigured (regardless of current connection health).","type":"boolean"},"has_connected_client":{"description":"HasConnectedClient is true if at least one supported AI client currently\nhas mcpproxy registered in its config.","type":"boolean"},"has_usable_server":{"description":"HasUsableServer is true once at least one enabled, non-quarantined\nserver has usable health and at least one approved (non-disabled) tool.\nThis is the real \"the wizard has something to try\" signal:\nHasConfiguredServer only means a server entry exists, even while every\none of them sits quarantined, requires sign-in, or has zero approved\ntools. The Servers step and Setup badge use this instead of\nHasConfiguredServer, which is kept above for compatibility.\nHealthStatus.Usable is the shared\nreadiness contract used by every UI surface (Spec 109-c, tasks.md T051).","type":"boolean"},"incomplete_tab_count":{"description":"IncompleteTabCount is the number of wizard tabs whose state is incomplete.\nDrives the sidebar Setup entry's badge. Formula:\n +1 if HasConnectedClient == false\n +1 if HasUsableServer == false\n +1 if FirstMCPClientEver == false","type":"integer"},"mcp_clients_seen_ever":{"description":"MCPClientsSeenEver is the capped list of recognized client names that\nhave ever called this mcpproxy. Names come from the MCP ` + "`" + `initialize` + "`" + `\npayload's ` + "`" + `clientInfo.name` + "`" + ` field, sanitized. Surfaces on the Verify tab\nso the user can see whether their real IDE — not a test client — has\nconnected.","items":{"type":"string"},"type":"array","uniqueItems":false},"should_show_wizard":{"description":"ShouldShowWizard is the derived flag the frontend uses to decide\nwhether to auto-show. 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Undo resolves\nthe full path server-side by joining it with the client's own config\ndirectory, so a client-supplied value can never contribute a directory\ncomponent (traversal is impossible by construction). 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Filtered per caller: an administrator sees every item; a scoped caller (agent token, or a non-admin server-edition OAuth user session) sees only server items whose server it may enumerate; every other subject type (client, setting) is administrator-only.","responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/httpapi.attentionResponse"}}},"description":"The needs-attention list"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"Get the needs-attention list","tags":["attention"]}},"/api/v1/catalog/search":{"get":{"description":"Fans out to every enabled catalog source (registry) in parallel, merges, de-duplicates and ranks the results (FR-060/061). An empty q returns official + popular sections instead of a flat list. Open to any authenticated caller — added is the only field filtered per caller scope (FR-007).","parameters":[{"description":"Free-text search","in":"query","name":"q","schema":{"type":"string"}},{"description":"Narrow to one catalog source id","in":"query","name":"source","schema":{"type":"string"}},{"description":"Not supported: catalog entries carry no tags; a non-empty value returns 400","in":"query","name":"tag","schema":{"type":"string"}},{"description":"Max results (default 20, max 50)","in":"query","name":"limit","schema":{"type":"integer"}}],"responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.SuccessResponse"}}},"description":"OK"},"400":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.APIResponse"}}},"description":"tag filtering is not supported"},"500":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.APIResponse"}}},"description":"configured servers could not be listed"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"Search the server catalog across every enabled source","tags":["catalog"]}},"/api/v1/clients":{"get":{"description":"Lists every client row (supported, other and custom) with its presence, its credential and its profile binding, plus response-level warnings. The list is content-read-free (Spec 075): credential_state comes from the token store, else the last on-demand observation (credential_checked_at), else unknown. It runs only the time-based half of the rotation reconciler. The profile and client filters match the CURRENT binding and are applied AFTER warnings are computed over the full set.","parameters":[{"description":"Rows whose active credential is bound to this profile; - = bound to All servers","in":"query","name":"profile","schema":{"type":"string"}},{"description":"Exact client id","in":"query","name":"client","schema":{"type":"string"}}],"responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"allOf":[{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/data"}],"properties":{"data":{"type":"object"},"error":{"type":"string"},"request_id":{"type":"string"},"success":{"type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"}}},"description":"Client rows, routing and warnings"},"403":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Administrator credentials required"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"List clients","tags":["clients"]},"post":{"description":"Creates a per-client credential for a client that is NOT in the connect registry (a script, a CI job, an editor without a connect adapter). The secret (mcp_cli_...) is returned ONCE, with a paste-ready snippet that carries it in the X-API-Key header. The id follows the client-id rule (lower-case letters, digits, '-' or '_', at most 56 characters) and must not be a supported client's id. A named profile binds the credential locked unless mode says otherwise. Refused with 409 binding_bypassable_without_auth when the binding would be bypassable while require_mcp_auth is off (FR-008a), and 409 conflicting_token when a regular token holds client-\u003cid\u003e. Writes one assign record. Personal edition only.","requestBody":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/httpapi.CreateClientRequest"}}},"description":"id (required), optional display_name, profile, mode and expires_in","required":true},"responses":{"201":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"allOf":[{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/data"}],"properties":{"data":{"type":"object"},"error":{"type":"string"},"request_id":{"type":"string"},"success":{"type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"}}},"description":"The new client row, its credential (once) and a snippet"},"400":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/httpapi.ClientBindingErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Invalid input; field names the offending input"},"403":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Administrator credentials required"},"409":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/httpapi.BindingGuardResponse"}}},"description":"binding_bypassable_without_auth, or conflicting_token (ClientCredentialConflictResponse)"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"Add a custom client","tags":["clients"]}},"/api/v1/clients/bulk-assign":{"post":{"description":"Moves every client credential bound to from_profile (\"\" = All servers) onto to_profile (\"\" = All servers). The guard and the credential precondition apply PER CLIENT: a refused client is reported in skipped[] with the code the single operation returns, the others move and each writes its own assign record and emits client.binding_changed. Personal edition only.","requestBody":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/httpapi.BulkAssignRequest"}}},"description":"from_profile and to_profile (both required; empty = All servers) and optional mode","required":true},"responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"allOf":[{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/data"}],"properties":{"data":{"type":"object"},"error":{"type":"string"},"request_id":{"type":"string"},"success":{"type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"}}},"description":"Moved client ids and the clients that were skipped"},"400":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/httpapi.ClientBindingErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Invalid input; field names the offending input"},"403":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Administrator credentials required"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"Move every client of one profile to another","tags":["clients"]}},"/api/v1/clients/upgrade-admin-key-holders":{"post":{"description":"Without apply: classifies every supported client whose config still holds the instance admin API key (an on-demand read per client) and returns preview[] (display path, what would change, the masked credential mcp_cli_••••, the binding and a precondition_token per client), a combined precondition_token, and guard when the whole request would be refused by FR-008a; next_step is rotate_admin_api_key when nothing holds the key. Nothing is written or minted. With apply=true: recomputes the preview, refuses with 409 precondition_failed when a sent precondition_token no longer matches, runs the FR-008a guard over the WHOLE request (409 binding_bypassable_without_auth, nothing minted, no file written), then connects each client with force bound to its own token; one client's failure does not stop the others. Each mint writes its own assign record. The guard only applies when a named profile is given. Personal edition only.","requestBody":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/httpapi.UpgradeAdminKeyHoldersRequest"}}},"description":"Optional profile and mode for every upgraded client; apply and precondition_token"},"responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.APIResponse"}}},"description":"UpgradePreview (no apply) or UpgradeResult (apply)"},"400":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/httpapi.ClientBindingErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Invalid input; field names the offending input"},"403":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Administrator credentials required"},"409":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/httpapi.BindingGuardResponse"}}},"description":"precondition_failed, or binding_bypassable_without_auth"},"503":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Service unavailable"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"Upgrade every client that holds the admin API key","tags":["clients"]}},"/api/v1/clients/{client}":{"delete":{"description":"Revokes the client's credential; it stops authenticating at once. With disconnect=true a SUPPORTED client's mcpproxy entry is removed from its config FIRST, but the credential is revoked either way: revocation never waits for a config write, so a failed write (for example a macOS App-Data denial) leaves the client cut off and is reported as disconnected:false with disconnect_error. A client with no credential record is 409 no_client_credential. disconnect=true on a custom client is ignored. Writes one forget record naming the revoked token. The FR-008a guard is not involved: revoking only removes a binding.","parameters":[{"description":"Client id","in":"path","name":"client","required":true,"schema":{"type":"string"}},{"description":"Also remove the entry from the client's config (supported clients)","in":"query","name":"disconnect","schema":{"type":"boolean"}}],"responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"allOf":[{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/data"}],"properties":{"data":{"type":"object"},"error":{"type":"string"},"request_id":{"type":"string"},"success":{"type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"}}},"description":"Revoked token name and what happened to the config entry"},"403":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Administrator credentials required"},"409":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/httpapi.ClientBindingErrorResponse"}}},"description":"no_client_credential"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"Forget a client (revoke its credential)","tags":["clients"]},"get":{"description":"Returns one client row with its sessions (newest 20, each with its latest effective profile). This is the only read that may open the client's config file: it runs the full rotation reconciler first, classifies the credential the config holds and records the observation. No scope filter is honoured on this route.","parameters":[{"description":"Client id","in":"path","name":"client","required":true,"schema":{"type":"string"}}],"responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"allOf":[{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/data"}],"properties":{"data":{"type":"object"},"error":{"type":"string"},"request_id":{"type":"string"},"success":{"type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"}}},"description":"Client row"},"403":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Administrator credentials required"},"404":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"client not found"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"Get one client","tags":["clients"]}},"/api/v1/clients/{client}/binding":{"put":{"description":"Changes the profile binding (and optionally the locked/switchable mode) of a\nclient that holds an active client credential. One service operation shared by\nevery surface: it updates the credential in the token store, clears the stored\nset_profile selection of every live session of that credential, sends\nnotifications/tools/list_changed to each, emits client.binding_changed and writes\none profile_change activity record. It never touches the client's config file.