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Adds command bytes 8 (RENEW_REQUEST, agent -> server) and 9
(RENEW_RESPONSE, server -> agent) plus their codecs, so an agent can ask
the backend to re-issue its client certificate over the existing tunnel
instead of a new authenticated endpoint.
RENEW_REQUEST carries a UTF-8 implementation/version identifier
("go/<version>"). RENEW_RESPONSE carries [status:1][body] where status is
0 RENEWED (body = new certificate PEM), 1 CURRENT (no body) or 2 ERROR
(body = diagnostic message).
The same three bytes and statuses are implemented by the DeployHQ backend
and the Ruby deploy-agent gem; they must not drift.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011XaiFEqsyQGcLhRmBtKRFA
A single *tls.Config is built once at start-up and reused by RunAgent for every reconnect, so the client certificate cached in cfg.Certificates kept being presented until the process restarted. Replacing ~/.deploy/agent.crt on disk had no effect on a running agent — verified against a real backend before this change. Leave cfg.Certificates nil and load the key pair from disk in GetClientCertificate instead, so a renewed certificate takes effect on the next reconnect with no customer-side restart. The pair is still loaded once up front so a missing or mismatched cert/key is a hard error at start-up rather than a puzzling handshake failure later. Also extracts NewCertPool so the same bundle parsing is shared with certificate-renewal validation instead of being duplicated. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011XaiFEqsyQGcLhRmBtKRFA
ca.crt is a PEM bundle, not a single certificate: during the CA rotation it will hold both the outgoing and the incoming DeployHQ CA so one binary verifies an agent server presenting a leaf from either. Certificates() parses every block in it and a test reports the count and subjects, so appending the new CA before a release is a visible, verifiable change rather than an unchecked assumption. Right now it holds exactly one: CN=Deploy Dev CA (charlie), expiring 2027-03-17. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011XaiFEqsyQGcLhRmBtKRFA
Only internal/caroot/ca.crt is go:embed'ed. The root-level copy was byte-identical but nothing kept the two in sync and nothing read it — not the goreleaser file list, not install.sh, not the README. Two copies of a trust anchor with no mechanism keeping them equal is a trap during a CA rotation. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011XaiFEqsyQGcLhRmBtKRFA
Certificate shapes are load-bearing in this codebase and were previously re-derived ad hoc per test. DeployHQ's leaves carry a Common Name and nothing else — no subjectAltName, no extendedKeyUsage — which is exactly why NewTLSConfig needs a CN fallback and why renewal verification has to ask for ExtKeyUsageAny. Getting that wrong in a fixture makes a test pass for the wrong reason. testca mints CAs, CN-only leaves, and the renewal operation itself (re-signing an existing public key under another CA, preserving subject and serial). It is imported only from _test.go files, so it is not linked into the released binary. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011XaiFEqsyQGcLhRmBtKRFA
Until now the only way to change which CA an agent trusts was to ship a new binary. DEPLOY_AGENT_CA_FILE points the agent at a PEM bundle on disk instead — for staging, for a private agent server, and as the escape hatch that lets an operator trust a newly issued CA without waiting for a release. An unreadable or empty override is an error rather than a silent fall back to the embedded bundle: trusting a different CA than the operator asked for is worse than refusing to start. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011XaiFEqsyQGcLhRmBtKRFA
… reload internal/config had no tests at all. Adds the two properties the CA rotation depends on: - A two-CA bundle verifies an agent server presenting a leaf from either CA, in either bundle order, and rejects a third CA or a wrong CN. - Replacing agent.crt on disk changes what the very next handshake presents, proven against an in-process server with RequireAndVerifyClientCert reporting the issuer it was actually shown. Control run: reverting NewTLSConfig to the shipped behaviour (key pair cached in cfg.Certificates) fails the second test with 'second handshake presented issuer "Deploy Dev CA (old)"', reproducing the stale-certificate behaviour end to end. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011XaiFEqsyQGcLhRmBtKRFA
The backend re-signs the public key it already holds for an agent under the new CA, preserving the subject and serial that identify it, so the agent keeps its private key and only agent.crt changes. Two properties drive the design. Nothing is written unless every check passes — the candidate must pair with the private key already on disk, carry the same subject and serial as the current certificate, and chain to a trusted CA — because a bad certificate that replaced a good one takes the agent offline behind a customer firewall where nobody can repair it. And the replacement is atomic: write agent.crt.tmp in the same directory, fsync, rename over the original. The rename is retried a few times. On Unix it is a single atomic syscall and never needs it; on Windows it is MoveFileEx(REPLACE_EXISTING), which fails with a sharing violation while antivirus or a backup agent holds the destination open. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011XaiFEqsyQGcLhRmBtKRFA
