EdgeProc is a signing- and verification-adjacent library: it mints trust-root keys, signs version pointers, and verifies content-addressed bundles fail-closed before promoting them. We treat cryptographic and supply-chain issues with the seriousness that posture demands. If a verification, signature, content-addressing, or trust-pinning path can be bypassed, weakened, or made to silently accept tampered data, that is a high-severity bug.

Please do not open a public GitHub issue, pull request, or discussion for a security vulnerability — that discloses it before a fix exists.

Instead, report it privately by email to:

harish.seshadri@gmail.com

Please include, as far as you can:

• A description of the issue and the impact (what a malicious publisher / CDN / network attacker could achieve).
• The affected version(s) or commit.
• Steps to reproduce, or a minimal proof of concept.
• Any suggested remediation.

You can expect an acknowledgement within a few days. We will work with you to confirm the issue, develop a fix, and coordinate disclosure. We are happy to credit you in the release notes unless you prefer to remain anonymous.

EdgeProc is pre-1.0 (beta). Security fixes land on main and ship in the next release. We support the latest released version; please upgrade to it before reporting, in case the issue is already fixed.

• The trust model is pinned-trust-root, fail-closed: a consumer trusts only the key — or keyring of keys — it pins out-of-band; sync refuses to run without one. Reports that demonstrate trust without a pinned root, signature acceptance after tampering, a revoked key's signature being accepted, an expired pointer being promoted, or content-address bypass are in scope and prioritized.
• Key rotation and a compromised signing key are handled by the runbook in docs/OPERATIONS.md. The trust root is a raw Ed25519 public.key (a keyring of one) or a JSON keyring: pointers may name their signing key_id, a revoked key never verifies at any sequence, and a signed expires_at bounds how long a withheld pointer is accepted. Rotation is an overlap window (pin {old, new}, switch the publisher, pin {new, revoked old}), and the pointer sequence keeps increasing across it so the anti-rollback floor holds. Revocation takes effect when a consumer's pinned keyring is updated; there is no remotely fetched revocation list, and expiry bounds a freeze, not a key compromise.
• Issues in third-party dependencies (e.g. cryptography, faiss-cpu) should be reported upstream; if EdgeProc's use of them is the weakness, report it here.