\nA client without an active client credential (none, admin key, revoked or expired)\nis refused with 409 no_client_credential and nothing is minted or written. A\nreassignment that would leave the binding bypassable while require_mcp_auth is off\nis refused with 409 binding_bypassable_without_auth (FR-008a). Personal edition only.","parameters":[{"description":"Client id (lower-case letters, digits, '-' or '_', at most 56 characters)","in":"path","name":"client","required":true,"schema":{"type":"string"}}],"requestBody":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/httpapi.PutClientBindingRequest"}}},"description":"profile (required; empty = All servers) and optional mode (locked|switchable)","required":true},"responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"allOf":[{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/data"}],"properties":{"data":{"type":"object"},"error":{"type":"string"},"request_id":{"type":"string"},"success":{"type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"}}},"description":"The client row after the change, with its warnings"},"400":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/httpapi.ClientBindingErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Invalid input; field names the offending input"},"403":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Administrator credentials required"},"409":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/httpapi.BindingGuardResponse"}}},"description":"no_client_credential, connect_in_progress (a connect of this client is mid-write), or binding_bypassable_without_auth with bindings and fixes"},"503":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Service unavailable"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"Reassign a client's profile and/or mode","tags":["clients"]}},"/api/v1/clients/{client}/rotate":{"post":{"description":"Replaces a client's secret without ever invalidating the old one mid-flight (FR-021a). A SUPPORTED client is rewritten through connect: staged rotation, binding kept, finalized when the config write succeeds, rolled back (the old secret keeps working) when it fails; a preview's precondition_token binds the call, a mismatch is the connect 409 precondition_failed. A CUSTOM client gets a new secret returned ONCE with a snippet; both secrets authenticate until POST /clients/{client}/rotate/finalize or 24 hours. A client with no active credential is 409 no_client_credential. The FR-008a guard is not involved: a rotation never changes a binding's reach. Writes one rotate record when it finalizes.","parameters":[{"description":"Client id","in":"path","name":"client","required":true,"schema":{"type":"string"}}],"requestBody":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/httpapi.RotateClientRequest"}}},"description":"Optional precondition_token of a connect preview"},"responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"allOf":[{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/data"}],"properties":{"data":{"type":"object"},"error":{"type":"string"},"request_id":{"type":"string"},"success":{"type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"}}},"description":"The client row and the rotation state"},"400":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/httpapi.ClientBindingErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Invalid input"},"403":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Administrator credentials required (or macOS App-Data block)"},"409":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/httpapi.ConnectConflictResponse"}}},"description":"no_client_credential, precondition_failed, connect_in_progress (another connect of this client is mid-write), or credential_superseded (the written credential was replaced or revoked before it could be finalized; reconnect)"},"503":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Service unavailable"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"Rotate a client's credential","tags":["clients"]}},"/api/v1/clients/{client}/rotate/finalize":{"post":{"description":"Promotes a client's pending secret: the old secret stops authenticating. Idempotent: with no rotation in progress it is a no-op success. A client with no client credential is 409 no_client_credential. Writes one rotate record when it promotes.","parameters":[{"description":"Client id","in":"path","name":"client","required":true,"schema":{"type":"string"}}],"responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"allOf":[{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/data"}],"properties":{"data":{"type":"object"},"error":{"type":"string"},"request_id":{"type":"string"},"success":{"type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"}}},"description":"The client row; rotation.state is finalized"},"403":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Administrator credentials required"},"409":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/httpapi.ClientBindingErrorResponse"}}},"description":"no_client_credential, or connect_in_progress (a connect of this client is mid-write)"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"Finalize a staged rotation","tags":["clients"]}},"/api/v1/code/scripts":{"get":{"description":"List the stored scripts available to the code_execution tool. Scripts are ` + "`" + `\u003cname\u003e.js` + "`" + ` / ` + "`" + `\u003cname\u003e.ts` + "`" + ` files in the ` + "`" + `scripts/` + "`" + ` directory next to the active configuration file. Entries are advisory: ` + "`" + `ok` + "`" + ` scripts are invocable, ` + "`" + `ambiguous` + "`" + ` names have both extensions, and ` + "`" + `invalid` + "`" + ` ones report why (empty, oversized, unreadable, non-regular). Read-only — there is no write surface for stored scripts. Administrator-only (Spec 105 FR-012): an agent token, whatever its server scope, is refused with 403 — the listing is the enumeration the missing-script error withholds from a scoped caller.","responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.SuccessResponse"}}},"description":"Stored scripts and the directory they were read from"},"403":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Agent tokens cannot list stored scripts"},"500":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Internal server error"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"List stored code-execution scripts","tags":["code"]}},"/api/v1/config":{"get":{"description":"Retrieves the current MCPProxy configuration including all server definitions, global settings, and runtime parameters","responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.GetConfigResponse"}}},"description":"Configuration retrieved successfully"},"401":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Unauthorized - missing or invalid API key"},"403":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Agent tokens cannot read the configuration document"},"500":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Failed to get configuration"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"Get current configuration","tags":["config"]},"patch":{"description":"Deep-merges only the fields present in the request body onto the live in-memory configuration and routes the result through the existing apply pipeline (validation, change detection, disk persistence, hot-reload). Fields the client omits — including masked secrets such as ` + "`" + `api_key` + "`" + ` and secret request headers — are preserved verbatim. Nested objects are merged recursively; arrays and scalars replace wholesale.","requestBody":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"type":"object"}}},"description":"Partial configuration with only the fields to change","required":true},"responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ConfigApplyResult"}}},"description":"Configuration patch applied (inspect validation_errors for rejected values)"},"400":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Invalid JSON payload or empty patch"},"401":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Unauthorized - missing or invalid API key"},"403":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Forbidden (agent tokens cannot mutate configuration)"},"409":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/httpapi.BindingGuardResponse"}}},"description":"binding_bypassable_without_auth: the patch would let a client bound to a named profile escape it while require_mcp_auth is off (FR-008a); nothing was written"},"500":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Failed to read or apply configuration"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"Partially update configuration","tags":["config"]}},"/api/v1/config/apply":{"post":{"description":"Applies a new MCPProxy configuration. Validates and persists the configuration to disk. Some changes apply immediately, while others may require a restart. Returns detailed information about applied changes and restart requirements.","requestBody":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.Config"}}},"description":"Configuration to apply","required":true},"responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ConfigApplyResult"}}},"description":"Configuration applied successfully with change details"},"400":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Invalid JSON payload"},"401":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Unauthorized - missing or invalid API key"},"403":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Forbidden (agent tokens cannot mutate configuration)"},"409":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/httpapi.BindingGuardResponse"}}},"description":"binding_bypassable_without_auth: the write would let a client bound to a named profile escape it while require_mcp_auth is off (FR-008a); nothing was written"},"500":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Failed to apply configuration"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"Apply configuration","tags":["config"]}},"/api/v1/config/docker-isolation":{"patch":{"description":"Convenience endpoint to flip ` + "`" + `docker_isolation.enabled` + "`" + ` without resending the full config. Persists to disk via the existing config writer — the file watcher then hot-reloads the change. Returns the new state and whether a restart is required for existing connections to pick it up.","requestBody":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"properties":{"enabled":{"type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"}}},"description":"New isolation state","required":true},"responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ConfigApplyResult"}}},"description":"Isolation toggle applied"},"400":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Invalid JSON payload"},"401":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Unauthorized - missing or invalid API key"},"403":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Forbidden (agent tokens cannot mutate configuration)"},"409":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/httpapi.BindingGuardResponse"}}},"description":"binding_bypassable_without_auth (FR-008a); nothing was written"},"500":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Failed to apply configuration"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"Toggle global Docker isolation","tags":["config"]}},"/api/v1/config/validate":{"post":{"description":"Validates a provided MCPProxy configuration without applying it. Checks for syntax errors, invalid server definitions, conflicting settings, and other configuration issues.","requestBody":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.Config"}}},"description":"Configuration to validate","required":true},"responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ValidateConfigResponse"}}},"description":"Configuration validation result"},"400":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Invalid JSON payload"},"401":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Unauthorized - missing or invalid API key"},"500":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Validation failed"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"Validate configuration","tags":["config"]}},"/api/v1/connect":{"get":{"description":"Returns the connection status for all known MCP client applications.