On every connect the agent sends RENEW_REQUEST with "go/<version>" and lets the server decide. RENEWED installs the returned certificate and closes the connection so the existing reconnect path presents it — deliberately without touching the TLS retry counter, since that connection succeeded. CURRENT and ERROR write nothing and leave the tunnel running. A renewal that cannot happen never takes down a working tunnel or the process: every failure path logs and carries on with the certificate the agent already has, and asks again on the next connection. Renewal is opt-in through tunnel.Options — without CA roots and both file paths the agent neither asks nor acts on an answer. The version is plumbed through Options rather than a package global, and RunAgent now takes Options in place of a bare Paths. Also wires both NewTLSConfig call sites in main.go through config.CACert so DEPLOY_AGENT_CA_FILE applies to `run` and `check` alike, and reports the trusted CAs in `check` output — which CAs a binary trusts is the thing this rotation turns on. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011XaiFEqsyQGcLhRmBtKRFA
README gains an Upgrading section (`network-agent update && network-agent restart` — both steps, there is no background update check), a customer-facing note on what certificate renewal does automatically, and the new environment variable. CLAUDE.md records the two new command bytes and their payload shapes as a contract shared with the backend and the Ruby gem, the unknown-command tolerance deployed agents depend on, and a warning against folding the per-handshake certificate reload back into tls.Config.Certificates. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011XaiFEqsyQGcLhRmBtKRFA
A server that answers RENEWED with the certificate the agent already presents would otherwise send it round connect - renew - reconnect forever, since installing it and recycling the connection changes nothing. After every validation check passes, compare the candidate's DER with the installed certificate's. If they match, write nothing, return ErrUnchanged and keep the connection. DER rather than PEM, so re-encoded line endings or an added PEM header cannot make an identical certificate look new. Matches the guard already implemented in the Ruby deploy-agent gem. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011XaiFEqsyQGcLhRmBtKRFA
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Included review availability: 4 reviews are currently available. Your included PR review attempts over the past 7 days set your current allowance at 5 reviews per hour. WalkthroughThe change adds configurable CA bundles, certificate renewal validation and atomic replacement, renewal protocol framing, per-handshake certificate loading, and tunnel reconnect handling. It also adds tests, fixtures, and documentation. ChangesCertificate renewal
Priority: ➖ Normal Estimated code review effort: 4 (Complex) | ~60 minutes Change: Feature Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
participant RunAgent
participant ServerConn
participant certrenew.Apply
participant TLSHandshake
RunAgent->>ServerConn: connect with renewal options
ServerConn->>ServerConn: send RENEW_REQUEST
ServerConn->>certrenew.Apply: pass renewed certificate
certrenew.Apply-->>RunAgent: return ErrCertificateRenewed
RunAgent->>ServerConn: reconnect
ServerConn->>TLSHandshake: reload certificate from disk
Merge Risk: ⚪ Minimal · up to The rotation flow preserves the existing certificate on invalid renewals and presents a validated replacement after reconnect, with no concrete current-head merge blocker identified. 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 4✅ Passed checks (4 passed)
✨ Finishing Touches🧪 Generate unit tests (beta)
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Appends the public certificate of the CA that agent certificates are issued under from the rotation onwards: CN=DeployHQ Agent CA, O=DeployHQ, valid until 2036-09-15 SHA256 4D:96:83:F0:CA:37:C8:4F:4A:52:E5:0E:E9:4E:61:5F:3B:CD:37:3A:29:F1:0B:5E:87:BE:C5:87:26:57:C7:6C The current CA stays first and unchanged. With both in the bundle this build accepts a renewed certificate and trusts the agent server whichever of the two signs its certificate. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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A replacement that pairs with the agent key, keeps subject and serial and chains to a trusted CA still has to be usable for the one thing the agent does with it. ExtKeyUsageAny also accepted a certificate whose extended key usage ruled client authentication out: it would be written over agent.crt and then refused by the server on every reconnect, leaving an agent behind a firewall offline with its working certificate already gone. ExtKeyUsageClientAuth costs nothing for real certificates -- the backend mints them with no extended key usage at all, which stays valid for every usage -- and refuses the broken case before anything is written. The Ruby agent makes the same check with PURPOSE_SSL_CLIENT. testca can now mint a leaf carrying an explicit extended key usage, which is what the new tests need; real ones carry none. Reported by Codex on #5. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
AppendCertsFromPEM reports success as soon as one block parses and silently drops the rest, so a DEPLOY_AGENT_CA_FILE bundle whose incoming CA is corrupt started the agent trusting only the CA it already had. The override is the escape hatch for trusting a new CA without waiting for a release, so failing silently is the one thing it must not do: it looks like it worked and then fails at the moment the server rotates. Every PEM block is now parsed, a non-certificate block is an error, and trailing junk after the last block is too. A test asserts the embedded bundle this binary ships with still parses through the stricter path. Reported by Codex on #5. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Inline comments:
In `@internal/config/tls.go`:
- Line 27: Update the PEM parsing loop in NewCertPool to reject any
non-whitespace data before the first certificate block and any malformed or
unterminated leading PEM block instead of allowing pem.Decode to skip it. Ensure
parsing validates and consumes the first non-whitespace block, while preserving
successful parsing of valid certificates, and add tests covering prefix garbage
and an unterminated leading certificate block.
