Rework XEdDSA signing policy: Compatible stops signing, AES-CCM overrides, Strict exemptions by jp-bennett · Pull Request #12191 · meshtastic/firmware

jp-bennett · 2026-10-18T16:11:47Z

Summary

Reworks when packets are XEdDSA-signed and which unsigned packets are accepted. The aim is that each packet is authenticated by AES-CCM, PKI, or a signature, without paying for a 64-byte signature where it buys nothing. Companion protobufs comment update: meshtastic/protobufs#1141.

Sending (`perhapsEncode`)

Compatible (the default) no longer signs.
Balanced and Strict sign broadcasts, and NodeInfo and position even when unicast: those ports are PKI-excluded, so a signature is their only authentication, and a NodeInfo carries the key a peer uses for PKI. Ham mode signs all unicasts, but only under Balanced or Strict.
Never signed:
- packets on an AES-CCM (use_aead) channel, whose tag already authenticates them. This also removes a case where a signed CCM packet passed signedDataFits() and then failed the CCM size check with TOO_LARGE.
- traceroutes, which every hop rewrites, so a signature fails verification from the second hop on.

Receiving (`checkXeddsaReceivePolicy`)

Only Strict drops a packet for lacking a signature. The Balanced rule that dropped unsigned broadcasts from known signers is removed, together with its canonicalSignableSize helper.
Strict does not drop:
- packets on an AES-CCM channel (the channel overrides the policy);
- acks and other routing packets, since an ack carries its own proof (AckProof.h);
- key verification messages, whose bootstrap messages precede any key and which the users' security number authenticates;
- traceroutes, which are accepted in every mode with any signature ignored.
Dropped in every mode:
- a malformed or failing signature, as before;
- a signed NodeInfo verified against a stored key whose advertised key is not the signing key or does not hash to the sender's node number. First contact already required this.

Identity

New NodeDB::refusesUnsignedIdentity(), used by updateUser, NodeInfoModule and TrafficManagementModule. Balanced and Strict refuse an unsigned NodeInfo that would change a known signer's name or role, except on an AES-CCM channel. Compatible accepts it, since firmware before 2.8 strips signatures when relaying.
TrafficManagementModule forwards a signed NodeInfo request instead of answering it from cache: a reply sent on the target's behalf can never be signed.

Other

Channels::isAEADEnabled() returns false for an out-of-range index instead of logging, since receive paths now pass a packet's index unchecked.
XEDDSA_SIGNATURE_FIELD_BYTES removed; the deleted Balanced size check was its only user.

Rollout note

2.8.0 and 2.8.1 nodes still drop unsigned NodeInfo broadcasts from nodes that have signed before, and refuse their name changes, in every mode. Once upgraded nodes stop signing in Compatible, those older nodes will not see their name changes until they upgrade too.

Tests

test_packet_signing:
- removed the cases that pinned the deleted Balanced size rule;
- flipped A4 and E1 to acceptance;
- added cases for: AES-CCM channels; Compatible; ham mode; NodeInfo, position and traceroute signing; the NodeInfo key-consistency check; and the Strict exemptions for acks, traceroutes and key verification.
test_mqtt: Balanced accepts unsigned plaintext downlink from a signer; Strict accepts it on an AES-CCM channel.
test_traffic_management: the identity guard under Balanced, Compatible and an AES-CCM channel; a signed NodeInfo request is forwarded while the same request unsigned is answered.

🤝 Attestations

Not yet tested. The native suites could not be built in the authoring environment: its network policy blocks the GitHub archive download PlatformIO needs for the native platform. The code was formatted with the pinned clang-format 20.1.0 and reviewed, but has not been compiled. Opened as a draft so CI runs the native suites first.

I have tested that my proposed changes behave as described.
I have tested that my proposed changes do not cause any obvious regressions on the following devices:
- Heltec (Lora32) V3
- LilyGo T-Deck
- LilyGo T-Beam
- RAK WisBlock 4631
- Seeed Studio T-1000E tracker card
- Other (please specify below)

Generated by Claude Code

Summary by CodeRabbit

Security and Packet Handling
- Balanced and Compatible policies accept unsigned packets, including from previously identified signers. Strict rejects unsigned packets except on AES-CCM channels and for select packet types.
- Signed NodeInfo packets are rejected if the advertised public key does not match the verified signer or sender identity.
- Outgoing packets are signed according to policy and channel settings when the signature fits within the LoRa payload limit; traceroutes remain unsigned.
Identity Updates
- Unsigned identity updates from known signers are rejected in Balanced and Strict modes, except on AES-CCM channels.