\nEach entry indicates whether the client config file exists and whether\nMCPProxy is currently registered in it. This stat-only listing never reads\na client config (Spec 075), so a client whose config exists reports\ncredential_state \"unknown\"; GET /connect/{client} resolves it.","responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.APIResponse"}}},"description":"List of ClientStatus objects"},"403":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Administrator credentials required"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"List client connection status","tags":["connect"]}},"/api/v1/connect/{client}":{"delete":{"description":"Remove the MCPProxy entry from the specified client's configuration file.\nCreates a backup of the existing config before modifying.","parameters":[{"description":"Client ID (claude-code, claude-desktop, cursor, windsurf, vscode, codex, gemini, opencode, zcode)","in":"path","name":"client","required":true,"schema":{"type":"string"}}],"requestBody":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/httpapi.ConnectRequest"}}},"description":"Optional parameters (server_name)"},"responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.APIResponse"}}},"description":"ConnectResult"},"400":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Bad request"},"403":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Permission denied (macOS App-Data block)"},"404":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Unknown client or entry not found"},"503":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Service unavailable"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"Disconnect MCPProxy from a client","tags":["connect"]},"get":{"description":"Resolves one client's status by reading its config file on demand.\nThis is the only Connect endpoint that opens a client config file, so\non macOS it is the sole place an App-Data privacy prompt may legitimately\nappear (scoped to this user action). Resolves access_state to\naccessible|absent|denied|malformed and populates remediation when denied.\nFor a connected client it also resolves credential_state (Spec 108 FR-025):\nclient (an active per-client credential), admin_key (the instance admin API\nkey), none, revoked (a rotated-away or revoked credential) or expired. The\ncredential value is classified and never echoed.","parameters":[{"description":"Client ID (claude-code, claude-desktop, cursor, windsurf, vscode, codex, gemini, opencode, zcode)","in":"path","name":"client","required":true,"schema":{"type":"string"}}],"responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.APIResponse"}}},"description":"ClientStatus"},"403":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Administrator credentials required"},"404":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Unknown client"},"503":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Service unavailable"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"Get a single client's connection status (on-demand)","tags":["connect"]},"post":{"description":"Register MCPProxy as an MCP server in the specified client's configuration file.\nCreates a backup of the existing config before modifying.\nOptionally accepts precondition_token from a preview (Spec 091): when supplied,\nthe core rechecks the raw pre-write state and the entry it would write, and\nrefuses a drifted write with 409 before taking any backup. The 409 body's\naction discriminates the two conflict kinds: \"precondition_failed\" (stale\npreview — re-preview, do not retry) vs \"already_exists\" (entry present — pass\nforce=true). force=true never rescues a stale token.\n\nSpec 108 FR-024: the entry carries a per-client mcp_cli_ credential bound to the\nrequested profile (default: All servers, switchable; a reconnect keeps the client's\nexisting binding unless a profile is given), never the instance admin API key.\nReconnecting over an active credential is a staged rotation: the old secret keeps\nworking until the config write succeeds. keyless=true writes no credential and is\nonly possible while require_mcp_auth is off (400 otherwise, and with a profile).\nA write that would let the client escape its profile by omitting its credential\nwhile require_mcp_auth is off is refused with 409 binding_bypassable_without_auth\n(nothing minted or written); a token named client-\u003cid\u003e held by a regular agent\ntoken is refused with 409 conflicting_token.","parameters":[{"description":"Client ID (claude-code, claude-desktop, cursor, windsurf, vscode, codex, gemini, opencode, zcode)","in":"path","name":"client","required":true,"schema":{"type":"string"}}],"requestBody":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/httpapi.ConnectRequest"}}},"description":"Optional connection parameters (server_name, force, precondition_token, profile, mode, keyless)"},"responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.APIResponse"}}},"description":"ConnectResult (credential is the masked mcp_cli_ value, with token_name, profile, mode, keyless and rotation)"},"400":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/httpapi.ClientBindingErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Bad request; field names the offending input (profile, mode, keyless)"},"403":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Permission denied (macOS App-Data block)"},"404":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Unknown client"},"409":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/httpapi.ConnectConflictResponse"}}},"description":"Conflict: action=already_exists (use force=true) or action=precondition_failed (preview is stale; re-preview); or binding_bypassable_without_auth (BindingGuardResponse); or conflicting_token (ClientCredentialConflictResponse); or connect_in_progress (another connect of this client is mid-write) or credential_superseded (the written credential was replaced or revoked before it could be finalized; reconnect)"},"503":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Service unavailable (or no credential store wired while require_mcp_auth is on)"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"Connect MCPProxy to a client","tags":["connect"]}},"/api/v1/connect/{client}/preview":{"get":{"description":"Returns the exact entry a subsequent connect would add to the client's\nconfig — target path, server key, entry name, and entry contents — WITHOUT\nmodifying the file or creating a backup (Spec 078 US1). The per-client credential\nis masked in the payload (credential, always starting mcp_cli_; contains_api_key is\nalways false since connect never writes the admin API key); profile, mode and\nkeyless echo the requested intent.\nentry_exists distinguishes a create from an overwrite of a same-named entry.\nReads the config on demand to classify create-vs-overwrite, so on macOS this\nmay raise an App-Data privacy prompt; a denial returns 403 + remediation.\nSpec 091 adds three fields: existing_entry_summary (present only when\nentry_exists — a sanitized, non-secret projection of the entry being replaced:\nits name, type, endpoint with query/userinfo stripped, command, and header and\nenv NAMES, never values); precondition_token (always present — an opaque keyed\ndigest of the raw pre-write state and the pending entry, echoed back on POST\nconnect to detect drift); and connect_refusal (present when the write would\nrefuse regardless of intent, e.g. a non-create-capable client with no config —\ntreat its presence as \"Connect unavailable\").","parameters":[{"description":"Client ID (claude-code, claude-desktop, cursor, windsurf, vscode, codex, gemini, opencode, zcode)","in":"path","name":"client","required":true,"schema":{"type":"string"}},{"description":"Entry name to preview (defaults to mcpproxy); mirror the value passed to POST connect","in":"query","name":"server_name","schema":{"type":"string"}},{"description":"Profile the client credential would bind to (empty = All servers); mirror POST connect","in":"query","name":"profile","schema":{"type":"string"}},{"description":"locked|switchable; mirror POST connect","in":"query","name":"mode","schema":{"enum":["locked","switchable"],"type":"string"}},{"description":"Preview a credential-less entry (only while require_mcp_auth is off)","in":"query","name":"keyless","schema":{"type":"boolean"}}],"responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.APIResponse"}}},"description":"ConnectPreview"},"400":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/httpapi.ClientBindingErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Invalid intent (field names the input; keyless with auth on or with a profile)"},"403":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Administrator credentials required or access denied by macOS App Data"},"404":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Unknown client"},"503":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Service unavailable"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"Preview the change a connect would make (no write)","tags":["connect"]}},"/api/v1/connect/{client}/undo":{"post":{"description":"Reverts the connect that produced the named backup (Spec 078 US3):\nrestores the client config byte-for-byte from that backup, or — when\nbackup_name is empty because the connect created the file — deletes the\ncreated file. backup_name is the bare filename of the backup the connect\nreturned (never a path); undo resolves the full path server-side inside\nthe client's own config directory, so a client value cannot escape it.\nRefuses with 409 when the config changed since the connect (undo never\nclobbers later edits; use DELETE /connect/{client} for a surgical entry\nremoval instead). Takes its own safety backup first; its path is returned\nas backup_path in the result. Undo is \"as if the connect never happened\": a\nclient credential the connect minted or rotated is revoked unless the restored\nconfig still holds it, and the result names it in credential_revoked.","parameters":[{"description":"Client ID (claude-code, claude-desktop, cursor, windsurf, vscode, codex, gemini, opencode, zcode)","in":"path","name":"client","required":true,"schema":{"type":"string"}}],"requestBody":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/httpapi.UndoConnectRequest"}}},"description":"Undo parameters (server_name, backup_name = the bare filename of the backup the preceding connect returned)"},"responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.APIResponse"}}},"description":"ConnectResult (action restored|deleted)"},"400":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Bad request (e.g. backup_name is a path, or not a backup of this client's config)"},"403":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Permission denied (macOS App-Data block)"},"404":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Unknown client or backup no longer exists"},"409":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Config changed since connect; undo refused"},"503":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Service unavailable"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"Undo a connect, restoring the pre-connect config","tags":["connect"]}},"/api/v1/diagnostics":{"get":{"description":"Get comprehensive health diagnostics including upstream errors, OAuth requirements, missing secrets, and Docker status","responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.Diagnostics"}}},"description":"Health diagnostics"},"500":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Internal server error"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"Get health diagnostics","tags":["diagnostics"]}},"/api/v1/docker/status":{"get":{"description":"Retrieve current Docker availability and recovery status","responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.SuccessResponse"}}},"description":"Docker status information"},"500":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Internal server error"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"Get Docker status","tags":["docker"]}},"/api/v1/doctor":{"get":{"description":"Get comprehensive health diagnostics including upstream errors, OAuth requirements, missing secrets, and Docker status","responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.Diagnostics"}}},"description":"Health