Codex/linkedin sther existing thread

.dockerignore

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+.git
+.turbo
+.vercel
+.env
+.env.*
+!.env.example
+node_modules
+**/node_modules
+**/.next
+**/.eve
+**/.output
+**/coverage
+**/dist
+**/tsconfig.tsbuildinfo
+phase6/artifacts
+phase7/.rehearsal-secrets
+ibl-v2-review.zip

.env.example

@@ -1,6 +1,9 @@
 # Postgres
 DATABASE_URL="postgresql://postgres:postgres@localhost:5432/crm?schema=public"
 
+# Optional host port for Docker Postgres when port 5432 is already in use.
+# POSTGRES_PORT="5432"
+
 # A direct, unpooled connection to that same database, used by
 # `prisma migrate deploy` when the API is built on Vercel. Set it only if
 # DATABASE_URL points at a pooler; POSTGRES_URL_NON_POOLING is read as a
@@ -83,12 +86,17 @@ GOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRET=""
 # their standard PORT variable instead.
 # AGENT_PORT="2000"
 
+# Scheduled agent dispatch is disabled unless explicitly enabled. The service
+# can boot and expose health/readiness while persisted work remains untouched.
+# ATLAS_SCHEDULED_EXECUTION_ENABLED="false"
+
 # Lets a signed-in rep talk to the agent from the contact sheet.
 #
 # The browser never calls the agent directly. The app proxies /eve/v1/* on its
 # own origin, checks the session, and mints a two-minute token signed with this
-# secret; the agent verifies it and learns *which rep* is asking. Set the same
-# value for both processes.  openssl rand -base64 32
+# secret; the agent verifies it and learns *which rep* is asking. The API also
+# uses the same secret for authenticated internal agent calls. Generate one
+# value with openssl rand -base64 32 and provide it to app, API, and agent.
 #
 # It also authorises two calls the API makes to the agent: the dispatch poke,
 # which is what makes a new company's logo appear as it is added instead of on
@@ -99,7 +107,7 @@ GOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRET=""
 # is skipped rather than sent unauthenticated, and a Context key is saved
 # without being checked. Nothing else changes: the agent still runs on its own
 # schedule.
-# AGENT_BRIDGE_SECRET=""
+AGENT_BRIDGE_SECRET=""
 
 # PORT="3001"
 
@@ -139,11 +147,21 @@ GOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRET=""
 # origin's URL and renders as an ordinary hotlinked image.
 # BLOB_READ_WRITE_TOKEN=""
 
-# The model the agent runs on is reached through the Vercel AI Gateway. On
-# Vercel this is handled by OIDC and needs nothing; elsewhere, set a key.
-# Which model is a setting, not a variable — change it on the settings page.
-# https://vercel.com/docs/ai-gateway
-# AI_GATEWAY_API_KEY=""
+# The agent uses Google's Gemini API directly.
+# https://ai.google.dev/gemini-api/docs
+GOOGLE_GENERATIVE_AI_API_KEY=""
+
+# Google Calendar is an optional meeting integration. Register this exact
+# callback in Google Cloud: ${API_URL}/api/integrations/google-calendar/callback
+# (local: http://localhost:3001/api/integrations/google-calendar/callback). The
+# account token is encrypted with BETTER_AUTH_SECRET; these values are only
+# needed to complete OAuth and identify the calendars used for availability.
+# GOOGLE_CALENDAR_CLIENT_ID=""
+# GOOGLE_CALENDAR_CLIENT_SECRET=""
+# GOOGLE_CALENDAR_CLIENT_SECRET_FILE="/run/secrets/google_calendar_client_secret"
+# GOOGLE_CALENDAR_PRIMARY_ID="primary"
+# GOOGLE_CALENDAR_HVA_ID=""
+# GOOGLE_CALENDAR_BLOCKER_IDS=""
 
 
 # ── Optional: operations ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -157,6 +175,24 @@ GOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRET=""
 # route. The route refuses to run without it. At least 16 characters.
 # CRON_SECRET=""
 
