Close local sidecar and plaintext persistence gaps

[Xyloth]

Security boundary

• replace wildcard sidecar CORS with exact shipped/loopback origin validation
• issue a random per-process bearer capability and require it for speech and CLI-intelligence operations
• reject hostile origins and invalid tokens before any model/API work occurs
• strip extracted text, per-page text, durable text artifacts, and case-store artifact payloads before browser localStorage serialization
• preserve the active in-memory workflow and the explicit encrypted workspace path
• make plain JSON export redact private source material

Honest product impact

• after a browser reload, private source text must be re-imported or restored from an encrypted workspace
• derived fields such as evidence quotes and meeting notes remain in plaintext localStorage; README and TRUST_MODEL now say so
• sidecar protection is a browser boundary, not an OS sandbox

Verification

pm run lint

pm test — 87/87 Vitest cases plus 3/3 Node security tests

pm run build

pm audit — 0 vulnerabilities

• live loopback probe: hostile Origin 403, invalid capability 401, valid capability reached bounded handler

[vercel]

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Project	Deployment	Actions	Updated (UTC)
sourcedeck	Ready	Preview	Aug 31, 2026 2:20pm