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Summary
Adds a Jenkins/Java rule that flags
ArgumentListBuilder.addTokenized(...)used on a command list that also containscmd.exe.On Windows,
Launcherreconstructs the token list into a command line thatcmd.exere-parses. Whitespace-split non-literal input (job parameters, process output, workspace file lines) can therefore injectcmdmetacharacters as extra commands.Pattern (generic)
Quiet when
addTokenizedis a string literal, when the builder never addscmd.exe, or when the untrusted value is passed withadd()(one argv slot, no tokenize).Why
addTokenizedis often assumed safe because it builds an argv list rather than a shell string. That assumption fails oncecmd.exeis the executable: the shell metacharacters become separate tokens and are then interpreted bycmd.Validation
semgrep --validate --config java/clean