+# IBL provider credentials are server-only and optional. Capability rows stay
+# UNVERIFIED until the separate real-provider proof has passed.
+# MIAB_IMAP_HOST="mail.example.test"
+# MIAB_IMAP_PORT="993"
+# MIAB_MAILBOX_CREDENTIALS_JSON='{"mailbox@example.test":"password"}'
+# RESEND_API_KEY_FILE="/run/secrets/resend_api_key"
+# RESEND_WEBHOOK_SECRET_FILE="/run/secrets/resend_webhook_secret"
+# RESEND_SYSTEM_FROM_EMAIL="no-reply@example.com"
+# RESEND_SYSTEM_FROM_NAME="IBL Command Center"
+# RESEND_OUTREACH_FROM_EMAIL="outreach@iblmedia.com"
+# RESEND_OUTREACH_FROM_NAME="IBL Media Team"
+# ATLAS_LIVE_OUTREACH_ENABLED="false"
+# The local LinkedIn executor cannot use authoritative CRM unless this is
+# explicitly set to "true" in the operator's runtime environment. It does not
+# enable Email or any other Atlas outbound capability.
+# ATLAS_LINKEDIN_LOCAL_EXECUTOR_ENABLED="false"
+# IBL_LOCAL_PROVIDER_DOUBLE="enabled"
+
 # Log every SQL statement Prisma runs, at debug level, without bound
 # parameters. Off by default: it buries every other line under a wall of
 # SELECTs.

.gitattributes

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+* text=auto eol=lf

.github/.release-please-manifest.json

@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
 {
-	".": "1.5.1"
+	".": "1.6.0"
 }

.github/workflows/ci.yml

@@ -29,17 +29,19 @@ jobs:
         env:
           POSTGRES_USER: postgres
           POSTGRES_PASSWORD: postgres
-          POSTGRES_DB: crm
+          POSTGRES_DB: crm_ci
         ports:
           - 5432:5432
         options: >-
-          --health-cmd "pg_isready -U postgres -d crm"
+          --health-cmd "pg_isready -U postgres -d crm_ci"
           --health-interval 3s
           --health-timeout 5s
           --health-retries 20
 
     env:
-      DATABASE_URL: postgresql://postgres:postgres@localhost:5432/crm?schema=public
+      DATABASE_URL: postgresql://postgres:postgres@localhost:5432/crm_ci?schema=public
+      DATABASE_MIGRATION_URL: postgresql://postgres:postgres@localhost:5432/crm_ci?schema=public
+      ATLAS_DISPOSABLE_DATABASE: 1
       ALLOWED_SIGN_IN: example.com
       BETTER_AUTH_SECRET: ci-only-secret-regenerate-for-any-real-deployment
       API_URL: http://localhost:3001
@@ -57,7 +59,7 @@ jobs:
       - run: bun install --frozen-lockfile
 
       - name: Apply migrations
-        run: bun run db:deploy
+        run: bun run scripts/migrate-fresh-with-workspace-bootstrap.ts --fresh
 
       - run: bun run check-types
 

.gitignore

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ node_modules
 .env
 .env.*
 !.env.example
+.env.phase0.local
 
 # Testing
 coverage
@@ -26,6 +27,12 @@ out/
 build
 dist
 
+# V1 migration exports can contain personal and mailbox data. Only redacted
+# manifests and reconciliation summaries belong in source control.
+/phase6/artifacts/
+/rehearsal-input/v1-authorized-copy/
+/phase7/.rehearsal-secrets/
+
 
 # Debug
 /.logs/

AGENTS.md

@@ -47,10 +47,11 @@ rules and skills you read.
 
 ## Median Tasks
 
-Median can use a project-local workspace binding. If this repository has
-`.median/config.json`, run `mdn` commands from inside this repository so the
-correct Median workspace profile is selected. The local config stores only a
-profile name; API keys stay in your user config.
+Median can use a project-local workspace binding when this repository is
+configured for Median. If `.median/config.json` and the `mdn` command are
+present, run `mdn` commands from inside this repository so the correct Median
+workspace profile is selected. The local config stores only a profile name;
+API keys stay in your user config.
 
 To bind this repository to a workspace:
 
@@ -84,7 +85,9 @@ mdn create --title "Description" --status todo --priority medium --agent <your-a
 
