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North Star execution: independent value, durable guarantees, and 90-day gates #216

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@fraware

North Star and mandate

Objective: turn OVK from a technically sophisticated verification research system into a product that external engineering teams repeatedly use to maintain important machine-checked commitments across AI-authored changes, with honest uncertainty and measured reduction in review/revalidation work.

The long-term product answers: What claim is established, by which evidence and assumptions? Which changes preserve that justification? Which invalidate it? What is the least costly sound work that restores it?

Near-term buyer hypothesis (not validated): security-conscious Python/FastAPI teams adopting AI coding agents. First product claim-family hypothesis: bounded route/Protected Effect authorization integrity. Start advisory only with the existing executable profile; unsupported source shapes produce review/unknown. Do not pretend current protected-effect extraction is a proof of arbitrary Python program security. Test willingness to pay before expanding the source profile.

This is an execution tracker, not an authorization to merge research experiments into production. As of 2026-10-15, no independent external adopter is recorded in the public pilot registry; maintained consumers/dogfood are not independent adoption. The source profile is executable_advisory, not externally_calibrated_strict. The v1.3.0-rc.1 release/status document has not established live publication, and repo ref-protection must be checked rather than inferred.

14-day operating sprint (October 15–29)

Workstream A — customer discovery and first independent pilot (highest priority)

  • Identify 10 plausible design partners with active backend/security workflows and AI-authored PRs; record contact, decision-maker, stack, expected risky-change frequency, and reason for fit. No invented interest or unsolicited public PRs.
  • Conduct at least 5 customer/problem conversations and obtain permission for at least 1 genuine external pilot. Distinguish end-user, security reviewer, and budget owner.
  • Check qualifying repository/source profile coverage before promising the integration. Pilot must run on the organization's natural, non-selected PR flow.
  • Adapt existing issue Run an external advisory-mode pilot #20 for a 14-day advisory deployment using an attributable released SHA/tag (do not pin an unqualified RC); minimum initial evidence: 5 natural PRs, plus all eligible PRs in the period, including failures and unknowns. Small N is feasibility evidence, not a false-negative estimate.
  • Collect exact-head/pr-revision identifiers, covered/unsupported input, full raw evidence, reviewer adjudications (blind to preferred outputs where feasible), workflow timing, setup effort, human triage, and concrete repair actions. No automatic merge blocking.

Exit: 1 externally governed repo operating OVK on normal work and a reviewer willing to adjudicate actual findings. If no design partner accepts, document the reasons and revisit the wedge instead of expanding infrastructure.

Workstream B — trustworthy product workflow

  • Audit the existing FastAPI authorization profile and the evidence bundle against a reproducible real-world PR. Distinguish what a PASS establishes over the extracted representation from what is known of the actual source.
  • Define a single end-to-end pilot acceptance test: natural PR -> extraction/coverage -> bounded check -> evidence + unknowns -> reviewer decision -> report, with no false allow on incomplete/unsupported input.
  • Review draft research: predecessor-bound guarantee transport admission (non-controlling) #179 against issue refinement: bind reused PE evidence to durable guarantee claim compatibility #178. Reuse predecessor-bound guarantee continuity if warranted, but keep the new transport eligibility non-controlling pending source-to-model/provenance and policy qualification. Do not turn human-readable changes into a machine theorem.
  • Produce a reviewer-readable guarantee diff for one supported claim if existing code allows it. If this needs significant new engineering, implement only after observing actual pilot need; prioritize clarity of scope over a broad dashboard.

Exit: an external reviewer can understand, audit, and disagree with each bounded finding; guarantees and residual unknowns are explicit.

Workstream C — engineering governance, release and research containment

Exit: an authoritative status table with product claims, evidence quality, open assumptions, exact live release identity, and one research GO/NO-GO decision.

30 / 60 / 90-day gates (targets, not promises)

Gate Customer evidence Product evidence Commercial decision
30 days 1 external pilot running on natural PRs End-to-end advisory evidence with adjudicated coverage/unknowns Problem and buyer mapped
60 days Aim for 2 genuinely external users/organizations At least one cross-revision guarantee case independently inspected; empirical triage costs measured Proposal for a paid continuation
90 days Repeat usage and engagement, or documented failure Qualified narrow supported envelope with unresolved cases reported One paid-pilot decision; pivot wedge if no meaningful use or buyer

No universal 5% false-positive threshold from a tiny sample; report numerator, denominator, source-profile support coverage, uncertainty and failure modes. Safety release gates are separate from commercial acceptance.

Four leadership metrics (review weekly)

  1. Actual independent adoption: organizations using OVK in normal engineering work; fraction of real eligible PRs observed.
  2. Justified decision quality: human-adjudicated relevant findings, unknowns, missed issues discovered through independent review; never treat absence of detected misses as a population safety guarantee.
  3. Workflow economics: setup effort, per-PR compute, active reviewer minutes, rework from false alarms and review/reverification avoided, paired where possible.
  4. Paid validation: count of buyer commitments, paid pilots, renewal/expansion decisions (zero until established).

