refactor(attestation): explicit trust configuration and mock E2E

dstack/Cargo.toml

@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ members = [
     "crates/dstack-auth",
     "crates/api-auth",
     "crates/build-info",
+    "crates/mock-attestation",
 ]
 resolver = "2"
 

dstack/cert-client/src/lib.rs

@@ -2,11 +2,16 @@
 //
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
 
+use std::sync::Arc;
+
 use anyhow::{Context, Result};
 use dstack_kms_rpc::{kms_client::KmsClient, SignCertRequest};
 use dstack_types::{AppKeys, KeyProvider};
 use ra_rpc::client::{RaClient, RaClientConfig};
-use ra_tls::cert::{generate_ra_cert, CaCert, CertSigningRequestV2};
+use ra_tls::{
+    attestation::AttestationVerifier,
+    cert::{generate_ra_cert, CaCert, CertSigningRequestV2},
+};
 
 pub enum CertRequestClient {
     Local {
@@ -54,7 +59,7 @@ impl CertRequestClient {
 
     pub async fn create(
         keys: &AppKeys,
-        pccs_url: Option<&str>,
+        attestation_verifier: Arc<AttestationVerifier>,
         vm_config: String,
     ) -> Result<CertRequestClient> {
         match &keys.key_provider {
@@ -79,7 +84,7 @@ impl CertRequestClient {
                     .tls_client_key(client_cert.key_pem)
                     .tls_ca_cert(keys.ca_cert.clone())
                     .tls_built_in_root_certs(false)
-                    .maybe_pccs_url(pccs_url.map(|s| s.to_string()))
+                    .attestation_verifier(attestation_verifier)
                     .build()
                     .into_client()
                     .context("Failed to create RA client")?;

dstack/crates/mock-attestation/Cargo.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+# SPDX-FileCopyrightText: © 2026 Phala Network <dstack@phala.network>
+#
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+
+[package]
+name = "mock-attestation"
+version.workspace = true
+authors.workspace = true
+edition.workspace = true
+license.workspace = true
+description = "Development-only cryptographically valid attestation evidence generator"
+
+[[bin]]
+name = "dstack-mock-attestation"
+path = "src/main.rs"
+
+[dependencies]
+anyhow.workspace = true
+clap.workspace = true
+fs-err.workspace = true
+rcgen.workspace = true
+ciborium.workspace = true
+p384 = { workspace = true, features = ["ecdsa", "pkcs8"] }
+p256 = { workspace = true, features = ["ecdsa", "pkcs8"] }
+sha2.workspace = true
+sev.workspace = true
+sev-snp-qvl.workspace = true
+tpm-types.workspace = true
+tpm-qvl.workspace = true
+dstack-types.workspace = true
+dcap-qvl.workspace = true
+scale.workspace = true
+yasna.workspace = true
+chrono.workspace = true
+rand.workspace = true
+tokio = { workspace = true, features = ["full"] }
+axum = "0.8"
+hex.workspace = true
+urlencoding = "2"
+reqwest.workspace = true
+serde.workspace = true
+serde_json.workspace = true
+time.workspace = true
+
+[dev-dependencies]
+tempfile.workspace = true
+nsm-qvl.workspace = true

dstack/crates/mock-attestation/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+# mock-attestation
+
+Development-only, cryptographically valid attestation evidence for CI and the
+`dstack-tee-simulator` dev image.
+
+The crate derives a development PKI from a 32-byte seed and dynamically signs evidence for:
+
+- Intel TDX/DCAP, including TCB Info, QE Identity, PCK certificates and CRLs;
+- AMD SEV-SNP, including ARK, ASK, VCEK and reports;
+- TPM, including AK certificates, quotes, AIA and CRLs;
+- AWS NSM, including the certificate bundle and COSE Sign1 document.
+
+All evidence is verified in the test suite by the production QVLs. These keys
+are test credentials and must never be copied into a production image.
+
+## CLI
+
+Generate matching public roots and `sys-config-fragment.json`:
+
+```console
+dstack-mock-attestation generate \
+  --output ./mock-roots \
+  --collateral-base-url http://HOST_REACHABLE_FROM_VERIFIER:8088
+```
+
+Merge the generated fragment into the VM sys-config, then start the host-side
+Mock PCCS/KDS/AIA service from that same config:
+
+```console
+dstack-mock-attestation serve \
+  --listen 127.0.0.1:8088 \
+  --sys-config ./sys-config.json \
+  --output ./active-mock-roots
+```
+
+The server exposes only production-shaped public collateral endpoints. Evidence
+is generated inside the development guest by `dstack-tee-simulator`; the HTTP
+service deliberately provides no unauthenticated signing endpoint.
+
+## Dev image
+
+Select the platform in `.sys-config.json`; omission defaults to TDX:
+
+```json
+{
+  "tee_simulator": {
+    "platform": "dstack-amd-sev-snp",
+    "mock_attestation_seed": "<64 hex characters>",
+    "collateral_base_url": "http://HOST_REACHABLE_FROM_VERIFIER:8088"
+  }
+}
+```
+
+Valid values mirror the supported attestation modes: `dstack-tdx`,
+`dstack-gcp-tdx`, `dstack-amd-sev-snp`, `dstack-nitro-enclave`, and
+`dstack-aws-nitro-tpm`. The simulator exposes
+the production guest ABI for the selected platform (TSM configfs, vTPM, or an
+NSM CUSE character device); attester libraries contain no mock HTTP or
+environment-variable path. The guest only reads the
+seed from `.sys-config.json`; it never writes credentials or roots back into
+`/dstack/.host-shared`. CI retains the generated public roots and mounts them
+into verifier/KMS/gateway. The independently running host collateral service
+reconstructs the same hierarchy from the seed. Configure it under
+`[attestation.urls]`: TDX uses `pccs`, and SEV-SNP uses `amd_kds`.
+
+Every verifier process must also explicitly set
+`attestation.insecure_allow_external_trust_anchors = true`. Merely mounting and
+configuring a mock root is rejected at startup while this flag remains false.
+
+The seed adds only 64 hex bytes (the generated fragment is well below 1 KiB),
+so the existing 32 KiB sys-config copy limit does not need to be enlarged.
+
+## Required negative tests
+
+The crate tests ensure every platform rejects a different root and modified
+signed bytes. SEV-SNP additionally performs expected `report_data` comparison
+inside its QVL API. TDX/TPM/NSM expose their authenticated binding field for
+the caller; the production `dstack-attest` layer performs the final equality
+check.