Jig is a local-first desktop application for Linux and macOS. This policy explains how to report a suspected vulnerability and the security boundaries to consider before using it.

Jig is beta software. Security maintenance targets the newest published release, including a release marked as a pre-release, on a best-effort basis. Older releases do not have a separate security-backport commitment. Check the release notes for the current version, known limitations, and any available mitigations.

Reports affecting main are also welcome, but development builds are not stable releases. There is no guaranteed response time, fix deadline, or security support SLA.

Use Report a vulnerability while signed in to GitHub. This opens the repository's private reporting channel; do not open a public issue or pull request with vulnerability details. GitHub describes this workflow in its private reporting guide.

If the private form is unavailable, open an issue asking only for a private security contact. Do not include the affected component, exploit, logs, or other sensitive details in that public request.

Include, when available:

• The Jig version or commit, operating system and architecture, and whether you used a published package or a source build.
• A description of the impact and the trust boundary crossed.
• Minimal reproduction steps using a disposable repository and synthetic data, plus the expected and observed behavior.
• Sanitized diagnostics or screenshots, relevant dependency versions, and any mitigation you have verified.

Never attach API tokens, passwords, private keys, authentication cookies, full environment dumps, private repository contents, or unreviewed terminal transcripts. Inspect diagnostic exports and screenshots before sharing them: automatic redaction cannot recognize every secret. If a credential has already been exposed, revoke or rotate it with its provider; do not send the credential as proof.

Maintainers may ask for additional reproduction details in the private report. Please coordinate public disclosure there so affected versions, mitigations, and any fix can be communicated together. Published security notices are available in repository advisories.

• Agent execution is not sandboxed by Jig. A selected CLI runs with your local account's filesystem and network access. Separate PTYs and Git worktrees are coordination boundaries, not security isolation. Only start executables and projects you trust; any vendor-specific sandbox or approval mode must be configured in that CLI.
• Jig is not a vendor proxy. Agent CLIs manage their own authentication and network traffic. Report vulnerabilities specific to an agent or its remote service to that vendor; report unsafe Jig integration behavior here.
• The daemon is a local control plane. It owns sessions and communicates through a per-user Unix socket, not an authenticated remote API. Private directories use mode 0700 and the socket uses 0600; Linux additionally checks the peer UID. macOS relies on filesystem ownership and permissions. Do not expose or forward the socket to other users or the network. Jig does not defend against an already-compromised process under the same operating-system account.
• Remote browser pages are untrusted. They must not gain application or daemon IPC access. Native browser permissions and isolation have platform-specific limitations; see known issues. Automated tests are not a substitute for the packaged browser acceptance checks in the release checklist.
• Recovery must not act on stale process IDs. Closing the desktop window does not stop daemon-owned sessions. After a daemon crash, affected session metadata becomes unknown; stored PIDs are not used to reattach or signal a process. Follow the recovery guide and verify process identity before taking manual action.

Unexpected command execution, cross-user socket access, path-validation bypasses, unsafe worktree deletion, secret leakage, and remote-page access to native application privileges are examples of reports in scope. Test only on systems, repositories, and data you own or have permission to test.

Current builds are unsigned, and macOS notarization is not configured. Download packages only from this repository's releases or packaging workflow and follow the installation and verification guide. Compare downloaded files against the accompanying SHA256SUMS; checksums detect corruption or mismatches but do not replace code signing or establish publisher identity. Do not disable system-wide security protections to run Jig.

For implementation details and residual risks, read the threat model. This policy is not a certification or a claim that every release has completed manual security acceptance.