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ChrisInvictus merged 2 commits into from
Jul 19, 2026
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README polish: at-a-glance + badges #10

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docs: at-a-glance summary + status badges
ChrisInvictus Jul 19, 2026
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docs: note v1.1 multi-agent extension in AI-security section
ChrisInvictus Jul 19, 2026
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6 changes: 5 additions & 1 deletion README.md
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# paved-org 🛣️

![CI](https://github.com/ChrisInvictus/paved-org/actions/workflows/plan.yml/badge.svg) ![License](https://img.shields.io/github/license/ChrisInvictus/paved-org) ![Release](https://img.shields.io/github/v/release/ChrisInvictus/paved-org)

*A GCP organization baseline as code: org-wide guardrails, a project factory that vends secure-by-default projects, and a zero-trust workload driving on the paved road — IAP-protected, deployed via a keyless WIF pipeline.
Prevention half of CloudCanary.*

**At a glance:** org policies that make insecure states unrepresentable · a project factory vending secure-by-default projects · zero exported keys anywhere (keyless WIF/OIDC end-to-end) · a zero-trust workload (IAP) as living proof · extended into agentic AI: an ai-guardrails module, AI-workload detection in its sister project, and a published MCP trust-boundary threat model (v1.1 — STRIDE × OWASP LLM Top 10 2025, multi-agent extension) with a two-part applied security runbook. Detection half: [CloudCanary](https://github.com/ChrisInvictus/CloudCanary).

## The thesis

Most organizations bolt security onto projects after they exist — a scanner here, a review checklist there, a policy document nobody reads. paved-org makes the **organization itself** the security boundary. Org policy constraints are enforced at the root and inherited by everything below; the project factory vends projects that are hardened before their first API call. Insecure states aren't forbidden by policy documents — they're **unrepresentable in the platform**.
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## AI-workload security
Extending the prevention/detection thesis to AI workloads:
- [**MCP trust-boundary threat model**](docs/threat-models/mcp-trust-boundaries.md) — five boundaries (B1–B5), STRIDE × OWASP LLM Top 10 (2025), with an IAM lens.
- [**MCP trust-boundary threat model**](docs/threat-models/mcp-trust-boundaries.md) — five boundaries (B1–B5), STRIDE × OWASP LLM Top 10 (2025), with an IAM lens and a multi-agent (agent ↔ agent) extension (v1.1).
- [**MCP security runbook**](docs/runbooks/securing-mcp-setup.md) — a two-part applied audit: a managed-connector host and a self-hosted agent gateway, with host hardening, a fail-closed exec-approval gate, and a staging-validated container.
- [**`modules/ai-guardrails`**](modules/ai-guardrails/) — org-policy guardrails for AI workloads (verified canned constraints), the prevention half of what [CloudCanary](https://github.com/ChrisInvictus/CloudCanary) detects.
## Cost & reproducibility
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