Scope guardrails / stop list

  • No generic checker proliferation, new source languages, self-authorizing VALID, new theorem-only PR without a specified actual-kernel bridge, or dashboards without a real reviewer.
  • Do not merge the Lean research stack wholesale, infer customer accuracy from in-repo benchmarks, reuse holdout cases during development, or describe conservative unknown as a passing proof.
  • Keep clean separation between signed provenance, extracted source-model fidelity, checker result, historical-evidence transport and human relying policy.

Linked work already in progress

Ownership and decisions

No individual owner or customer's commitment has been verified. Assign explicit owners for customer discovery, product engineering and research once staffing is confirmed. At the weekly leadership review, update every workstream with evidence / blocker / decision / next action; do not count green research CI as customer-value attainment.

Go: a real team repeatedly uses and values the narrow evidence workflow. Revise: technical signal exists but installation or reviewer workflow fails. Stop/pivot: no willing buyer or persistent external use despite targeted discovery, regardless of research depth.

Activity

  1. fraware commented on Oct 15, 2026

    @fraware
    OwnerAuthor

    Product milestone checkpoint — 15 October 2026. Draft PR #218 is stacked on existing non-controlling guarantee transport PR #179, and implements an advisory reviewer record from source/target guarantee assurance snapshots and signed PE evidence. It does not create a new eligibility checker or promote historical evidence reuse to authority. The machine-readable/Markdown outputs separately state (i) recorded current source/target typed-machine-claim status; (ii) conditional historical predecessor-transport eligibility and precise reasons; (iii) unverified Git-manifest authority; (iv) no live expiry/revocation decision; (v) source-semantics refinement unproved; and (vi) production reliance false. Synthetic signed integration scenarios exercise unchanged guarantee, changed statement, changed assumptions, wrong key, unknown target state, and CLI report generation. Pilot demo guide.

    Current qualification: exact-head CI at f05bdf8a67b850b49a79c2f39b01042eccf2d66e is running, not yet claimed green. Treat this as in-progress implementation, not independent customer validation. Still zero independently agreed external pilots. Once code qualifies, the next value gate is an actual-source/profile-coverage dry run on a consented external PR, with an external reviewer judging the report's usefulness and recording time/cost/unknowns. Do not prioritize a new research branch ahead of that external pilot.

  2. fraware commented on Oct 15, 2026

    @fraware
    OwnerAuthor

    15 October product milestone — qualified advisory reviewer artifact. Draft PR #218, head 93799e4156844d85baa5432ed23c76d21a5fb726, is fully green: six-job CI (2,614 passed, 36 skipped, 13 warnings), Assurance Product Qualification, Native Tier 1, Native Tier 1b. Seven new signed-evidence reviewer integration tests passed, including a real CLI subprocess producing JSON and Markdown.

    Four-file change, stacked on non-controlling #179, draft/unmerged. It separates recorded typed-machine-claim statuses from conditional historical-evidence transport, shows field-level changes in caller-supplied guarantees (statement vs assumptions), reports gate rejection reasons, and explicitly disclaims live state rechecking, authentic governing Git manifests, expiry/revocation, source-language semantic refinement, and production reliance. No production decision code changed.

    Milestone interpretation: Internally reproducible reviewer-interface demonstration COMPLETE. Independent customer problem validation, actual FastAPI source coverage, reviewer adoption, paid interest, and measured engineering savings remain NOT ESTABLISHED. These synthetic development cases are excluded from independent holdout scoring (#177).

    Next executive action: recruit a consenting independent repository owner/reviewer under #20, screen supported source profiles on natural PR flow, and evaluate the reviewer report on actual records with time/unknowns/errors retained. Do not let another formal research PR displace this customer-value gate.

  3. fraware commented on Oct 15, 2026

    @fraware
    OwnerAuthor

    Strategic launch audit, 2026-10-15. Newly verified release facts and remediation are recorded in #25 (including unprotected main, nonexistent RC tag, unsigned historical annotated tag and non-immutable historical Release, documentation and action install ambiguity). Business reality: GitHub repository public metadata currently reports 1 star and 0 forks; zero independent external pilots and zero verified paying customers. Stacked #179/#218 is fully green but still draft/unmerged, and the new demonstration requires six artifact inputs and a local key, with a script outside package console entrypoints. A marketed ready-to-install app would currently overstate launch maturity.

    Proposed product distribution decision: open-source CLI + GitHub Action first; one narrowly supported advisory guarantee diff in real PR flow; private GitHub App only after independent pilots; public Marketplace App/hosted dashboard after repeat usage and security/service hardening. Compete on machine-checkable guarantee continuity with explicit unknowns, not generic AI review or generic security scanning. Public README/installation and license/docs cleanup, exact release attestation, at least one consented real external pilot and honest source-profile coverage precede public launch. Proposed 30/60/90 gates remain in #216; do not merge exploratory research stack just to create marketing inventory.

