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fix(pdu): retain unknown ClientInfoFlags bits instead of refusing the PDU - #1843

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Marc-André Moreau (mamoreau-devolutions) merged 1 commit into
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fix(pdu): retain unknown ClientInfoFlags bits instead of refusing the PDU#1843
Marc-André Moreau (mamoreau-devolutions) merged 1 commit into
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lamco-admin:fix/client-info-flags-retain

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ClientInfo::decode rejects the whole Client Info PDU when the flags field carries a bit outside the twenty-one INFO_* flags this library defines. [MS-RDPBCGR] 3.3.5.3.11 asks the server to validate the embedded lengths and to test the UNICODE flag before reading character data; it never asks the server to validate the flags bit set. Microsoft has extended the INFO_* list several times (INFO_AUDIOCAPTURE, INFO_VIDEO_DISABLE and INFO_HIDEF_RAIL_SUPPORTED are all later additions), so a newer client setting a bit this list does not know yet is refused at the login step, after the connection sequence has otherwise succeeded.

The fix switches the site to from_bits_retain, the crate-wide policy since #1144: the unknown bits are kept rather than dropped, so re-encoding a decoded ClientInfo reproduces the wire value. The CompressionTypeMask bits are unaffected; they are masked out before the flags conversion and parsed separately, as before.

This continues the same interop line as #1489 (unknown GCC user-data blocks), #1458 (unknown security header flags), #1536/#1541 (under-declared lengths) and #1837 (undefined channel option bits).

Test: a Client Info fixture with an undefined flag bit decodes, the bit is retained, and re-encoding reproduces the exact input bytes. Verified to fail with the strict from_bits restored.

cargo xtask check fmt/lints/tests/typos/locks all pass.

… PDU

ClientInfo::decode rejected the whole Client Info PDU when the flags
field carried a bit outside the twenty-one INFO_* flags this library
defines. [MS-RDPBCGR] 3.3.5.3.11 asks the server to validate the
embedded lengths and to test the UNICODE flag before reading character
data; it never asks the server to validate the flags bit set. Microsoft
has extended the INFO_* list several times (INFO_AUDIOCAPTURE,
INFO_VIDEO_DISABLE and INFO_HIDEF_RAIL_SUPPORTED are all later
additions), so a newer client setting a bit this list does not know yet
was refused at the login step, after the connection sequence had
otherwise succeeded.

Switch the site to from_bits_retain, the crate-wide policy since Devolutions#1144:
unknown bits are kept rather than dropped, so re-encoding a decoded
ClientInfo reproduces the wire value. The CompressionTypeMask bits are
unaffected; they are masked out before the flags conversion and parsed
separately, as before.

This continues the same interop line as Devolutions#1489 (unknown GCC user-data
blocks), Devolutions#1458 (unknown security header flags), Devolutions#1536/Devolutions#1541
(under-declared lengths) and Devolutions#1837 (undefined channel option bits).
@github-actions github-actions Bot added maintainer-required Maintainer review or intervention is required risk/unknown Risk could not be determined automatically; needs maintainer-level scrutiny scope/core Touches the core architectural tier size/XS Size: up to 49 counted lines and 2 files labels Aug 30, 2026
Marc-André Moreau (mamoreau-devolutions) pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 30, 2026
…elds (#1846)

The two GCC core-data fields that echo the X.224 negotiation values are
decoded strictly: serverSelectedProtocol in the client core data and
clientRequestedProtocols in the server core data both reject the whole
settings exchange when the value carries a bit outside the five defined
PROTOCOL_* flags. The negotiation layer itself already decodes this
exact type with from_bits_retain in both the RDP Negotiation Request and
Response, so a value the library accepts leniently at X.224 becomes
connection-fatal when echoed back one phase later.

The strictness also works against the field's purpose. [MS-RDPBCGR]
3.3.5.3.3's mandated handling of serverSelectedProtocol is a value
comparison: if the field does not contain the same value the server
transmitted in the RDP Negotiation Response, the server SHOULD drop the
connection. That comparison needs the value to survive decode; rejecting
unknown bits at parse time replaces the spec's check with a decode
error. The client-side echo is symmetric: the client knows what it
requested and compares, rather than validating the bit set.