diagnostics"},"500":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Internal server error"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"Get health diagnostics","tags":["diagnostics"]}},"/api/v1/feedback":{"post":{"description":"Submit a bug report, feature request, or general feedback","requestBody":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/telemetry.FeedbackRequest"}}},"description":"Feedback request","required":true},"responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/telemetry.FeedbackResponse"}}},"description":"OK"},"400":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"additionalProperties":{"type":"string"},"type":"object"}}},"description":"Bad Request"},"429":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"additionalProperties":{"type":"string"},"type":"object"}}},"description":"Too Many Requests"},"500":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"additionalProperties":{"type":"string"},"type":"object"}}},"description":"Internal Server Error"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]}],"summary":"Submit feedback","tags":["feedback"]}},"/api/v1/index/search":{"get":{"description":"Search across all upstream MCP server tools using BM25 keyword search","parameters":[{"description":"Search query","in":"query","name":"q","required":true,"schema":{"type":"string"}},{"description":"Maximum number of results","in":"query","name":"limit","schema":{"default":10,"maximum":100,"type":"integer"}}],"responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.SearchToolsResponse"}}},"description":"Search results"},"400":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Bad request (missing query parameter)"},"500":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Internal server error"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"Search for tools","tags":["tools"]}},"/api/v1/info":{"get":{"description":"Get essential server metadata including version, web UI URL, endpoint addresses, and update availability\nweb_ui_url carries the ?apikey= credential ONLY for an authenticated admin; a scoped agent token receives the bare URL\nThis endpoint is designed for tray-core communication and version checking\nUse refresh=true query parameter to force an immediate update check against GitHub\nThe launched_by field reports durable launch provenance (\"tray\", \"installer\", or \"\" for user-launched/unknown)","parameters":[{"description":"Force immediate update check against GitHub","in":"query","name":"refresh","schema":{"type":"boolean"}}],"responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"allOf":[{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/data"}],"properties":{"data":{"type":"object"},"error":{"type":"string"},"request_id":{"type":"string"},"success":{"type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"}}},"description":"Server information with optional update info"},"500":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Internal server error"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"Get server information","tags":["status"]}},"/api/v1/onboarding/mark":{"post":{"description":"Updates wizard engagement and per-step status. Once engaged is\ntrue, the wizard does not auto-show again, even if state regresses.","requestBody":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/httpapi.OnboardingMarkRequest"}}},"description":"Mark request","required":true},"responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"allOf":[{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/data"}],"properties":{"data":{"type":"object"},"error":{"type":"string"},"request_id":{"type":"string"},"success":{"type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"}}},"description":"Updated OnboardingStateResponse"},"400":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Bad request"},"403":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Agent tokens cannot read onboarding state"},"503":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Service unavailable"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"Mark onboarding wizard state (Spec 046)","tags":["onboarding"]}},"/api/v1/onboarding/state":{"get":{"description":"Returns the wizard engagement record alongside live predicates\n(whether any client is connected, whether any server is configured),\nplus a derived ShouldShowWizard flag the frontend can rely on.","responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"allOf":[{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/data"}],"properties":{"data":{"type":"object"},"error":{"type":"string"},"request_id":{"type":"string"},"success":{"type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"}}},"description":"OnboardingStateResponse"},"403":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Agent tokens cannot read onboarding state"},"503":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Service unavailable"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"Get onboarding wizard state and predicates (Spec 046)","tags":["onboarding"]}},"/api/v1/preflight":{"post":{"description":"Deterministic, side-effect-free availability check for a caller-supplied list of tool IDs (Spec 098). Performs zero upstream calls and mutates no runtime state. HTTP status reports whether the CHECK executed: a fully blocked set is still 200, with the availability verdict in the body. Every executed preflight writes an activity record before the response is returned.","requestBody":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.PreflightRequest"}}},"description":"Tool IDs (1-100 before dedup), optional profile, annotation policy filters and wait budget","required":true},"responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"allOf":[{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/data"}],"properties":{"data":{"type":"object"},"error":{"type":"string"},"request_id":{"type":"string"},"success":{"type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"}}},"description":"Preflight verdict and per-tool results"},"400":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.APIResponse"}}},"description":"Validation error (malformed, oversized, doubled or unknown-field body; empty or oversized tool list; conflicting duplicate pins; unknown profile; wait_ms out of range)"},"401":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.APIResponse"}}},"description":"Missing or invalid credentials"},"503":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.APIResponse"}}},"description":"Runtime unavailable, evaluator infrastructure read failure, or the activity record could not be persisted"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyHeader":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"Preflight required tools","tags":["tools"]}},"/api/v1/profiles":{"get":{"description":"Lists every profile as a ProfileView: the config fields as stored, the derived effective values, visible tool counts by tier, 24 h calls and blocked calls, and (administrators only) used_by and the anonymous_profile. A caller that is not an administrator sees only the profiles its entitlement reaches, with servers, rules and switchable_to narrowed to what it may see; an unreachable profile is omitted, never shown empty.","responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"allOf":[{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/data"}],"properties":{"data":{"type":"object"},"error":{"type":"string"},"request_id":{"type":"string"},"success":{"type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"}}},"description":"Profile list"},"500":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Configuration unavailable"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"List configured profiles","tags":["profiles"]},"post":{"description":"Adds a profile. The body is a ProfileConfig. A name that already exists is 409 profile_exists; ` + "`" + `active` + "`" + ` and ` + "`" + `try` + "`" + ` are reserved by the REST API; a fatal validation rule is 400 with the offending field and the unchanged FR-007 text. A write that would let a client bound to a named profile escape it while require_mcp_auth is off is refused 409 binding_bypassable_without_auth (FR-008a) and nothing is written. Writes one profile_change record.","requestBody":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.ProfileConfig"}}},"description":"The profile","required":true},"responses":{"201":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"allOf":[{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/data"}],"properties":{"data":{"type":"object"},"error":{"type":"string"},"request_id":{"type":"string"},"success":{"type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"}}},"description":"Created, with the validator's warnings"},"400":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/httpapi.ClientBindingErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Invalid input; field names the offending input"},"403":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Administrator credentials required"},"409":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/httpapi.ProfileConflictResponse"}}},"description":"profile_exists, or binding_bypassable_without_auth (BindingGuardResponse)"},"503":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Service unavailable"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"Create a profile","tags":["profiles"]}},"/api/v1/profiles/active":{"get":{"description":"Deprecated (Spec 108 FR-039; sends a Deprecation header, successor GET /api/v1/profiles). Get the server-level default active profile used by UI surfaces (Web UI / tray). Empty string means \"all servers\". Note: within a live MCP session, the set_profile tool selection takes precedence over this default.","responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.SuccessResponse"}}},"description":"Active profile"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"Get the default active profile","tags":["profiles"]},"put":{"description":"Deprecated (Spec 108 FR-039; sends a Deprecation header, successor GET /api/v1/profiles). Set the server-level default active profile for UI surfaces. The slug must match a configured profile; pass an empty string to clear. This does not affect live MCP sessions, which use the set_profile tool.","requestBody":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/httpapi.SetActiveProfileRequest"}}},"description":"Profile slug to activate (empty clears)","required":true},"responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.SuccessResponse"}}},"description":"Active profile updated"},"400":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Invalid request body"},"403":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Forbidden (agent tokens cannot change the active profile)"},"404":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Unknown profile"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"Set the default active profile","tags":["profiles"]}},"/api/v1/profiles/try":{"post":{"description":"Evaluates a DRAFT profile against a query exactly as retrieve_tools would (policy is applied before the limit) and returns the hits plus what the draft hides (hidden_by_profile and up to 100 {server, tool, reason}). The draft is validated as if it replaced the same-named profile, or was appended under a placeholder name when it has none. Nothing is persisted, no record is written, no event is published and the FR-008a guard does not run. Administrators only.","requestBody":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/httpapi.TryProfileRequest"}}},"description":"draft profile, query and optional limit (default 10, max 50)","required":true},"responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"allOf":[{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/data"}],"properties":{"data":{"type":"object"},"error":{"type":"string"},"request_id":{"type":"string"},"success":{"type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"}}},"description":"Search result under the draft"},"400":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/httpapi.ClientBindingErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Invalid draft; field names the offending input"},"403":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Administrator credentials required"},"503":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Service unavailable"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"Try a draft profile","tags":["profiles"]}},"/api/v1/profiles/{name}":{"delete":{"description":"Deletes a profile. 409 profile_in_use (with used_by) while clients or tokens point at it, unless reassign_to names another existing profile (every pin moves there) or force is set (pins are left dangling, which the resolver treats as deny-all). 