  4. fraware commented on Oct 15, 2026

    @fraware
    OwnerAuthor

    Triple-check readiness audit — 15 October 2026 (live GitHub, exact-code, documentation and outside state of art)

    Executive decision: GO for a controlled, consented, non-blocking reviewer demonstration; NO-GO for production reliance, strict required checks, a new public RC release, claims of independent customer efficacy, or broadly sound replay-free certificate transport. Keep those decisions separate.

    Verified product code: draft #218 corrected head 9a8b820fa215e7795ca2e11dadcfd58633581766, stacked on draft #179, unmerged. Exact-head CI 38810850715 is successful: all six jobs, 2616 passed, 36 skipped, 13 warnings. Product qualification and Native Backends Tier 1/1b all success. One meaningful audit defect fixed: invalid/inconsistent supplied snapshots could have displayed recorded established. The report now shows untrusted_snapshot with structural issue codes; two new adversarial tests pass. Transport remains non-controlling. The report consumes caller-selected specifications and HMAC-signed evidence and DOES NOT authenticate actual governing Git manifests, perform current-time revocation/expiry review, independently re-prove source semantics, or authorize production use.

    Verified repo integrity: main branch object explicitly protected=false and protection.enabled=false; repository rulesets []. Existing annotated v1.2.1 tag Git verification verified=false, reason=unsigned, targeting commit a27d5720f4350c00bca34f71d991c31f5a2f38c7; published GitHub release object immutable=false. Release assets contain separate signing-related files; their independent cryptographic verification has not been performed in this audit. Neither tag signing nor immutability may be claimed. No v1.3.0-rc.1 Git tag or GitHub release exists; #25 remains a blocking governance issue. Draft correction #219, based on main, updates README, release notes/status, pilot cases and pilot playbook. The previous docs described v1.2.1 as signed/immutable; the pilot playbook promoted strict following a small under-5%-false-positive rate. Both claims/decision rules are unsafe. #219 exact-head CI/repro qualification must be checked before merger.

    Key security constraint: ovk/core/attestation_signing.py uses HMAC-SHA256; the CLI's --signature-key-file requires the same secret used by the signer, not a publishable verification key. NEVER put that secret in untrusted pull_request workflows, public artifacts, independent reviewer machines, or disclose it to pilot users. A local trusted-reviewer demo is permitted; production multi-tenant trust needs a separate verifier/signer authority design.

    Product/market qualification: pilot registry remains 2 maintained consumer fixture reports, one in-repo fixture and a first external adopter row recruiting. No external buyer, deployment, consent, source-profile coverage on real PRs, independent adjudicator, or paid outcome has been established. FastAPI Protected Effects source extractor is explicitly experimental, with narrow unsupported control flow, local semantic assumptions, and UNKNOWN handling; a signed proof of typed Assurance IR is not a proof of arbitrary Python or English guarantee.

    Research qualification: #212–#215 provide model-relative theorems and exposed patched-Lean development experiments. #195's real-kernel semantic support/refinement obligation, #177's blinded prospective independent applicability evaluation, and #205's security/checker qualification remain OPEN. Do not count green Lean builds or 3 synthetic replay controls as a population false-reuse estimate, checker equivalence, source refinement, or minimal repair.

    State of art, checked against contemporary official docs: GitHub CodeQL performs PR-integrated source scanning; Certora has mature machine-checkable property specs and SMT-based contract verification; AWS Bedrock Automated Reasoning now has policy/source-document fidelity reports and explicitly scopes VALID to translated policy variables; SLSA provenance formalizes artifact/builder/source binding and verifier trust. Lean4Lean already proves typing/equality monotonicity for a specified abstract environment extension. The defensible research wedge is claim-conditioned cross-context applicability + smallest sound revalidation/repair, not generic scanning, evidence graphs or environment monotonicity.

    Immediate owners/actions (not assumed assigned): (1) maintainer release admin: enable and live-audit main/tag protection, qualify and cryptographically sign a future exact tag; (2) engineer: review #218/HMAC source-attestation boundary and #219 corrections; (3) product lead: secure one consenting external organization, qualify the supported claim on all naturally arriving PRs, document unknowns/false alarms/missed defects, capture reviewer minutes and setup costs; (4) research lead: refrain from new theorem-only PRs until a real-checker correspondence GO decision and independent cohort are defined.

    Audit limitation: GitHub source, diffs, Git-object API, workflow metadata and hosted logs were inspected. I cannot independently run the full repository outside GitHub Actions in this environment because the container cannot resolve GitHub; nor did I verify release asset Sigstore bundles or repository-admin configuration outside the exposed GitHub API. No claims are made beyond those checks.