…ides Signing costs 66 bytes per packet. On a crowded mesh that matters, and packets on an AES-CCM channel were paying it on top of the CCM tag. Sending (perhapsEncode): - Compatible, the default, no longer signs. Balanced and Strict sign broadcasts as before; licensed (ham) nodes also sign unicasts, but now only under Balanced or Strict. - Packets on an AES-CCM (use_aead) channel are never signed. This also removes the case where a signed CCM packet passed signedDataFits() but then failed the CCM size check with TOO_LARGE. Receiving (checkXeddsaReceivePolicy): - Only Strict drops a packet for lacking a signature. Balanced no longer drops unsigned broadcasts from known signers; that downgrade rule and its canonical-sizing helper are removed. - An AES-CCM channel overrides Strict: its unsigned or unverifiable packets are accepted, since the CCM tag authenticates them. - A malformed or failing signature still drops the packet in every mode. Identity (new NodeDB::refusesUnsignedIdentity, used by updateUser, NodeInfoModule and TrafficManagementModule): - Balanced and Strict still refuse an unsigned NodeInfo that would change a known signer's identity, except on an AES-CCM channel. - Compatible accepts it, since firmware before 2.8 strips signatures when relaying. Channels::isAEADEnabled() now returns false for an out-of-range index instead of logging, since receive paths pass a packet's index unchecked. XEDDSA_SIGNATURE_FIELD_BYTES lost its only user and is removed. Tests: test_packet_signing drops the cases that pinned the removed downgrade sizing (A7-A9, A18-A19, E5, E10-E13, D1), flips A4 and E1 to acceptance, and adds AES-CCM, Compatible and ham cases (A18-A20, B18-B20, N12-N13). test_mqtt and test_traffic_management pin the same rules on the plaintext-MQTT and NodeInfo-cache paths. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011DjtCrF8NLMGs9DtEVQkUK

…o keys A NodeInfo request or reply carries the key a peer will use for PKI direct messages, but off ham mode only broadcasts were signed. A Strict node therefore dropped every NodeInfo reply and could only learn a new peer's key from a signed broadcast, hours apart. - perhapsEncode: under Balanced and Strict, NodeInfo is signed even when unicast (still never on an AES-CCM channel, never in Compatible). - TrafficManagementModule: a NodeInfo request that carries a signature is forwarded instead of answered from the cache. Its sender may need a signed reply, and a reply sent on the target's behalf can never be signed. - checkXeddsaReceivePolicy: a signed NodeInfo verified against a stored key must advertise that same key, and the key must hash to the sender's node number, as first contact already requires. Otherwise it is dropped. This stops a valid signature vouching for another key, and stops a key planted on trust under the wrong node number proving itself with fresh signatures. Tests: B7 now expects NodeInfo unicasts signed; B21 pins signing per policy; A21-A23 pin the key-consistency check; a traffic-management case pins that a signed request is forwarded while the same request unsigned is answered. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011DjtCrF8NLMGs9DtEVQkUK

Strict dropped every unsigned packet that was not PKI-encrypted. Acks and traceroutes are never signed, so a Strict node saw no acks, retransmitted every reliable packet to exhaustion, and could not take part in traceroutes. - checkXeddsaReceivePolicy: Strict no longer drops an unsigned ROUTING_APP packet; an ack carries its own proof (AckProof.h). Traceroutes are accepted in every mode, and any signature on one is ignored rather than verified. - perhapsEncode: a traceroute is never signed, including in ham mode, which signs other unicasts. Every relay rewrites the route, so a signature fails verification from the second hop on, and a bad signature drops the packet in every mode. - TraceRouteModule::alterReceivedProtobuf: strip any signature when rewriting the route, so a traceroute signed by older firmware is not dropped by older receivers further along. Tests: A24-A26 (Strict accepts unsigned acks and traceroutes; a traceroute signature is ignored), B22 (traceroutes never signed), B7 updated, and test_traceroute_nexthop pins the signature strip on rewrite. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011DjtCrF8NLMGs9DtEVQkUK

Only 2.8.0 and 2.8.1 pre-release nodes ever signed a traceroute: ham mode, which signs every unicast, and client-sent broadcast traceroutes. Stripping the signature on rewrite only helped those pre-releases interoperate, which does not justify the code. Receivers still ignore a traceroute signature, and traceroutes are still never signed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011DjtCrF8NLMGs9DtEVQkUK