409 profile_is_anonymous_profile whenever it is the anonymous_profile and reassign_to is absent, even with force. Both paths remove the name from every switchable_to. Guarded by FR-008a. Writes one ` + "`" + `delete` + "`" + ` record.","parameters":[{"description":"Profile name","in":"path","name":"name","required":true,"schema":{"type":"string"}},{"description":"Another existing profile that takes over the pins","in":"query","name":"reassign_to","schema":{"type":"string"}},{"description":"Delete although in use, leaving pins dangling","in":"query","name":"force","schema":{"type":"boolean"}}],"responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"allOf":[{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/data"}],"properties":{"data":{"type":"object"},"error":{"type":"string"},"request_id":{"type":"string"},"success":{"type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"}}},"description":"Deleted"},"400":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/httpapi.ClientBindingErrorResponse"}}},"description":"reassign_to does not name another existing profile"},"403":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Administrator credentials required"},"404":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"profile not found"},"409":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/httpapi.ProfileConflictResponse"}}},"description":"profile_in_use, profile_is_anonymous_profile, or binding_bypassable_without_auth (BindingGuardResponse)"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"Delete a profile","tags":["profiles"]},"get":{"description":"Returns the ProfileView of the named profile. A caller that is not an administrator gets the same 404 for an unreachable profile as for an unknown one.","parameters":[{"description":"Profile name","in":"path","name":"name","required":true,"schema":{"type":"string"}}],"responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"allOf":[{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/data"}],"properties":{"data":{"type":"object"},"error":{"type":"string"},"request_id":{"type":"string"},"success":{"type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"}}},"description":"The profile"},"404":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"profile not found"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"Get one profile","tags":["profiles"]},"put":{"description":"Replaces the named profile with the body (a ProfileConfig whose name, when sent non-empty, must equal the path; 409 name_mismatch otherwise - a rename has its own route; an omitted or empty name takes the path's). A write whose only change is tools.classify is recorded as ` + "`" + `classify` + "`" + `. Guarded by FR-008a like a create.","parameters":[{"description":"Profile name","in":"path","name":"name","required":true,"schema":{"type":"string"}}],"requestBody":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/config.ProfileConfig"}}},"description":"The profile","required":true},"responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"allOf":[{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/data"}],"properties":{"data":{"type":"object"},"error":{"type":"string"},"request_id":{"type":"string"},"success":{"type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"}}},"description":"Updated, with the validator's warnings"},"400":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/httpapi.ClientBindingErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Invalid input; field names the offending input"},"403":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Administrator credentials required"},"404":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"profile not found"},"409":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/httpapi.ProfileConflictResponse"}}},"description":"name_mismatch, or binding_bypassable_without_auth (BindingGuardResponse)"},"503":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Service unavailable"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"Replace a profile","tags":["profiles"]}},"/api/v1/profiles/{name}/effective-tools":{"get":{"description":"One row per catalog tool with the verdict of the access chain (the same rendering GET /tools?profile= uses): server, tool, intrinsic_tier, profile_tier, access{visible, callable, reason} and classification_stale. With client=\u003cid\u003e the client's credential is evaluated UNDER this profile (\"what would Cursor get here\"). An administrator gets every row plus counts.callable, counts.by_reason and stale_classifications; every other caller gets only visible rows and counts{visible, hidden}, and client= and reason= are refused 403. An unreachable profile answers exactly like an unknown one.","parameters":[{"description":"Profile name","in":"path","name":"name","required":true,"schema":{"type":"string"}},{"description":"Evaluate this client's credential under the profile (administrators only)","in":"query","name":"client","schema":{"type":"string"}},{"description":"Keep only this server's rows","in":"query","name":"server","schema":{"type":"string"}},{"description":"Keep only rows with this access reason (administrators only)","in":"query","name":"reason","schema":{"type":"string"}}],"responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"allOf":[{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/data"}],"properties":{"data":{"type":"object"},"error":{"type":"string"},"request_id":{"type":"string"},"success":{"type":"boolean"}},"type":"object"}}},"description":"Effective tools"},"403":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"operation requires admin access"},"404":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"profile not found / client not found"},"503":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Service unavailable"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"Effective tools of a profile","tags":["profiles"]}},"/api/v1/profiles/{name}/rename":{"post":{"description":"Renames a profile and moves every reference to it - token pins, client bindings, other profiles' switchable_to and the anonymous_profile - in one write (D19). Tokens move first, so a failure part-way never widens a scope. Guarded by FR-008a. 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Alias of discover-tools, named for the upstream_servers 'refresh' operation; use it to make just-approved tools searchable immediately.","parameters":[{"description":"Server ID or name","in":"path","name":"id","required":true,"schema":{"type":"string"}}],"responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ServerActionResponse"}}},"description":"Tool refresh triggered successfully"},"400":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Bad request (missing server ID)"},"403":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Forbidden (agent tokens cannot refresh)"},"404":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Server not found"},"500":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Failed to refresh tools"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"Refresh a server's tools","tags":["servers"]}},"/api/v1/servers/{id}/restart":{"post":{"description":"Restart the connection to a specific upstream MCP server","parameters":[{"description":"Server ID or name","in":"path","name":"id","required":true,"schema":{"type":"string"}}],"responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ServerActionResponse"}}},"description":"Server restarted successfully"},"400":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Bad request"},"403":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Forbidden (agent tokens cannot mutate servers)"},"404":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Server not found"},"500":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Internal server error"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"Restart an upstream server","tags":["servers"]}},"/api/v1/servers/{id}/review":{"get":{"description":"Returns redacted server configuration, captured tool definitions, annotations, scan verdicts, and diffs. 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The approve and disable land in a single write per tool, so a tool is never left in the approved+enabled state. The \"blocked\" field counts tools actually blocked.","parameters":[{"description":"Server ID or name","in":"path","name":"id","required":true,"schema":{"type":"string"}}],"requestBody":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"type":"object"}}}},"responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.SuccessResponse"}}},"description":"Block result"},"400":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Bad request"},"403":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Forbidden (agent tokens cannot mutate servers)"},"500":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Internal server error"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"Block (approve+disable) tools for a server","tags":["servers"]}},"/api/v1/servers/{id}/tools/disable_all":{"post":{"description":"Bulk-toggles every known tool of a server. The \"changed\" field","parameters":[{"description":"Server ID or name","in":"path","name":"id","required":true,"schema":{"type":"string"}}],"requestBody":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"type":"object"}}}},"responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.SuccessResponse"}}},"description":"Operation result"},"400":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Bad request"},"500":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Internal server error"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"Enable or disable all tools for a server","tags":["servers"]}},"/api/v1/servers/{id}/tools/enable_all":{"post":{"description":"Bulk-toggles every known tool of a server. 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Each session represents a connection from an MCP client to MCPProxy, tracking initialization time, tool calls, and connection status.","parameters":[{"description":"Maximum number of sessions to return (1-100, default 10)","in":"query","name":"limit","schema":{"type":"integer"}},{"description":"Number of sessions to skip for pagination (default 0)","in":"query","name":"offset","schema":{"type":"integer"}},{"description":"Filter by session status","in":"query","name":"status","schema":{"enum":["active","closed"],"type":"string"}},{"description":"Filter by the session's latest effective profile; - selects sessions with none (Spec 108)","in":"query","name":"profile","schema":{"type":"string"}},{"description":"Filter by the client id the session's credential is bound to; - selects sessions with none (Spec 108)","in":"query","name":"client","schema":{"type":"string"}},{"description":"Filter by the token name the session initialized with; - selects sessions with none (Spec 108)","in":"query","name":"token","schema":{"type":"string"}},{"description":"Alias of token","in":"query","name":"agent","schema":{"type":"string"}}],"responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.GetSessionsResponse"}}},"description":"Sessions retrieved successfully"},"400":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Invalid status filter, token and agent naming different tokens, or client_name (not supported here; 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Counters in the payload reflect the current in-memory state. Spec 042.","responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.SuccessResponse"}}},"description":"Telemetry heartbeat payload"},"403":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Agent tokens cannot read the deployment telemetry payload"},"503":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Telemetry service unavailable"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"Preview next telemetry heartbeat payload","tags":["telemetry"]}},"/api/v1/telemetry/update-failure":{"post":{"description":"Records one terminal update-session failure, identified only by its\nstage (appcast, download, install, other). The body carries no error\ntext, URL, or version — the stage is the only value transmitted.\nReturns 204 both when the occurrence was durably persisted and when\ntelemetry is inactive at event time (config opt-out, environment\nopt-out, CI, or dev build), in which case nothing is recorded.