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internal/certrenew/certrenew.gointernal/certrenew/certrenew_test.gointernal/config/tls.gointernal/config/tls_test.gointernal/testca/testca.go
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Parsing every block closed the back of the file but not the front: encoding/pem skips whatever it cannot read AHEAD of a block it can, so junk before the first certificate, or a BEGIN line with no matching END, left the agent quietly trusting whichever CA did parse. Probed against the shipped bundle: both were accepted. Each chunk must now begin with a PEM header once whitespace is stripped, and the number of certificates read has to match the number of BEGIN lines in the file -- which is what catches the unterminated block that a later, valid one would otherwise cover for. Reported by CodeRabbit on #5. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Go-agent half of the agent CA rotation (deployhq/deployhq#1202; backend: deployhq/deployhq#1211). The agent CA expires 2027-03-17. This release lets the agent trust a second CA and obtain a re-issued client certificate over its existing tunnel — customers only
network-agent update && network-agent restart.What it does
internal/config/tls.go). Shipped code loadsagent.crtonce and reuses it on every reconnect, so a renewed cert on disk would never be presented until restart. Still fails fast at startup on a bad key pair.internal/certrenew,internal/tunnel/renew.go). After the handshake the agent sends command 8 (go/<version>); the server answers command 9 (0renewed + PEM ·1current ·2error). A renewed cert is installed only if it pairs withagent.key, keeps subject and serial, and chains to the embedded CA bundle as a client-authentication certificate — then written atomically (0600 temp, fsync, rename with a short retry for Windows) and the connection recycled without counting as an SSL failure. An identical cert is a no-op.DEPLOY_AGENT_CA_FILEoverrides the embedded bundle (urgent rotation without a release). A bundle must parse completely or the agent refuses to start — every block, nothing skipped before or after one — because a silently half-loaded bundle would trust only the outgoing CA and fail at the moment of rotation.network-agent checkprints the trusted CAs and expiry. Unused rootca.crtremoved.internal/config; renewal, protocol and tunnel coverage with production-shaped fixtures (CN-only leaves, no SANs).Before tagging v0.3.0
internal/caroot/ca.crtholds both CAs — the current one andCN=DeployHQ Agent CA(until 2036-09-15, SHA2564D:96:83…57:C7:6C).Compatibility
Additive wire protocol (commands 1–7 unchanged; the current backend ignores 8). v0.2.0 installs,
~/.deploy, CLI and service install untouched.RunAgent/Connectnow take anOptionsstruct (internal API).Tests
go test -race ./...green (caroot 100 %, protocol 87 %, config 80 %, certrenew 76 %, tunnel 72 %);go vet,gofmtclean; all five release targets build; CI green including lint. Cross-language TLS handshakes against a mirror of the backend proven beforehand (15 cases). Not measured: the Windows rename retry (darwin host).Review round
ExtKeyUsageAny, so a certificate whose EKU excludes client auth would be installed and then rejected by the server — agent offline, old certificate gonee9ce952: verify withExtKeyUsageClientAuth(a no-EKU certificate, which is what the backend mints, stays valid). Tests pin both directions; matches the Ruby agent'sPURPOSE_SSL_CLIENTAppendCertsFromPEMsucceeds if any block parses, so a partly malformed override bundle silently trusted only the old CA73da9a4: every block is parsed, a non-certificate block or trailing junk is an error, and a test asserts the shipped bundle still parsespem.Decodealso skips junk before a good block, so leading garbage and an unterminatedBEGINstill slipped through (reproduced against the shipped bundle)b695b3a: each chunk must start with a PEM header, and the certificates read must equal theBEGINlines in the fileBoth were found by review, reproduced with a failing test first, and fixed minimally.
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New Features
DEPLOY_AGENT_CA_FILE.Documentation