  5. fraware commented on Oct 15, 2026

    @fraware
    OwnerAuthor

    Triple-check addendum (15 Oct 2026): additional defects found and patched, still draft/unmerged.

    • PR #217 now head 652e158146a4711bf4f94422efe62c8e8df5772d: the prior circular false-positive estimator is removed, and a second hidden path that auto-consumed external_pilot_report.json from downloaded artifacts is also removed. Such embedded files must never supply error rates or strict_enabled without explicit separate selection. A selected --report now rejects mismatched repository instead of overwriting the CLI's authoritative --repo; new tests exercise embedded forged metrics, cross-repository spoofing and the matching legitimate case. Pilot workflow examples now pin full historical OVK Action SHA and full audited checkout/upload-artifact action SHAs, while documenting unpinned transitive dependencies. Exact-head CI/Repro pending. A manually selected self-report is still self-reported, not independently ground truth.
    • PR #218 9a8b820fa215e7795ca2e11dadcfd58633581766: structural invalidity of source or target guarantee snapshots forces displayed untrusted_snapshot, instead of merely showing a forged established state while the underlying gate rejects it. Fully green: 2,616 tests passed / 36 skipped / 13 warnings and dedicated product/native workflows. HMAC signing and checking use the same shared secret; never copy it into untrusted PR jobs/reviewer artifacts. Still synthetic and non-controlling.
    • PR #219 now head 795811a624e0db9889e975a1be51d5a6409f6fec: corrects historical Git-tag unsigned/unprotected-release docs, installer examples and integration-guide misuse of “signed” v1.2.1; README now points first-time adopters to the controlled advisory pilot instead of the unpublished strict RC consumer template. PR docs: correct unsigned release-tag claims and unsafe pilot promotion guidance #219 intentionally does not duplicate PR fix(pilot): prevent circular false-positive metrics and unsafe strict promotion #217's playbook rewrite. Exact-head CI/Repro pending.
    • SOTA correction: the current approved supply-chain provenance standard is SLSA v1.2, not retired v1.1 (see https://slsa.dev/spec/v1.2/). This strengthens the argument to reuse established source/build provenance standards rather than claiming novelty for attestation formats. GitHub CodeQL, Certora and AWS Bedrock Automated Reasoning also occupy substantial adjacent commercial verification territory. Our differentiator remains auditable cross-revision evidence applicability and smallest sound repair, validated in real customer workflows.

    Leadership gate: No merge, strict enforcement, public new release, or claimed independent calibration on green draft research CI alone. Product owner and independent reviewer recruitment under #20 is still the real next milestone; #25 branch/tag rules remain unprotected and block attributable release.

  6. fraware commented on Oct 15, 2026

    @fraware
    OwnerAuthor

    Developer-first launch execution checkpoint — October 15, 2026. Draft PR #220 is stacked directly on main, with current review head 525a854df31c604215c8ea2c5f96654f609c8ef3. The work hardens explicitly requested Action installation to fail closed, adds executable negative-path tests, restores the full Apache-2.0 license and copyright NOTICE, corrects release/security provenance, replaces the unusable strict external-consumer example with a least-privilege advisory-only example, and removes active pilot workflow references to the nonexistent RC tag. The old v1.2.1 Action still has fallback behavior; the docs now disclose this instead of attributing PR #220 safety changes retroactively. Launch acceptance checklist and developer activation issue #221 translate this to a first-user and repeat-use gate.

    An earlier commit's CI run 38812801585 passed 2,601 Python tests, 36 skipped, 13 warnings and all six original installer-contract tests; it is NOT final-head qualification. Current CI 38815434102 and six-cell Repro 38815434088 are still queued as of this note. All final-head checks must pass before merge.

    Value roadmap: one reproducible, safely scoped real-PR report → consenting external review (#20) → demonstrably repeated installs → authorized OSS preview and shareable evidence receipt. No paid users, independent customer deployment, verified release, strict profile, or production historical-proof transport is claimed. Administrator action on protected branch and release tags remains blocked under #25. Do not launch a public hosted app or GitHub Marketplace App until actual user demand and security operations justify it.

  7. fraware commented on Oct 15, 2026

    @fraware
    OwnerAuthor

    New release-bound provenance obligation found during first-user audit (15 Oct 2026): issue #222 documents the real pull_request event distinction between PR head SHA and synthetic merge-preview SHA. In action.yml the default diff compares base with PR head, while later evidence and GitHub check paths use github.sha (merge-preview SHA). No exploit or confirmed false acceptance is claimed; this is a source-/evidence-subject correspondence gap to resolve with precise identifiers and adversarial tests before distributing portable "verified PR" receipts or enabling strict checks.