The exposure is demonstrated by history: the PROTOCOL_* list has grown
three times (RDSTLS, HYBRID_EX, RDSAAD), and each addition would have
made older strict decoders refuse newer peers whose negotiation had
already succeeded.

Both sites switch to from_bits_retain, the crate-wide policy since
#1144; re-encoding a decoded block reproduces the wire value.

This continues the interop line of #1489, #1458, #1837, #1843, #1844 and
#1845.

Tests: one per direction, each verifying that a fixture with an
undefined protocol bit decodes, that the bit is retained, and that
re-encoding reproduces the exact input bytes. Both fail with the strict
from_bits restored.

`cargo xtask check fmt/lints/tests/typos/locks` all pass.
@mamoreau-devolutions
Marc-André Moreau (mamoreau-devolutions) merged commit ff48d8a into Devolutions:master Aug 30, 2026
43 checks passed
Marc-André Moreau (mamoreau-devolutions) pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 30, 2026
…s exchange (#1844)

Three GCC settings-block decoders reject the whole Basic Settings
Exchange when a flags field carries a bit outside the defined list:
RedirectionFlags in Client Cluster Data, the per-monitor flags in Client
Monitor Data, and transportFlags in the Multitransport Channel Data.
[MS-RDPBCGR] 3.3.5.3.3's processing rules mandate nothing for any of
these three fields (its checks cover the Client Network Data bounds, the
color depth fields, the serverSelectedProtocol echo, and the encryption
method flags), so the strictness is this library's own, and it fails the
connection at GCC, before any channel is joined.

The exposure is real in each case. The transportFlags list has grown
before (TRANSPORTTYPE_UDP_PREFERRED and SOFTSYNC_TCP_TO_UDP are later
additions), so an older IronRDP would have refused every client that
advertised them. The monitor flags list defines only TS_MONITOR_PRIMARY,
so any vendor or future bit refuses a multimon client outright. The
redirection flags sit next to a version mask that already anticipates
growth.

All three sites switch to from_bits_retain, the crate-wide policy since
#1144: unknown bits are kept rather than dropped, so re-encoding a
decoded block reproduces the wire value. The cluster version mask
handling is untouched, and the separately parsed RedirectionVersion
stays strict since it is a discriminant, not a bit set.

This continues the interop line of #1489 (unknown GCC user-data blocks),
#1458 (unknown security header flags), #1837 (undefined channel option
bits) and #1843 (unknown ClientInfoFlags bits).

Tests: one per site, each verifying that a fixture with an undefined bit
decodes, that the bit is retained, and that re-encoding reproduces the
exact input bytes. All three fail if the strict from_bits is restored.

`cargo xtask check fmt/lints/tests/typos/locks` all pass.
Marc-André Moreau (mamoreau-devolutions) pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 30, 2026
…urity data (#1845)

ClientSecurityData::decode rejects the whole Basic Settings Exchange
when the encryptionMethods field carries a bit outside the four defined
flags. [MS-RDPBCGR] 2.2.1.3.3 defines the field as the set of methods
the client supports, with the server obliged to "select one of the
methods specified by the client", and [MS-RDPBCGR] 3.3.5.3.3's mandated
handling for this field is to examine encryptionMethods and
extEncryptionMethods for at least one valid flag, not to validate the
bit set. The strict decode implemented neither half of that: it rejected
a valid flag accompanied by an unknown bit, and accepted the zero-flags
case the rule actually addresses. The sibling extEncryptionMethods field
in the same structure is already read without validation. So the
strictness is this library's own, it fails the connection at GCC, and it
protects nothing: a server simply never selects a method it does not
know.

The advertisement site switches to from_bits_retain, the crate-wide
policy since #1144, with the usual property that re-encoding a decoded
block reproduces the wire value.