 ## Commit Messages & Pull Requests
 
-Always include the Median task ID in commit messages and PR titles so tasks get marked automatically.
+When Median is configured and a task ID is assigned, include that Median task ID
+in commit messages and PR titles so tasks get marked automatically. Otherwise,
+follow the repository's normal Conventional Commit workflow.
 
 ```
 git commit -m "MDN-42 fix: resolve auth token expiry"

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,5 +1,70 @@
 # Changelog
 
+## [1.6.0](https://github.com/iblmediaconsultancy/crm/compare/v1.5.9...v1.6.0) (2026-10-03)
+
+
+### Features
+
+* **atlas:** restore authenticated Email dispatch readiness ([789e8ce](https://github.com/iblmediaconsultancy/crm/commit/789e8ced1d559bc4b415d5ba9ab07d5b77eadc97))
+
+## [1.5.9](https://github.com/iblmediaconsultancy/crm/compare/v1.5.8...v1.5.9) (2026-10-02)
+
+
+### Fixes
+
+* **atlas:** restore authenticated email authorization flow ([cadb50e](https://github.com/iblmediaconsultancy/crm/commit/cadb50eb63c019cb541dfc32229f29de6f72a956))
+* **atlas:** restore authenticated email authorization flow ([2bbdd5c](https://github.com/iblmediaconsultancy/crm/commit/2bbdd5c8b077d5c04a4e912890f7429c20e29d0b))
+* **db:** seed workspace before Atlas membership ([9a9896c](https://github.com/iblmediaconsultancy/crm/commit/9a9896c659cc0c77410b2fa8713c5b3fb340916d))
+
+## [1.5.8](https://github.com/iblmediaconsultancy/crm/compare/v1.5.7...v1.5.8) (2026-10-01)
+
+
+### Fixes
+
+* ignore LinkedIn recommendation headings during profile verification ([1cd364a](https://github.com/iblmediaconsultancy/crm/commit/1cd364add6fbe8a01bc55a5edda9bf7bb031557c))
+
+## [1.5.7](https://github.com/iblmediaconsultancy/crm/compare/v1.5.6...v1.5.7) (2026-10-01)
+
+
+### Fixes
+
+* harden LinkedIn profile and conversation resolution ([14509a8](https://github.com/iblmediaconsultancy/crm/commit/14509a894b342b2c205e807da1405d519bbbb94e))
+
+## [1.5.6](https://github.com/iblmediaconsultancy/crm/compare/v1.5.5...v1.5.6) (2026-09-30)
+
+
+### Fixes
+
+* **api:** wait for stable LinkedIn composer hydration ([ac3ffcc](https://github.com/iblmediaconsultancy/crm/commit/ac3ffcc8e2e94dc91f238dc2bc0711737a8ca69c))
+
+## [1.5.5](https://github.com/iblmediaconsultancy/crm/compare/v1.5.4...v1.5.5) (2026-09-30)
+
+
+### Fixes
+
+* **api:** scope LinkedIn history to resolved composer ([dca90ac](https://github.com/iblmediaconsultancy/crm/commit/dca90ac0a58c90e4b71859ede7f3e4fb353cc373))
+
+## [1.5.4](https://github.com/iblmediaconsultancy/crm/compare/v1.5.3...v1.5.4) (2026-09-28)
+
+
+### Fixes
+
+* **linkedin:** reconcile profile and member identities ([341c382](https://github.com/iblmediaconsultancy/crm/commit/341c3820a23eb3643c578a1a56bde0ec24441827))
+
+## [1.5.3](https://github.com/iblmediaconsultancy/crm/compare/v1.5.2...v1.5.3) (2026-09-28)
+
+
+### Fixes
+
+* **linkedin:** stabilize browser recipient resolution ([cec1a68](https://github.com/iblmediaconsultancy/crm/commit/cec1a68d8b6dd9c4078b685ddabb411b56266ba1))
+
+## [1.5.2](https://github.com/iblmediaconsultancy/crm/compare/v1.5.1...v1.5.2) (2026-09-27)
+
+
+### Fixes
+
+* **linkedin:** harden history checks and quota rollover ([57e0106](https://github.com/iblmediaconsultancy/crm/commit/57e0106e072fb0d0f70f90bf8a710f2e73c60467))
+
 ## [1.5.1](https://github.com/trycompai/crm/compare/v1.5.0...v1.5.1) (2026-08-08)
 
 

README.md

@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ A [Turborepo](https://turborepo.dev) monorepo on [Bun](https://bun.com), deploye
 | | |
 | --- | --- |
 | **Agent** | [eve](https://eve.dev) — durable sessions, tools, skills, schedules, sandboxes |
-| **Model** | [Vercel AI Gateway](https://vercel.com/docs/ai-gateway) — no provider SDK, and OIDC on Vercel means no key to manage |
+| **Model** | [Google Gemini](https://deepmind.google/models/gemini/flash/) through [`@ai-sdk/google`](https://ai-sdk.dev/providers/ai-sdk-providers/google-generative-ai) — fixed `gemini-3.6-flash` |
 | **Sandbox** | [Vercel Sandbox](https://vercel.com/docs/vercel-sandbox) in production, Docker or microsandbox locally |
 | **Front end** | [Next.js](https://nextjs.org) App Router · [shadcn/ui](https://ui.shadcn.com) · [nuqs](https://nuqs.dev) for URL state |
 | **API** | [NestJS](https://nestjs.com) with [nestjs-trpc](https://nestjs-trpc.io) — HTTP, auth, tRPC, mailbox sync |

adrs/ibl/0001-comp-release-pin.md

