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ci: regenerate packaged action for Dependabot updates #28

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Merged
Jamie-BitFlight merged 1 commit into from
Oct 10, 2026
Merged

ci: regenerate packaged action for Dependabot updates #28

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42 changes: 42 additions & 0 deletions .github/workflows/package-dependabot.yml
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
name: Refresh Dependabot action bundle

on:
pull_request:
types: [opened, synchronize, reopened]
branches: [main]

permissions:
contents: write

concurrency:
group: package-dependabot-${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}
cancel-in-progress: true

jobs:
package:
if: github.event.pull_request.user.login == 'dependabot[bot]' && github.event.pull_request.head.repo.full_name == github.repository
runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
with:
ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}
persist-credentials: true
Comment on lines +20 to +23

@chatgpt-codex-connector chatgpt-codex-connector Bot Oct 10, 2026

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P1 Badge Isolate the write token from dependency execution

When a Dependabot update contains a compromised npm package or build tool, its lifecycle hooks or code loaded by yarn build execute after checkout has persisted a repository-wide contents: write credential. The checkout input documentation confirms that this credential enables subsequent scripts to run authenticated Git commands, so hostile dependency code could push or delete refs beyond the intended dist commit and bypass the branch/SHA restriction in the final command. Run installation and packaging in a read-only job, then pass the generated artifact to a separately isolated writer with narrowly scoped credentials.

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- uses: actions/setup-node@v6
with:
node-version: '24.19.0'
cache: yarn
- run: yarn install --frozen-lockfile
- run: yarn build
- name: Commit updated action bundle
env:
BRANCH: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }}
EXPECTED_SHA: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}
run: |
if git diff --quiet -- dist; then
exit 0
fi
git config user.name 'github-actions[bot]'
git config user.email '41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com'
git add -- dist
git commit -m 'chore: rebuild packaged action for dependency update'
git push origin "HEAD:refs/heads/$BRANCH" --force-with-lease="refs/heads/$BRANCH:$EXPECTED_SHA"

@chatgpt-codex-connector chatgpt-codex-connector Bot Oct 10, 2026

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P1 Badge Trigger validation automatically for the rebuilt head

Whenever packaging changes dist, this push updates the PR using the persisted repository GITHUB_TOKEN; according to GitHub's workflow-trigger documentation, pull_request runs resulting from a PR update made with that token are created in an approval-required state. Consequently the new head does not automatically receive the independent CI, unit, and Jira E2E results—the earlier runs belong to the pre-generated head—so required checks can remain pending until a maintainer manually approves them. Use an authentication/dispatch design that starts validation for the generated commit without approval.

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