The server-side selection in ServerSecurityData deliberately STAYS
strict, and this change adds a comment making that asymmetry durable:
that field is the server's selected method, not an advertisement, a
conforming server can never send an unknown bit there, a client cannot
implement a method it does not know, and the value drives the
conditional serverRandom/serverCertificate parse.

This continues the interop line of #1489, #1458, #1837, #1843 and #1844.

Test: a Client Security Data fixture with an undefined method bit
decodes, the bit is retained, and re-encoding reproduces the exact input
bytes. Fails with the strict from_bits restored.

`cargo xtask check fmt/lints/tests/typos/locks` all pass.
Marc-André Moreau (mamoreau-devolutions) pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 30, 2026
…ropping the session (#1847)

The fast-path input decoder rejects the whole event stream when a
keyboard or synchronize event carries an eventFlags bit outside the
defined set, and a decode error there is session-fatal mid-use: input
events arrive continuously, so a single unknown flag bit from a client
drops a live session with work in progress.

The strictness is also internally inconsistent: the slow-path decoders
for the very same events already tolerate unknown bits. Slow-path
keyboard flags (scan_code.rs), synchronize toggle flags (sync.rs) and
unicode keyboard flags (unicode.rs) all decode with from_bits_retain, so
the identical keystroke is tolerated on one path and connection-fatal on
the other.

The spec's only mandated strictness in this area is about event types,
not flags: [MS-RDPBCGR] 3.3.5.8.2 says the server SHOULD drop the
connection when an event structure does not match one of the known
types. That check is the existing eventCode rejection, which stays
exactly as it is. The eventFlags tables (2.2.8.1.2.2.1 and
2.2.8.1.2.2.5) carry no receiver-validation language.

All three flag sites (scancode, sync, unicode) switch to
from_bits_retain, the crate-wide policy since #1144. The retained bits
fit the 5-bit header field, so re-encoding reproduces the wire value,
and the server-side consumers read these flags with contains(), so
retained bits flow through harmlessly.

This continues the interop line of #1489, #1458, #1837, #1843, #1844,
#1845 and #1846, and it is the last flag-site conversion of that series.

Tests: a keyboard event and a synchronize event, each with an undefined
bit in the 5-bit field, decode successfully, retain the bit, and
re-encode byte-identically. Both fail with the strict from_bits
restored.

`cargo xtask check fmt/lints/tests/typos/locks` all pass.
@glamberson
Greg Lamberson (glamberson) deleted the fix/client-info-flags-retain branch August 30, 2026 15:04
Marc-André Moreau (mamoreau-devolutions) pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 30, 2026
…ce policy (#1850)

STYLE.md's error handling section documents the message-formatting
conventions but predates two rounds of change in the machinery itself,
and it says nothing about the decode-tolerance convention that this
month's merges made the most exercised rule in ironrdp-pdu. This adds
three subsections, plus two mirroring bullets in AGENTS.md's Key Style
Conventions.

Choosing an error kind: the structured DecodeErrorKind/EncodeErrorKind
variants carry byte offsets and are constructed through the *_err!
macros with in: src; Other is the deliberate offset-less kind for
non-stream failures (constructors, conversions, state validation).

Error types: typed errors rather than anyhow in library crates, and no
proc-macro error derives in core-tier crates, hand-rolling Display and
Error per ironrdp-error's own Location-capturing Source pattern.

Decoding unknown values: the taxonomy the recent interop line converged
on. Peer advertisements decode with from_bits_retain (unknown bits kept,
never fatal, byte-identical re-encode); negotiation outputs the receiver
must implement stay strict; structural discriminants stay strict per the
specifications' own drop-the-connection language. Precedent: #1144
established retain crate-wide, #1489, #1458, #1536, #1541, #1837, and
#1843 through #1847 applied the taxonomy field by field, and #1845
documents the strict half in-code at the server-selected encryption
method.

Deliberately out of scope: connector-layer error types, which #1751 and
the sequence-contract stack are actively reshaping; nothing here
describes them. Testing guidance is also untouched; that conversation
belongs with the in-flight test-centralization series.

`cargo xtask check fmt/lints/tests/typos/locks` all pass (docs-only
change).
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