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+# ADR 0001: Pin the Comp release foundation
+
+- Status: Accepted for Phase 0
+- Date: 2026-08-08
+
+## Context
+
+Comp's `release` branch resolves to `c26a08d63db7d22e86bcdfe76872c86c7f640ea1`. Tag `v1.4.0` resolves to `db65dd6e2445826d7af9df2893f5f5227c0127bb`; both commits have tree `81b51d5d1191b5e6047a384fdcaa6ca4d7304865`.
+
+## Decision
+
+Use the release-promotion commit `c26a08d63db7d22e86bcdfe76872c86c7f640ea1` as the immutable V2 base and preserve the upstream MIT notice.
+
+## Alternatives
+
+Tag `v1.4.0`, a moving release branch, and latest main were rejected because the approved baseline names the promotion commit and reproducibility requires a full SHA.
+
+## Consequences
+
+Upstream updates require an explicit review and new ADR. Security fixes do not arrive automatically.
+
+## Security invariants
+
+Build inputs must resolve to the recorded commit and tree. No dependency or source is fetched from V1.
+
+## Reversal conditions
+
+Reverse only after reviewing a newer Comp release, its migration delta, licenses, and Phase 0 security gates.

adrs/ibl/0002-prisma-postgres.md

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+# ADR 0002: Dedicated Prisma and PostgreSQL database
+
+- Status: Accepted for Phase 0
+- Date: 2026-08-08
+
+## Context
+
+Comp already uses Prisma 7 and PostgreSQL. V2 needs transactional migrations, row-level mailbox controls, and durable row leasing.
+
+## Decision
+
+Use a dedicated V2 PostgreSQL database managed through Prisma migrations. Phase 0 uses an isolated database, port, role, and volume.
+
+## Alternatives
+
+Sharing V1 Supabase, SQLite, and a second ORM were rejected because they weaken isolation or add divergence.
+
+## Consequences
+
+RLS SQL remains a reviewed migration concern alongside Prisma models. Release automation must run migrations explicitly.
+
+## Security invariants
+
+V1 and V2 never share runtime credentials, schemas, roles, or connection pools. Application traffic uses a non-owner role.
+
+## Reversal conditions
+
+Reverse if Comp changes its supported persistence layer or PostgreSQL cannot meet a proven requirement.

adrs/ibl/0003-better-auth.md

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+# ADR 0003: Better Auth with invite and reset migration
+
+- Status: Accepted for Phase 0
+- Date: 2026-08-08
+
+## Context
+
+Comp already uses Better Auth. Password hashes and active sessions are not assumed portable from V1.
+
+## Decision
+
+Keep Better Auth. Import user identity records through repeatable ETL, then use controlled invitations or password resets and revoke legacy sessions.
+
+## Alternatives
+
+Copying password/session material and retaining V1 authentication were rejected because compatibility and revocation cannot be guaranteed.
+
+## Consequences
+
+Users may complete a one-time activation flow. Phase 1 must design invitation expiry, reset delivery, audit, and support procedures.
+
+## Security invariants
+
+Authenticated IDs are server verified; roles never grant mailbox access; client identity claims never override the session.
+
+## Reversal conditions
+
+Reverse if a reviewed identity provider integration provides safer migration and equivalent Better Auth compatibility.

adrs/ibl/0004-mailbox-isolation.md

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+# ADR 0004: Owner-only mailbox isolation
+
+- Status: Accepted for Phase 0
+- Date: 2026-08-08
+
+## Context
+
+Email bodies are private user data. CRM administration and mailbox delegation are different authorities.
+
+## Decision
+
+Enforce owner or explicit read-grant access in both repositories and PostgreSQL RLS. Admin is not a mailbox permission. Workers receive one leased mailbox scope.
+
+## Alternatives
+
+Workspace-wide visibility, Admin bypass, and application-only filtering were rejected as excessive privilege or single-layer controls.
+
+## Consequences
+
+Cross-mailbox reporting requires purpose-built, privacy-reviewed projections. Support cannot inspect bodies by default.
+
+## Security invariants
+
+Unscoped roles see zero rows. Any cross-user body exposure is a release blocker. Worker context cannot enumerate other mailboxes.
+
+## Reversal conditions
+
+Only an explicit product/legal decision with a new threat model, auditable consent, and equivalent database enforcement can reverse this ADR.