[iamrraj]

Version 2.2.1: env scrubbing for bash/run_code (#38) and the file-write healing fix (#37). Changelog dated, release notes in docs/releases/2.2.1.md. Full suite: 4,645 passed. #39 (runtime hardening) follows as 2.2.2 once approved.

[github-actions]

🛡️ ShipIT Forge — security scan

✅ Nothing found. No committed credentials, no infrastructure or workflow misconfiguration, and nothing matching the source-code security rules.

What was scanned

• Committed credentials — Named shapes from thirty-one providers — GitHub, AWS, Anthropic, OpenAI, Google, Slack, Stripe, GitLab, SendGrid, Twilio, Shopify, HuggingFace, Linear, npm, JWT, PEM private keys, database URLs and more — and, because a provider list is never complete, a generic pass that reads the variable name and the randomness of the value rather than the vendor. Placeholders, names and empty PEM headers are not findings; a real key in documentation is one, at lower severity.
• Infrastructure and workflows — Dockerfile and Compose (running as root, :latest bases, remote ADD, privileged services), Kubernetes (privileged pods, host-path mounts), Terraform (0.0.0.0/0, public buckets, encryption switched off), and GitHub Actions (mutable action pins, pull_request_target, untrusted event text reaching a shell).
• Source code — Command injection (CWE-78), path traversal (CWE-22), clear-text logging of a credential (CWE-532), information exposure through an exception (CWE-209), open redirect (CWE-601), unsafe deserialization (CWE-502), binding every interface (CWE-1327), and workflows that never declare their permissions (CWE-732). Each needs something attacker-controlled and something dangerous done with it on the same line.

All of it is deterministic: the same commit gives the same answer, every time, with no model call and no token cost. The model review judges what is reachable and worth worrying about; this pass judges nothing and simply never gets bored.

_{Scanned 3 files in the files this pull request changes. No model call — this scan is deterministic and costs nothing.}

[github-actions]

👀 ShipIT Forge — what this run looked at:

Pass	Looking for
🔑 Secrets	Committed credentials — provider shapes, entropy, file context
🏗️ Infrastructure	Dockerfile, Compose, Kubernetes, Terraform, workflows
🧩 Code	Injection, traversal, credentials in logs, unsafe deserialization
🤖 Code review	The model reads the diff — correctness, security, and what it would break

_{The scans are deterministic — no model call, no token cost — and run before the review, so their findings survived even if the model run stopped early. Findings arrive as inline comments, plus one security-scan comment grouped by rule.}

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🔍 ShipIT Forge reviewed this PR — 💬 commented (no blocking issues)

No findings.

[github-actions]

ShipIT Forge review

✅ No blocking issues found. I reviewed the changed files and ran:

• 🛡️ Security checks — SSRF, injection (SQL/command/template), broken auth/authz, hardcoded secrets, unsafe deserialization, path traversal, weak crypto.
• 🔧 Code review — correctness, error handling, missing tests, clarity.

Nothing to flag. This is a comment, not an approval — ShipIT Forge never approves PRs; a human reviewer should approve and merge.