    Latest launch-hardening head: draft PR #220 at 525a854df31c604215c8ea2c5f96654f609c8ef3, still unmerged and awaiting GitHub Actions runners. CI 38815434102 and Repro 38815434088 remain queued, so old green runs do not qualify this head. The existing published v1.2.1 Action retains the old fallback; docs now disclose it.

    Priorities: preserve one frozen exact-head PR until runner-backed tests finish; independently verify #25 protection administration; resolve #222 source/head/merge-binding before PR claim-sharing; and use #221 for a real external first-run with evidence/unknowns and consent under #20. Avoid expanding checker count, hosted app infrastructure, or public marketing before those gates.

  8. fraware commented on Oct 15, 2026

    @fraware
    OwnerAuthor

    P0 integration / sequencing decision (2026-10-15). Two launch-critical PRs are intentionally independent drafts against main, not simultaneously releasable:

    • #220 hardens package identity, license, first-user README, and least-privilege advisory workflow. Its exact-head CI passed all six jobs, recording 2,610 passed Python tests. Its six-platform reproducibility run has five passes and one still-active macOS 3.10 cell at last check.
    • #223 fixes the PR head/merge-preview/diff identity mismatch, adds adversarial real Git tests, suppresses shareable Check/comments for caller-supplied unbound diff, and records a non-authoritative source-binding sidecar. First native PR dogfood passed; the initial unit run failed on an overly global checkout invariant, now narrowed without weakening the ordinary PR-head release jobs. Latest exact-head CI/repro 9d0cfd95ba1f8d002e20d564765a67efe632e6ca are pending.

    Safe merge order once all checks and human reviews qualify:

    1. Protect main and v* through active administrative rulesets, read back effective settings and permitted bypass roles (Release blocker: protect main and v* release tags before v1.3.0-rc.1 #25).
    2. Merge/rebase release: fail-closed Action version pin and accurate public adoption guidance #220 under the protected PR process, keeping the release unpublished.
    3. Rebase security(action): bind PR diff to checked-out merge preview and refuse stale source identity #223 on the resulting exact main SHA, carefully reconcile both action.yml install and source-identity changes, and update the copyable external advisory workflow to explicitly check out ref: ${{ github.sha }} with fetch-depth: 2 for a normal PR. Run all unit, gates, package, Action default/strict dogfood, six-platform Repro, and clean-outside-checkout install tests on that integrated SHA.
    4. Verify the first-user process (Developer activation: first useful PR evidence in five minutes #221) on the integrated candidate; do not grant historical evidence transport/relying authority or advertise public verified-PR receipts before Bind PR head, merge-preview tree, input diff, and check attribution in evidence #222's remaining signed binding and source-semantics qualification.
    5. Only then authorize tagged release per Release blocker: protect main and v* release tags before v1.3.0-rc.1 #25, keeping external advisory pilots (Run an external advisory-mode pilot #20) and independent customer/user feedback as separate go/no-go decisions.

    Do not treat two independently green PRs as proof that their merged diff is safe. Publish the actual integrated release candidate only after cross-PR tests and administrative provenance closure. This sequence prioritizes one safely installable product with real reviewer value over more research PRs.

  9. fraware commented on Oct 15, 2026

    @fraware
    OwnerAuthor

    Operating checkpoint — 2026-10-15.

    Keep all source and cumulative branches draft/unmerged until independent review and exact-head gates succeed. No tag, release, admin settings, or production reliance changed.

  10. fraware commented on Oct 16, 2026

    @fraware
    OwnerAuthor

    Independent advisory pilot prospect screening — 2026-10-15 (public GitHub evidence only)

    Screening method: inspected repository metadata and public PRs created 2026-10-01 through 2026-10-15, excluding Dependabot (bot-authored results may still exist). These are uncontacted prospects, not willing partners, and none has undergone a source-profile eligibility or consent review. PR counts below refer to observed human-authored submissions in this period, not verified unique security-relevant changes or forecast future activity.

    Candidate Public evidence Fit hypothesis Material unresolved condition
    benavlabs/crudauth 6 recent PRs, all from igorbenav, addressing OAuth, disabled accounts, migrations and auth/session flows; e.g. #56 and #59 Directly aligned with bounded authentication/authorization questions, manageable project size All six from one maintainer; verify at least one supported Protected Effect construct and independent maintainer willingness before proposing OVK
    fastapi/full-stack-fastapi-template 8 recent non-Dependabot PRs including security JWT expiry #2514 and weak-secret checks #2513 Multiple contributors, real FastAPI app authorization operations and ongoing security changes Large established project; check representative code/PR eligibility and avoid confusing template fixture changes with natural deployed-app assurances
    insistence/RuoYi-FastAPI 3 recent maintainer PRs including OAuth2/OIDC integration #129 Real backend management/authorization surface Low 14-day PR denominator and Chinese-language collaboration; require actual profile screening and willing owner

    Down-ranked under the 14-day natural-PR design: ivan-borovets/fastapi-clean-example (strong contextual RBAC technical fit, 1 observed October PR); yezz123/authx (observed recent PRs are automated dependency updates; 0 non-Dependabot in queried window). Both remain possible but do not establish sufficient current natural-PR throughput.