\nCallers cannot and need not distinguish the two.","requestBody":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/httpapi.UpdateFailureRequest"}}},"description":"Update failure stage","required":true},"responses":{"204":{"description":"Accepted (recorded, or a deliberate no-op while telemetry is inactive)"},"400":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Malformed body, unknown field, trailing value, or stage outside the closed set"},"500":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Persistence failure"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"Record a desktop auto-update failure occurrence (Spec 095)","tags":["telemetry"]}},"/api/v1/tool-calls":{"get":{"description":"Retrieves paginated tool call history across all upstream servers or filtered by session ID. Includes execution timestamps, arguments, results, and error information for debugging and auditing.","parameters":[{"description":"Maximum number of records to return (1-100, default 50)","in":"query","name":"limit","schema":{"type":"integer"}},{"description":"Number of records to skip for pagination (default 0)","in":"query","name":"offset","schema":{"type":"integer"}},{"description":"Filter tool calls by MCP session ID","in":"query","name":"session_id","schema":{"type":"string"}}],"responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.GetToolCallsResponse"}}},"description":"Tool calls retrieved successfully"},"401":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Unauthorized - missing or invalid API key"},"405":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Method not allowed"},"500":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Failed to get tool calls"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"Get tool call history","tags":["tool-calls"]}},"/api/v1/tool-calls/{id}":{"get":{"description":"Retrieves detailed information about a specific tool call execution including full request arguments, response data, execution time, and any errors encountered.","parameters":[{"description":"Tool call ID","in":"path","name":"id","required":true,"schema":{"type":"string"}}],"responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.GetToolCallDetailResponse"}}},"description":"Tool call details retrieved successfully"},"400":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Tool call ID required"},"401":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Unauthorized - missing or invalid API key"},"404":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Tool call not found"},"405":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Method not allowed"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"Get tool call details by ID","tags":["tool-calls"]}},"/api/v1/tool-calls/{id}/replay":{"post":{"description":"Re-executes a previous tool call with optional modified arguments. Useful for debugging and testing tool behavior with different inputs. Creates a new tool call record linked to the original.","parameters":[{"description":"Original tool call ID to replay","in":"path","name":"id","required":true,"schema":{"type":"string"}}],"requestBody":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ReplayToolCallRequest"}}},"description":"Optional modified arguments for replay"},"responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ReplayToolCallResponse"}}},"description":"Tool call replayed successfully"},"400":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Tool call ID required or invalid JSON payload"},"401":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Unauthorized - missing or invalid API key"},"405":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Method not allowed"},"429":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Shed by a concurrency limit (Retry-After header carries the wait hint)"},"500":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Failed to replay tool call"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"Replay a tool call","tags":["tool-calls"]}},"/api/v1/tools":{"get":{"description":"Consolidated, read-only listing of all tools from every configured server (including disabled servers and disabled/config-denied tools), enriched with approval state and 30-day usage. Backs the global Tools page and the CLI global ` + "`" + `tools list` + "`" + ` (spec 050, issue #437).","parameters":[{"description":"View-as (administrator only): the tools this client would see, each with its access verdict {visible, callable, reason} and profile_tier (Spec 108 FR-032)","in":"query","name":"client","schema":{"type":"string"}},{"description":"View-as: the tools this profile would expose. An administrator gets every row with a verdict; any other caller gets only the visible rows plus counts {visible, hidden} (Spec 108 FR-032)","in":"query","name":"profile","schema":{"type":"string"}}],"responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.GlobalToolsResponse"}}},"description":"All tools across all servers"},"400":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Unsupported scope filter (token), both client and profile, or '-' on a tools filter"},"403":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"client= requires administrator credentials"},"404":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Unknown or unreachable client / profile"},"500":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Could not enumerate servers"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"List every tool across all servers","tags":["tools"]}},"/api/v1/tools/call":{"post":{"description":"Execute a tool on an upstream MCP server (wrapper around MCP tool calls)","requestBody":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"properties":{"arguments":{"type":"object"},"tool_name":{"type":"string"}},"type":"object"}}},"description":"Tool call request with tool name and arguments","required":true},"responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.SuccessResponse"}}},"description":"Tool call result"},"400":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Bad request (invalid payload or missing tool name)"},"429":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Shed by a concurrency limit (Retry-After header carries the wait hint)"},"500":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/contracts.ErrorResponse"}}},"description":"Internal server error or tool execution failure"}},"security":[{"ApiKeyAuth":[]},{"ApiKeyQuery":[]}],"summary":"Call a tool","tags":["tools"]}},"/healthz":{"get":{"description":"Get comprehensive health status including all component health (Kubernetes-compatible liveness probe)","responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/observability.HealthResponse"}}},"description":"Service is healthy"},"503":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/observability.HealthResponse"}}},"description":"Service is unhealthy"}},"summary":"Get health status","tags":["health"]}},"/readyz":{"get":{"description":"Get readiness status including all component readiness checks (Kubernetes-compatible readiness probe)","responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/observability.ReadinessResponse"}}},"description":"Service is ready"},"503":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/observability.ReadinessResponse"}}},"description":"Service is not ready"}},"summary":"Get readiness status","tags":["health"]}}}, diff --git a/oas/swagger.yaml b/oas/swagger.yaml index a88d234ae..9e5576561 100644 --- a/oas/swagger.yaml +++ b/oas/swagger.yaml @@ -4834,6 +4834,12 @@ components: $ref: '#/components/schemas/profile.FixAction' label: type: string + profile: + description: |- + Profile is set for move_client only: the destination profile slug the fix + moves the client to. Target stays the client id (UIs navigate by it) and + Label carries the title, so neither can name the slug. + type: string step: type: string x-enum-varnames: From c571caf5591ec1b1ec3de3761d85ce298cac6f0c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Algis Dumbris Date: Fri, 2 Oct 2026 16:22:08 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 3/3] docs(profiles): spec, contracts and docs for nested block_reason and explain hint (Spec 108 T168) --- ROADMAP.md | 2 +- docs/cli/profile-commands.md | 2 +- docs/features/activity-log.md | 4 +++- docs/features/profiles.md | 2 +- specs/108-profiles-v3/contracts/cli.md | 2 +- specs/108-profiles-v3/contracts/mcp-tools.md | 2 +- specs/108-profiles-v3/contracts/refusals.md | 6 +++--- specs/108-profiles-v3/contracts/rest-api.md | 2 +- specs/108-profiles-v3/data-model.md | 6 +++--- specs/108-profiles-v3/plan.md | 1 + specs/108-profiles-v3/tasks.md | 10 +++++++++- 11 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/ROADMAP.md b/ROADMAP.md index 78ac342af..9ea0d67b2 100644 --- a/ROADMAP.md +++ b/ROADMAP.md @@ -1035,7 +1035,7 @@ Legend: `shipped` ≥95% checked · `in-flight` 1–94% · `drafted` 0% · `—` | [105-agent-scope-hardening](./specs/105-agent-scope-hardening/) | `in-flight` | 94/113 (83%) | | [106-security-residual-fixes](./specs/106-security-residual-fixes/) | `shipped` | 18/19 (95%) | | [107-server-edition-sso-hardening](./specs/107-server-edition-sso-hardening/) | `shipped` | 126/126 (100%) | -| [108-profiles-v3](./specs/108-profiles-v3/) | `shipped` | 185/186 (99%) | +| [108-profiles-v3](./specs/108-profiles-v3/) | `shipped` | 188/189 (99%) | | [109-ux-navigation-consistency](./specs/109-ux-navigation-consistency/) | `shipped` | 200/201 (100%) | | [110-catalog-popularity](./specs/110-catalog-popularity/) | `in-flight` | 19/23 (83%) | | [112-client-header-forwarding](./specs/112-client-header-forwarding/) | `shipped` | 38/40 (95%) | diff --git a/docs/cli/profile-commands.md b/docs/cli/profile-commands.md index 20fcf3f98..3642d510a 100644 --- a/docs/cli/profile-commands.md +++ b/docs/cli/profile-commands.md @@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ A client without an active client credential exits 1 with `mcpproxy connect mcpproxy access explain --tool github:create_issue (--client cursor | --token ci | --profile work-readonly | --anonymous) ``` -Walks the gates a call meets (credential, profile, server in scope, tool rule, tier cap, token permission, global gate, server state, tool approval), prints the verdict (`allowed`, `blocked`, `hidden`) and the fixes in preference order, each with the command that performs it. The verdict is computed by the same predicate that enforces the call, so it never disagrees with what actually happens. Exit code 0 whenever an explanation is produced: the verdict is data. +Walks the gates a call meets (credential, profile, server in scope, tool rule, tier cap, token permission, global gate, server state, tool approval), prints the verdict (`allowed`, `blocked`, `hidden`) and the fixes in preference order, each with the command that performs it. The verdict is computed by the same predicate that enforces the call, so it never disagrees with what actually happens. The move-client fix prints `mcpproxy client set-profile ` with the profile it names. Exit code 0 whenever an explanation is produced: the verdict is data. ## `mcpproxy token` diff --git a/docs/features/activity-log.md b/docs/features/activity-log.md index aab977dba..4b1955279 100644 --- a/docs/features/activity-log.md +++ b/docs/features/activity-log.md @@ -130,7 +130,9 @@ Each tool call record includes: Every upstream tool call a sandboxed `code_execution` script makes is recorded as a first-class `tool_call` record with its own `request_id` and a `parent_id` equal to the parent `code_execution` record's `request_id` (`source` is -`internal`; a policy-refused sub-call is recorded with status `blocked`). +`internal`; a policy-refused sub-call is recorded with status `blocked`; when +the refusal comes from the caller's profile it also carries `block_reason`: +`profile_tier`, `profile_rule` or `profile_unannotated`). Filter with `parent_id=` to list a script's sub-calls, or `request_id=` to find the parent — the Web UI drawer, the macOS Activity window, and `mcpproxy activity list --parent-id` all expose the diff --git a/docs/features/profiles.md b/docs/features/profiles.md index f65f2df96..3e407aed1 100644 --- a/docs/features/profiles.md +++ b/docs/features/profiles.md @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ Patterns are `server:tool` with `*` as the only wildcard, matched case-sensitive | `retrieve_tools` | Left out **before** the result limit, and counted in `hidden_by_profile` without naming any of them. The response names the caller's own profile (`profile`) when it came from the caller's own credential or choice, never the operator's anonymous profile | | `describe_tool` | The same not-found answer as a tool that does not exist | | `call_tool_read`, `call_tool_write`, `call_tool_destructive`, `/mcp/all`, REST `/tools/call` | Refused before any upstream call with `blocked by profile: : is a tool; profile "" (<slug>) allows <cap> tools only`, or `... is denied by a rule in profile "<title>" (<slug>)`, or `... has no tier annotation; an operator can classify it in profile "<title>" (<slug>) to allow it` | -| `code_execution` | Absent and refused when the profile turns it off; every nested `call_tool` goes through the same gate | +| `code_execution` | Absent and refused when the profile turns it off; every nested `call_tool` goes through the same gate and is recorded with the same `block_reason` | A refusal names the profile only to a caller whose effective profile is its own: one that came from the caller's pin, its client binding, the URL or `set_profile`, so an agent can tell the operator which profile to change. A caller that connects without a credential and falls under `anonymous_profile` gets the same refusal without the profile name (`... this profile allows <cap> tools only`, `... is denied by a profile rule`, `... in the profile to allow it`), and so does a caller whose profile no longer exists, so the operator's anonymous confinement is never handed out. The title is quoted and escaped, so it cannot add a line to the refusal. The operator sees the profile in the activity record and in the explainer. A blocked call is recorded with `status=blocked` and `block_reason` `profile_tier`, `profile_rule` or `profile_unannotated` (`profile_code_execution` and `profile_management` for the tools above). diff --git a/specs/108-profiles-v3/contracts/cli.md b/specs/108-profiles-v3/contracts/cli.md index 93e8b99ea..97bf65d60 100644 --- a/specs/108-profiles-v3/contracts/cli.md +++ b/specs/108-profiles-v3/contracts/cli.md @@ -64,6 +64,6 @@ Table: `STEP STATUS DETAIL FIX`, then `VERDICT: blocked at tier_cap`. The FIX co Out of scope: a `sessions` command (none exists; `activity list --session` covers it). -**108-f (what the CLI renders of the REST shapes).** `client rotate` prints `rotation finalized` for a supported client and, for a custom client, the new secret once with the snippet and `rotation pending`; `client forget --disconnect` prints `revoked`, whether the entry was removed and any `disconnect_error`; `client add --display-name --expires-in`; `access explain` renders `fixes[]` in order with their labels. `-o json` equals the REST `data`. +**108-f (what the CLI renders of the REST shapes).** `client rotate` prints `rotation finalized` for a supported client and, for a custom client, the new secret once with the snippet and `rotation pending`; `client forget --disconnect` prints `revoked`, whether the entry was removed and any `disconnect_error`; `client add --display-name --expires-in`; `access explain` renders `fixes[]` in order with their labels and the command that performs each; the `move_client` command names the destination profile (`mcpproxy client set-profile <client> <profile>`). `-o json` equals the REST `data`. **108-g (as shipped).** Every command above except `connect` is daemon-only (`<group> requires running daemon. Start with: mcpproxy serve`, exit 1): the FR-008a delta needs the published (index, snapshot) pair, so there is no offline mode. Every REST refusal exits 1, including ones whose text mentions "config". `-o json|yaml` prints the REST `data` object exactly (the raw bytes re-indented); a command that makes two REST calls (`profile update|classify|try`, `client lock|unlock`) prints the last call's data. Response `warnings[]` print to stderr in table mode only. `profile update` is a read-modify-write of the stored fields (no ETag: last writer wins). `profile show --effective` prints the table `SERVER TOOL TIER PROFILE TIER ACCESS REASON NOTE`, then the stale-classification footer (each stale note comes from `stale_classification_reasons`; against a daemon without it, only an unfiltered request guesses the reason from the listed rows, a `--server`/`--reason` request prints the neutral `classification ignored`); a non-administrator response has only visible rows and prints `Hidden: N`. `client lock` on All servers prints the REST `field: mode` 400 plus `mcpproxy client set-profile <id> <profile> --lock`. `client upgrade-admin-key-holders` exits 1 after the preview when the guard would refuse, and when some client could not be upgraded. `access explain` prints each fix with the command that performs it. The JSON keys, not the table headers, are the REST parity surface. diff --git a/specs/108-profiles-v3/contracts/mcp-tools.md b/specs/108-profiles-v3/contracts/mcp-tools.md index fff01db58..0326bae10 100644 --- a/specs/108-profiles-v3/contracts/mcp-tools.md +++ b/specs/108-profiles-v3/contracts/mcp-tools.md @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ Profile gate evaluated after the Spec 105 server-scope gate and before upstream ## `code_execution` -Absent from `tools/list` and refused at call (`tool not found` uniform shape) when the profile's effective code execution is off: `code_execution: false`, or unset under a `read`/`write` `max_tier` (FR-003a). Nested `call_tool` refusals are returned to the script as the same error text and recorded as children (`parent_id`). +Absent from `tools/list` and refused at call (`tool not found` uniform shape) when the profile's effective code execution is off: `code_execution: false`, or unset under a `read`/`write` `max_tier` (FR-003a). Nested `call_tool` refusals are returned to the script as the same error text and recorded as `tool_call` children (`parent_id`, `status=blocked`) carrying the same `block_reason` as a top-level refusal. ## `set_profile` (semantics change only) diff --git a/specs/108-profiles-v3/contracts/refusals.md b/specs/108-profiles-v3/contracts/refusals.md index 009bc37b3..39c325881 100644 --- a/specs/108-profiles-v3/contracts/refusals.md +++ b/specs/108-profiles-v3/contracts/refusals.md @@ -4,9 +4,9 @@ Texts are exact (tests compare byte-for-byte after substituting `<server>`, `<to | Situation | Surface | Response | Activity | |---|---|---|---| -| Tool above cap on in-scope server | `call_tool_*`, `/mcp/all` `tools/call`, nested `call_tool` in `code_execution` (from MCP, REST `/tools/call` or REST `/code/exec`), REST `POST /api/v1/tools/call` and `POST /api/v1/tool-calls/{id}/replay` (HTTP `403`, same text as `error`) | disclosed: `blocked by profile: <server>:<tool> is a <tier> tool; profile <label> allows <cap> tools only`; undisclosed (anonymous): `blocked by profile: <server>:<tool> is a <tier> tool; this profile allows <cap> tools only` (cap phrase: `read` → "read", `write` → "read and write") | `status=blocked`, `block_reason=profile_tier` | -| Tool matches deny rule | same | disclosed: `blocked by profile: <server>:<tool> is denied by a rule in profile <label>`; undisclosed: `blocked by profile: <server>:<tool> is denied by a profile rule` | `block_reason=profile_rule` | -| Unannotated, unclassified, policy deny | same | disclosed: `blocked by profile: <server>:<tool> has no tier annotation; an operator can classify it in profile <label> to allow it`; undisclosed: `blocked by profile: <server>:<tool> has no tier annotation; an operator can classify it in the profile to allow it` | `block_reason=profile_unannotated` | +| Tool above cap on in-scope server | `call_tool_*`, `/mcp/all` `tools/call`, nested `call_tool` in `code_execution` (from MCP, REST `/tools/call` or REST `/code/exec`), REST `POST /api/v1/tools/call` and `POST /api/v1/tool-calls/{id}/replay` (HTTP `403`, same text as `error`) | disclosed: `blocked by profile: <server>:<tool> is a <tier> tool; profile <label> allows <cap> tools only`; undisclosed (anonymous): `blocked by profile: <server>:<tool> is a <tier> tool; this profile allows <cap> tools only` (cap phrase: `read` → "read", `write` → "read and write") | `status=blocked`, `block_reason=profile_tier`; a nested `call_tool` / `call_tools` refusal in `code_execution` is the `tool_call` child (`parent_id`, `source=internal`, `status=blocked`) with the same `block_reason`, `profile` and `profile_source` | +| Tool matches deny rule | same | disclosed: `blocked by profile: <server>:<tool> is denied by a rule in profile <label>`; undisclosed: `blocked by profile: <server>:<tool> is denied by a profile rule` | `block_reason=profile_rule`; a nested `call_tool` / `call_tools` refusal in `code_execution` is the `tool_call` child (`parent_id`, `source=internal`, `status=blocked`) with the same `block_reason`, `profile` and `profile_source` | +| Unannotated, unclassified, policy deny | same | disclosed: `blocked by profile: <server>:<tool> has no tier annotation; an operator can classify it in profile <label> to allow it`; undisclosed: `blocked by profile: <server>:<tool> has no tier annotation; an operator can classify it in the profile to allow it` | `block_reason=profile_unannotated`; a nested `call_tool` / `call_tools` refusal in `code_execution` is the `tool_call` child (`parent_id`, `source=internal`, `status=blocked`) with the same `block_reason`, `profile` and `profile_source` | | Server outside effective scope (incl. FR-010 `server_not_in_profile`) | all, incl. REST `POST /api/v1/tool-calls/{id}/replay` (its existing out-of-scope/unknown-id `404`, FR-015) and the REST discovery routes (absent rows / scoped `404`, FR-015a) | **unchanged** Spec 105 non-disclosing refusal — never the descriptive `403` texts above, which apply only to the three policy reasons on an in-scope server | unchanged | | Excluded tool via `describe_tool` | `describe_tool` | uniform not-found (Spec 105) | none (discovery) | | Excluded tool in `retrieve_tools` | `retrieve_tools` | omitted; counted in `hidden_by_profile` | none | diff --git a/specs/108-profiles-v3/contracts/rest-api.md b/specs/108-profiles-v3/contracts/rest-api.md index 1336331bb..c4f0019e5 100644 --- a/specs/108-profiles-v3/contracts/rest-api.md +++ b/specs/108-profiles-v3/contracts/rest-api.md @@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ Every mutating route writes one `profile_change` record and emits `profiles.chan ## Access explain -`GET /access/explain?tool=<server:tool>&client=<id>|token=<name>|profile=<name>|anonymous=true` (exactly one subject; admin) → `AccessExplanation` (data-model §7: `steps[]`, `verdict`, `first_failure`, top-level `fixes[]`). `400` when the subject is missing/ambiguous; unknown tool → verdict `hidden` with step `server_state`/`tool_approval` failing as appropriate (admin callers get full detail). Error texts: `400 exactly one of client, token, profile, anonymous is required`; `400 use client=<id> for a client credential` (`token=client-<id>`); `400 access/explain covers upstream tools (server:tool) only` (a built-in tool name); `404 client not found` / `404 token not found` / `404 profile not found`; in the server edition `client=` is `404 client not found`. +`GET /access/explain?tool=<server:tool>&client=<id>|token=<name>|profile=<name>|anonymous=true` (exactly one subject; admin) → `AccessExplanation` (data-model §7: `steps[]`, `verdict`, `first_failure`, top-level `fixes[]`; `fixes[].profile` is the destination profile slug of a `move_client` fix, omitted for every other action). `400` when the subject is missing/ambiguous; unknown tool → verdict `hidden` with step `server_state`/`tool_approval` failing as appropriate (admin callers get full detail). Error texts: `400 exactly one of client, token, profile, anonymous is required`; `400 use client=<id> for a client credential` (`token=client-<id>`); `400 access/explain covers upstream tools (server:tool) only` (a built-in tool name); `404 client not found` / `404 token not found` / `404 profile not found`; in the server edition `client=` is `404 client not found`. ## Filters on grids (FR-031) diff --git a/specs/108-profiles-v3/data-model.md b/specs/108-profiles-v3/data-model.md index ea8b68732..c169ee1ea 100644 --- a/specs/108-profiles-v3/data-model.md +++ b/specs/108-profiles-v3/data-model.md @@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ One call per request returns it with the `(index, snapshot)` pair (Spec 105 pair | `ClientID` | `client_id,omitempty` | `AuthContext.ClientID` | | `ClientName` | `client_name,omitempty` | session `clientInfo.name` (was `metadata.client_name`) | | `TokenName` | `token_name,omitempty` | `AuthContext.AgentName` for agent/client tokens | -| `BlockReason` | `block_reason,omitempty` | `profile_tier`, `profile_rule`, `profile_unannotated`, `profile_code_execution`, `profile_management` (new); existing block causes keep their current metadata and are not renamed | +| `BlockReason` | `block_reason,omitempty` | `profile_tier`, `profile_rule`, `profile_unannotated`, `profile_code_execution`, `profile_management` (new); existing block causes keep their current metadata and are not renamed; set on `policy_decision` records and on blocked `tool_call` children of `code_execution` (a nested profile refusal; other nested refusals carry none) | An internal `token_prefix` (`storage.ActivityRecord.TokenPrefix`, the calling token's 12-char display prefix) is persisted with every attributed record as the ownership proof behind FR-031's scoped views; it is never projected to any API shape, export or SSE frame, and a record written before it existed falls back to the `_auth_token_prefix` argument, else