    Decision protocol before any outreach or installation:

    1. Audit one representative recent candidate PR and the current supported OVK source/profile fragment, documenting an actual construct-by-construct supported/unsupported mapping; do not equate "authentication repository" with formal Protected Effect verification.
    2. Request maintainer consent to a non-blocking, read-only advisory observation; do not create unsolicited PRs, enable write permissions or imply prior endorsement.
    3. If accepted, prospectively record every natural eligible/unsupported PR with source/evidence SHA and reviewer-independent adjudication, including failures/misses and operational costs. Do not select only security-related successes.
    4. Confirm end-user, reviewer, and buyer roles. No pilot or willingness-to-pay exists until observed directly.

    No external organization was contacted. This is a candidate shortlist and screening evidence for workstream A, not proof of adoption.

  11. fraware commented on Oct 16, 2026

    @fraware
    OwnerAuthor

    Product steering checkpoint — distribution + reusability (2026-10-15)

    Governing constraints: maximize independent developer-to-developer distribution and cross-repository reuse of source-scoped claims and evidence. Scientific validity, provenance, unsupported coverage and honest relying policy are non-negotiable. A viral but falsely source-bound "PASS" is a negative outcome.

    Evidence-driven wedge review:

    • crudauth PR #56 is a concrete OAuth service mutation whose invariant is "inactive account never linked/claimed." Its altered class/service methods are not the documented simple FastAPI route guard→sink profile. No OVK verdict or empirical sensitivity was measured.
    • full-stack-fastapi-template PR #2514 changes JWT expiry verification in FastAPI dependencies/utilities. The patch does not establish the specific configured protected-sink relation needed by the documented Protected Effect extractor. No independent coverage claim.
    • RuoYi-FastAPI PR #129 spans OIDC configuration and broader auth infrastructure; it is outside a simple local handler demonstration. No OVK execution/independent adjudication.
    • Implication: a FastAPI/auth repo match alone is inadequate for the first natural-PR pilot. Source-profile eligibility and unknown proportion need to be checked before asking to install. A limited, cross-stack CI secrets/workflow policy claim is a candidate for wider initial distribution, subject to real-PR calibration; do not substitute generic "verified" wording.

    Immediate contribution: draft #226 closes a real distribution hazard in the Action: caller-selected multi-lane manifests bypass source-binding yet previously emitted PR Checks/comments and allow outputs. The new branch prevents public emission, suppresses Action-level allow, refuses strict for unbound manifests, clears stale generated artifacts, and leaves scoped local advisory verification available. Parent draft #225 completed exact-head CI at 49a9e910 (cross-platform repro still running during this note). #226 exact-head CI/repro are still queued. All are unmerged and no release/strict authority exists.

    Distribution experiment, once the release/ref gate and consenting source eligibility are satisfied:

    1. A maintainer adds one read-only, version-pinned GitHub workflow in a consented repo. Zero secrets or write permission to untrusted PRs; no automatic merge blocking.
    2. Every natural PR produces a compact report that clearly separates observed source revision/merge preview, checked claim, support/unknown, runtime/economics, and local vs independently authenticated status. No shareable "verified PR" stamp from unbound input.
    3. A second engineer uses the result on a subsequent natural PR or copies an appropriately scoped specification; document that event, not only impressions or stars.
    4. Record per prospect: time to first correctly scoped finding, total natural eligible/unsupported denominator, independent reviewer precision/false alarms and misses, setup/review cost, repeat use, teammate adoption, and concrete willingness to pay. Preserve zero-adoption outcome.
    5. Only generalize templates, transport conditions or new profilers from observed repeat demand and proven common semantics. Store evidence with exact revision/assumption/reviewer provenance; no certificate transport without research: bounded Lean semantic-support soundness and historical-certificate oracle #195/research: independently adjudicated RTK transport experiment — execution gate #177 justification.

    No-go conditions: #25 still reports unprotected main and unsigned historical tag; no authorized RC; #20 lacks a consenting independent pilot; #195 lacks real source/checker refinement; #177 lacks a separately adjudicated historical-applicability oracle. Draft green CI is development evidence, not a release or a market experiment.

    Decision: stop widening research features. Qualify the publication boundary, finish release administration, recruit an independent consenting maintainer, and measure reuse/viral adoption on real PRs before investing in a broader public interface or service.

  12. fraware commented on Oct 16, 2026

    @fraware
    OwnerAuthor

    Real-PR source-subject correction and distribution feature — Oct 15, 2026

    The first read-only job-summary dogfood CI #38830701134 failed for the correct reason: receipt's synthetic merge-preview SHA differed from the OVK EvidenceBundle subject SHA. The artifact review and root cause (event pull_request.head.sha overwrote explicit github.sha) are preserved in #222.