reads as foreign to a scoped caller. @@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ New `ActivityType`: `profile_change`, metadata: `{actor_kind, actor_name, surfac **EffectiveTool** (`effective-tools`, `tools?client=`): `server, tool, intrinsic_tier (read|write|destructive|unannotated), profile_tier, access{visible, callable, reason}, classification_stale`. `access` is computed by walking the AccessExplanation chain below in its canonical order (`credential → profile → server_in_scope → tool_rule → tier_cap → token_permission → global_gate → server_state → tool_approval`, FR-032), so `callable` equals a real call's outcome and `reason` names the first failing step. `reason` enum (empty when callable): the FR-010 decision reasons reported by the step that carries them — `server_not_in_profile` (step `server_in_scope`, server outside the profile's `servers`; evaluated before the token half of that step), `denied_by_rule` (step `tool_rule`), `unannotated_hidden` and `above_tier_cap` (step `tier_cap`) — and otherwise the step name itself: `credential`, `profile` (dangling base), `server_in_scope` (server in the profile but outside the subject credential's token servers), `token_permission`, `global_gate`, `server_state`, `tool_approval`. The caller's own authorization scope is applied before the rows are built and never appears as a `reason` (FR-032). For a **non-administrator** caller (`profile=` view-as, `effective-tools`) the response contains only rows with `access.visible=true` plus `counts{visible, hidden}` — excluded rows, their tiers and reasons are administrator-only (FR-032). `classification_stale` is the FR-005 stale-classification report surfaced by every effective-tools consumer. **On `GET /tools`** the intrinsic tier stays in the existing `tier` field (Spec 109-a); a view-as row adds `profile_tier` and `access{visible, callable, reason}`, and a non-administrator profile view-as adds response-level `counts{visible, hidden}`. `reason` is the one Go type `profile.AccessReason` (`profile.AccessReasons()`), and `EvaluateAccess` returns `profile.AccessVerdict{Visible, Callable, Reason, ProfileTier, Steps[{step, status, detail}]}` with every step of the canonical order — the shape 108-f's explainer renders. -**AccessExplanation**: `subject{client|token|profile|anonymous}, tool, steps[{step, status (pass|fail|skip), detail}], verdict (allowed|blocked|hidden), first_failure, fixes[{step, action, target, label}]`. `fixes[]` is top-level (FR-035) because one failure can have several fixes, ordered by preference (e.g. for `tier_cap`: `allow_in_profile` → the profile editor focused on the tool, then `move_client` → the client's binding); it is empty when `verdict=allowed`. `action` enum: `allow_in_profile`, `classify_in_profile`, `add_server_to_profile`, `move_client`, `edit_token`, `enable_server`, `approve_tool`, `change_setting`, `reconnect_client`. Steps in enforcement order (identical to the refusal precedence in [contracts/refusals.md](contracts/refusals.md)): `credential, profile, server_in_scope, tool_rule, tier_cap, token_permission, global_gate, server_state, tool_approval`. `server_in_scope` covers profile servers ∩ token servers; `tier_cap` covers the unannotated policy. +**AccessExplanation**: `subject{client|token|profile|anonymous}, tool, steps[{step, status (pass|fail|skip), detail}], verdict (allowed|blocked|hidden), first_failure, fixes[{step, action, target, label, profile?}]` (`profile`: move_client only, the destination profile slug). `fixes[]` is top-level (FR-035) because one failure can have several fixes, ordered by preference (e.g. for `tier_cap`: `allow_in_profile` → the profile editor focused on the tool, then `move_client` → the client's binding); it is empty when `verdict=allowed`. `action` enum: `allow_in_profile`, `classify_in_profile`, `add_server_to_profile`, `move_client`, `edit_token`, `enable_server`, `approve_tool`, `change_setting`, `reconnect_client`. Steps in enforcement order (identical to the refusal precedence in [contracts/refusals.md](contracts/refusals.md)): `credential, profile, server_in_scope, tool_rule, tier_cap, token_permission, global_gate, server_state, tool_approval`. `server_in_scope` covers profile servers ∩ token servers; `tier_cap` covers the unannotated policy. **ProfileView** (`GET /profiles` row): config fields + `effective_servers, tool_counts{read,write,destructive,unannotated_hidden}, used_by{clients[], tokens[], anonymous_profile: bool}, calls_24h, blocked_24h, is_legacy`. `used_by` is present for administrator callers only and **omitted** (not emptied) for every non-admin caller — it discloses other credentials' bindings, the FR-032 rule (FR-034, zcode review). @@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ New `ActivityType`: `profile_change`, metadata: `{actor_kind, actor_name, surfac **EffectiveTool response**: `{profile, tools: EffectiveTool[], counts: {visible, hidden, callable?, by_reason?}, stale_classifications?, stale_classification_reasons?}`; `callable`, `by_reason`, `stale_classifications` (classify entries for annotated **or** missing tools) and `stale_classification_reasons` (`{id: annotated|missing}`, computed over the unfiltered tool set so a `server`/`reason` filter never changes it) are administrator-only; `classification_stale` is true when the profile has a `tools.classify` entry for the tool and its intrinsic tier is not `unannotated` (the entry is ignored). -**AccessExplanation** JSON: `{subject: {kind: client|token|profile|anonymous, name?}, tool, profile: {name, source}, steps: [{step, status: pass|fail|skip, detail}], verdict: allowed|blocked|hidden, first_failure, fixes: [{step, action, target, label}]}`. `verdict` is `allowed` when callable, `hidden` when not visible (or the tool is unknown) and `blocked` when visible but not callable; `first_failure` is the failing step's name, empty when allowed; `move_client` targets the client id. +**AccessExplanation** JSON: `{subject: {kind: client|token|profile|anonymous, name?}, tool, profile: {name, source}, steps: [{step, status: pass|fail|skip, detail}], verdict: allowed|blocked|hidden, first_failure, fixes: [{step, action, target, label, profile?}]}`. `verdict` is `allowed` when callable, `hidden` when not visible (or the tool is unknown) and `blocked` when visible but not callable; `first_failure` is the failing step's name, empty when allowed; `move_client` targets the client id and names the destination profile slug in `fixes[].profile`. **ProfileView** field list: `name, title, description, servers, max_tier, unannotated, tools {allow, deny, classify}, code_execution, management_tools, switchable_to` (as stored), `effective_servers, effective_unannotated, effective_code_execution, is_legacy, tool_counts {read, write, destructive, unannotated_hidden}, tool_count` (deprecated v2: indexed tools on the effective servers), `calls_24h, blocked_24h` (one 24 h streaming pass over `tool_call` and `policy_decision` records grouped by the first-class `profile` and `client_id`, cached 30 s per scope) and, for administrators only, `used_by`. For a non-administrator `servers`/`effective_servers`, rule entries whose literal server segment is not visible and `switchable_to` are narrowed fail-closed. diff --git a/specs/108-profiles-v3/plan.md b/specs/108-profiles-v3/plan.md index db84fec61..b130764aa 100644 --- a/specs/108-profiles-v3/plan.md +++ b/specs/108-profiles-v3/plan.md @@ -128,6 +128,7 @@ Merge order: `a → (b ∥ c) → d → e → f → (g ∥ h ∥ i ∥ k) → j | 108-l | `108-l-profiles-v3-parity-docs` | cross-surface parity test, Playwright `profiles-scope.spec.ts` in the release-gate sweep, docs, release notes, CLAUDE.md line | FR-051, SC-001, SC-006 | g, h, j, k | all | | 108-retro-go | `fix/108-retro-go` | post-merge Sol findings; Go only; after 108-k | FR-021a, 008a, 029, 031, 005 | k | Go core, REST, MCP, CLI | | fix-1458 | `fix-1458-profile-index-reconcile` | reconcile per-profile indexes on every apply/reload that changes `profiles` or `anonymous_profile` | FR-011 (`retrieve_tools` under a profile), L9 follow-up | l, retro-go | Go core | +| fix-nested-refusal | `fix-nested-refusal` | nested code_execution profile refusals record block_reason; access-explain move_client hint names the destination | FR-029, FR-035, US1-5 | fix-1458, demo-ux-fixes | Go core, CLI | ## Design — the five mechanisms diff --git a/specs/108-profiles-v3/tasks.md b/specs/108-profiles-v3/tasks.md index bc8d8ff15..854bbf450 100644 --- a/specs/108-profiles-v3/tasks.md +++ b/specs/108-profiles-v3/tasks.md @@ -338,6 +338,14 @@ Four findings from a live demo of `main` at `b3191a059`; Spec 109's T160–T165 - [x] T151 [US2] #9 radio and checkbox labels sit next to their control: one unlayered rule in `frontend/src/assets/main.css`, pinned by `frontend/tests/unit/form-control-label-shim.spec.ts` and the Playwright sweep `e2e/web-ui-sweep/demo-ux-fixes.spec.ts` - [x] T152 [US2] Docs and bookkeeping for T148–T151: `docs/features/profiles.md`, `contracts/refusals.md`, `contracts/mcp-tools.md`, FR-011, FR-042, FR-048, `parity-matrix.json`, research D39 +## Phase 17: PR fix-nested-refusal — final done-check F (US1-5, FR-029, FR-035) + +Two gaps found by the done-check audit: a nested `call_tool` refused by the profile inside `code_execution` wrote its `tool_call` child without `block_reason`, and the `access explain` move-client hint printed a `<profile>` placeholder beside a label that names the destination. + +- [x] T166 [US1] Nested profile refusal carries `block_reason` (FR-029, US1-5): the sandbox gate adds `ProfilePolicyBlockReason()` beside the unchanged `ProfilePolicyRefusal()`, `jsruntime.AuthzGateReport.BlockReason`, `emitActivityToolCallCompletedWithBlockReason`, `EmitActivityToolCallCompletedAttributed(…, parentID, blockReason, attr)` and `handleToolCallCompleted` writing both `record.BlockReason` and `Metadata["block_reason"]`. Non-profile nested refusals stay without one. Tests: `TestCodeExecution_ProfileV3NestedCallBlockedBeforeUpstream`, `TestCodeExecution_ProfileV3NestedRefusalReasons`, `TestCodeExecution_ProfileV3NestedRefusalMatchesTopLevel` (`internal/server`), `TestAuthzObserver_ProfileRefusalReportsBlockReason` (`internal/jsruntime`), `TestActivityService_ToolCallCompletedPersistsBlockReason` (`internal/runtime`), `statusArgIndex` in `activity_result_status_test.go` +- [x] T167 [US4] `access explain` move-client hint names the destination profile (FR-035): `runtime.Fix.Profile` (`profile`, `omitempty`, move_client only), `explainFixes` fills it, `fixCommand` prints `mcpproxy client set-profile <client> <profile>` and falls back to the placeholder for a daemon that predates the field. Tests: `TestExplain_FixesOrderedByPreference`, `TestExplain_DanglingClientBindingMoveFixNamesDestination`, `TestAccessExplain_MoveClientFixNamesDestinationProfile`, `explain_blocked.json` in `internal/httpapi/access_explain_route_test.go` and `internal/profile/contract_test.go`; `oas/swagger.yaml` +- [x] T168 Docs and bookkeeping for T166–T167: `contracts/refusals.md`, `contracts/mcp-tools.md`, `contracts/rest-api.md`, `contracts/cli.md`, `data-model.md`, `plan.md`, `docs/features/activity-log.md`, `docs/features/profiles.md`, `docs/cli/profile-commands.md` + --- ## Dependencies & Execution Order @@ -373,4 +381,4 @@ MVP = 108-a + 108-b (US1 discovery via config + `/mcp/p/<slug>` or pinned tokens ## Task Count -186 tasks: setup 3 · a 14 · b 13 · c 24 · d 19 · e 14 · f 17 · g 8 · h 4 · i 16 · j 11 · k 21 · l 9 · retro-go 7 · fix-1458 1 · demo-ux-fixes 5 (counted mechanically; the 108-l plan carries the counting script). History: codex round 4 added T005a; codex round 3 added T046c, T052b; codex round 1 added T004a, T016a, T027a, T027b, T028a, T030a, T033a, T040a, T055a; 108-j's composable/link-map tasks were merged into Spec 109-k and replaced by profile-specific UI tasks; 108-j added T106a, T107a, T108a, T109a; the post-merge macOS and Go review fixes added to k and retro-go; 108-l added T124a, T126a, T127; fix-1458 added T147; demo-ux-fixes added T148–T152. +189 tasks: setup 3 · a 14 · b 13 · c 24 · d 19 · e 14 · f 17 · g 8 · h 4 · i 16 · j 11 · k 21 · l 9 · retro-go 7 · fix-1458 1 · demo-ux-fixes 5 · fix-nested-refusal 3 (counted mechanically; the 108-l plan carries the counting script). History: codex round 4 added T005a; codex round 3 added T046c, T052b; codex round 1 added T004a, T016a, T027a, T027b, T028a, T030a, T033a, T040a, T055a; 108-j's composable/link-map tasks were merged into Spec 109-k and replaced by profile-specific UI tasks; 108-j added T106a, T107a, T108a, T109a; the post-merge macOS and Go review fixes added to k and retro-go; 108-l added T124a, T126a, T127; fix-1458 added T147; demo-ux-fixes added T148–T152; fix-nested-refusal added T166–T168.