    A corrected intermediate implementation passed true GitHub PR dogfood in CI #38839898034, and I downloaded artifact 12021550038 to check exact agreement: evaluated checkout = receipt subject = evidence bundle subject = 9af58527fa069420392cbb99aaa34b63199acfe8; distinct contributor PR head = b7020afa50db8d6b25d52d7f1c697d2424f01cbd. These are local structurally observed identities, not signed/canonical source-to-model correctness.

    Final proposed draft head: 5a17d08884bfd8fffd0b3f18db2b82bf64d63391 adds real two-parent Git adversarial tests, opt-in ovk check --source-binding validation, default caller compatibility, portable standard-library Markdown summary, and explicit limitations. Exact-head CI 38840137045, six-cell Repro 38840137072, Native Tier 1 38840137051 remained queued at checkpoint; Native Tier 1b 38840137188 completed SUCCESS. None of the queued workflows is counted as passing.

    The next measurable viral/reuse event is one independent consenting maintainer encountering a bounded, accurate, source-identified result in a natural PR and then a second engineer reusing it in a later PR. We have zero qualifying independent maintainer adoptions/second-PR proof. The current historical Action v1.2.1 and unsigned/unprotected refs remain NO-GO for broad outreach or production reliance; admin issue #25 and scientific #195/#177 remain open.

    Keep #225, #226 and #227 draft/unmerged pending independent review and governance; no public release or assumed vulnerability-prevention rate.

  13. fraware commented on Oct 16, 2026

    @fraware
    OwnerAuthor

    Oct 15 product gate — source-scoped shareability implemented, adoption not yet demonstrated

    Qualified upstream: draft #225 exact head 49a9e910, draft #226 52ab39d3, and draft #227 5a17d088 all have completed successful exact-head CI/repro (and #227 both required native backend suites). All are draft/unmerged.

    Why new draft #228 exists: #227 real Action dogfood generated correctly scoped GitHub job text, but its downloadable artifact omitted that readable summary; the older ovk-pr-comment.md stated Merge recommendation: allow without those source/reliance caveats. Draft #228 packages the same validated source/decision-limited text in ovk-advisory-pr-summary.md, without raw source excerpts, Check write permissions, or PR comments.

    Real execution evidence: draft #228's intermediate Action CI #38853750067, artifact id 12026102979, includes the portable 1,367-byte Markdown alongside the evidence and receipt; measured SHA-256 of uploaded ovk-evidence.json equals the digest printed in the Markdown, and the merge-preview subject agrees with the source receipt. The portable report explicitly refuses whole-PR security certification or merge authority. Further hardening removed .ovk-pr.diff from the uploader's configured path altogether, so raw PR source need not travel to a third-party reviewer. This changed candidate source; the final #228 exact-head CI/repro/native matrix is still queued and must pass before review.

    Bottleneck now: administrator-controlled main/tag protection #25 remains absent in live API (unprotected main, rulesets=[]). I provided exact admin handoff there; the connected GitHub app cannot change repository rulesets. No release or strict reliance.

    External pilot: zero consenting independent maintainers, zero measured second-PR use or teammate adoption. Maintained consumer repo fraware/ovk-consumer-fastapi-terraform currently has an older workflow pin and write-scoped pull-requests:write/checks:write permissions; changing it to test this unreleased draft would trigger older PR workflows and could publish misleading historic checks. Do not treat that as independent user demand or install a new unapproved workflow. Test first with consent and governed read-only configuration after ref-release gates.

    Distribution metric to record prospectively: consented outside-team install → correctly scoped first natural PR observation → independent reviewer reads/cross-checks the portable report → second natural PR → second engineer or repository voluntarily reuses a claim with explicit applicability. Separate supported/unknown PR denominator, reviewer minutes, adjudicated errors, and user willingness to pay; stars/downloads are not validity evidence.

  14. fraware commented on Oct 16, 2026

    @fraware
    OwnerAuthor

    Usability/distribution milestone — static public resource explorer (#229)

    New draft PR #229 builds a real first frontend for OVK. The repository's main has no frontend or GitHub Pages deployment; this work is an independent site-only draft from main@79370539ca9b26a0a6b01f6ac6ab6923243f40f4, not a live hosted service or a release of verification code.

    User value: responsive, restrained UI; curated client-side search of 51 actual repository documents/examples/templates; immediate suggestions, category filters, keyword synonyms (e.g. authentication→authorization), keyboard navigation, zero-result recovery and source links. Two draft-only documents are explicitly marked Development draft and pinned to exact #228 SHA; source links are not fabricated. Readers can discover supported checkers, application/source contracts, evidence applicability research, release limits, and read-only advisory setup from one place.

    Technical execution: no backend, login, analytics, external script/font/CDN, secrets, GitHub API requests or hosted state. Search text uses DOM textContent to avoid HTML injection. The frontend never claims to evaluate uploaded PRs, certify a result, or grant merging authority. The static site can be previewed from site/index.html without installing packages. GitHub Pages is disabled; public deployment must be authorized separately.

    Tests: desktop 1440px and mobile 320–1440px Chromium smoke locally exercised search, navigation, copy, keyboard, empty states and no JS exceptions; a discovered 320px overflow was corrected. Site-only GitHub Actions workflow runs read-only syntax and indexed-resource/source path contract checks. The precise development candidate remains open/draft; check exact-head workflow conclusions at review time.

    North Star impact: turn disconnected formal-verification assets into searchable, approachable, source-linked knowledge that external engineers and agents can reuse. This is an activation/discoverability precursor, not evidence of organic adoption or cross-repository certification. Next product milestone remains an independent consenting maintainer's real PR plus repeat use; site traffic or stars alone are not proof of useful verification. Do not call the user interface a production verification platform until a real evidence backend, authentication, privacy boundaries and independent reliance policy are designed and qualified.

    Issue #25 ref governance and verification PR #228 still require independent review. #229 may be reviewed separately without altering the engine or release chain.

  15. fraware commented on Oct 17, 2026

    @fraware
    OwnerAuthor

    2026-10-17 North Star execution — full draft inventory and constrained 14-day plan

    Live state, confirmed by GitHub API: main=79370539ca9b26a0a6b01f6ac6ab6923243f40f4, protected=false, repository rulesets=[]; latest release v1.2.1 remains associated with an unsigned tag. 85 open PRs, all draft, no verified independent customer in the pilot tracker.

    Inventory of all 85 PRs (classification by PR number/title/base branch, for triage only; NOT a file-by-file merge/duplication determination):

    Candidate precision:

    • feat(product): package source-scoped advisory PR summary for reuse #228 source 837c931d059f74dcda06432d83f5bde759f53d0a: 104 commits, 49 changed files relative to main. All four exact-head workflows completed SUCCESS, including real GitHub Action dogfood, six-platform reproducibility and native suites; report is an unsigned advisory observation only. Zero independent submitted GitHub reviews verified.
    • feat(site): accessible searchable OVK resource explorer (static preview) #229 source 59be60c89c1382a9bcc01b73994846d60cac9b23: 20 commits, 9 changed files relative to main, site-quality/CI/Repro all SUCCESS. Frontend is a static curated search of 51 linked resources, not a live guarantee/evidence dashboard. Zero independent submitted reviews, and GitHub Pages off.
    • Full product candidate also modifies LICENSE (replaces short Apache reference with standard full license text) and adds NOTICE; both need ownership/third-party attribution review, not just runtime CI.

    Single accountable launch-review workstream: #230 records four required independent roles (source security, UX/accessibility, release/provenance, outside pilot). No approvals or named reviewers have been fabricated. Do not request external PRs or consent on their behalf.

    14-day actions, October 17–31:

    1. Days 1–3: repository owner names actual reviewers A/B/C, independent from authors, and enables effective main and v* protections per Release blocker: protect main and v* release tags before v1.3.0-rc.1 #25. Review Launch gate: independent security, UX, provenance and external-pilot reviewers #230 acceptance protocols, including source-profile partial-YAML uncertainty from Run an external advisory-mode pilot #20. Record review outcomes, not only checkmarks.
    2. Days 4–7: resolve only review-blocking code or documentation issues, rerun all exact-head gates on the actual integration parent after any change. Independently review feat(site): accessible searchable OVK resource explorer (static preview) #229 site separately and do not publish hosting by default.
    3. Days 8–10: decide a single governed product merge/release plan; feat(product): package source-scoped advisory PR summary for reuse #228 supersedes most recent individual drafts only after source/equivalence review. Audit generated binaries/distribution hashes and authorize a new correctly signed annotated release tag only through the release-ledger workflow.
    4. Days 11–14: complete problem interviews with potential design partners, screen exact source profile eligibility and seek explicit consent for one read-only nonblocking natural-PR pilot. No independence/adoption claim until real data collected. Distinguish source/claim coverage from verdict rate, independently adjudicated misses from tool output, and developer-first/second-use retention from impressions.

    Product decision rules: The first useful artifact must be a correctly scoped claim/revision/evidence record understandable by another engineer, with an actionable next step. Organic distribution success is second natural PR + second developer reuse, not a shareable green badge or GitHub stars. The scientific moat remains independently justified evidence applicability with minimal sound repair (#177, #195), not additional unsupported checker families. Avoid creating more feature PRs until the review/first-user bottleneck is resolved.

    NO-GO remains: no merges, new strict reliance, claimed signed production proof, unreviewed public rollout or retroactive v1.2.1 trust assertions. Issue #230 is a gate, not review success.

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