A position request or reply is PKI-excluded, so a signature is its only authentication, but off ham mode only broadcasts were signed. Strict dropped every position request and reply, and under Balanced any channel member could fake another node's location with an unsigned reply. perhapsEncode now signs POSITION_APP unicasts under Balanced and Strict, as it does NodeInfo. Nothing rewrites a position in flight - precision is applied by the originator before signing - so the signature survives relaying, and it binds request_id so a reply cannot be retargeted. Compatible and AES-CCM channels still sign nothing. Tests: B23 pins position unicast signing per policy and Strict acceptance; B7 expects position unicasts signed; B2 and B5 use PRIVATE_APP as their unsigned unicast now that position is signed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011DjtCrF8NLMGs9DtEVQkUK

Key verification's bootstrap messages (M1, M2) go out channel-encrypted because the peer's key is not known yet, so they cannot carry a signature the receiver could verify. Strict dropped them, so two Strict nodes that did not already hold each other's keys could never run key verification. The handshake does not rely on the transport: hash1 binds both public keys to the security number the users exchange, and a key is only stored after the numbers match and the user accepts. A forged request can at most raise a verification prompt, bounded by the single session slot and the 60 s remote cooldown - as it already can under Balanced. Test: A27 pins that Strict accepts an unsigned key verification message. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011DjtCrF8NLMGs9DtEVQkUK

coderabbitai · 2026-10-18T16:11:56Z

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test/test_nodedb_identity_hygiene/test_main.cpp

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📝 Walkthrough

The changes revise packet signature acceptance and signing rules, add policy-aware checks for unsigned NodeInfo identity updates, and update related MQTT, packet-signing, and traffic-management tests.

Changes: Packet Signature Policy

Layer / File(s)	Summary
Unsigned identity policy `src/mesh/Channels.cpp`, `src/mesh/NodeDB.h`, `src/mesh/NodeDB.cpp`	`NodeDB::refusesUnsignedIdentity` allows signed and local updates. It also permits unsigned updates under Compatible policy or on an AEAD channel. Otherwise, it rejects updates from known signers. Out-of-range channel indices are not treated as AEAD-enabled.
Packet receive and send rules `src/mesh/Router.cpp`, `src/mesh/CryptoEngine.h`, `src/mqtt/MQTT.cpp`	Receive handling accepts unsigned packets in Balanced and Compatible modes, with Strict-mode exceptions for AEAD, routing, traceroute, and key-verification packets. Verified NodeInfo signatures are checked against the advertised key and sender number. Send-side signing covers eligible NodeInfo and position unicasts; traceroutes remain unsigned.
NodeInfo identity and cache paths `src/modules/NodeInfoModule.cpp`, `src/modules/TrafficManagementModule.cpp`	NodeInfo broadcast filtering and cache updates use the shared identity-policy check. Signed NodeInfo requests continue through forwarding rather than receiving direct cache responses.
Policy and integration tests `test/test_packet_signing/test_main.cpp`, `test/test_mqtt/MQTT.cpp`, `test/test_traffic_management/test_main.cpp`, `test/test_nodedb_identity_hygiene/test_main.cpp`	Tests cover revised receive and send rules, AES-CCM exceptions, NodeInfo key consistency and identity updates, and signed-request forwarding. Tests for unsigned packet rejection based on canonical encoded size were removed.

Priority: ➖ Normal

Estimated code review effort: 4 (Complex) | ~45 minutes

Change: Feature

Suggested reviewers: thebentern

Merge Risk: 🟡 Moderate · up to 3886f

If an untrusted client can reach the Portduino TCP API, it can submit unsigned decoded packets that change node identity fields despite the signature policy. Restrict that API to trusted clients or require authentication before merging; deployments that already restrict access are less exposed.

Pre-merge checks: 4 · 1

Failed checks: 1 warning

Check name	Status	Explanation	Resolution
Docstring Coverage		Docstring coverage is 75.00% which is insufficient. The required threshold is 80.00%. Docstring coverage is scoped to functions touched by this diff. Analyzed 76 functions across 11 files.	Write docstrings for the functions missing them to satisfy the coverage threshold.

Passed checks: 4 passed

Check name	Status	Explanation
Title check		The title clearly summarizes the main changes to XEdDSA signing policy, including Compatible behavior, AES-CCM overrides, and Strict-mode exemptions.
Description check		The description is complete and relevant. It explains the sending, receiving, identity, forwarding, rollout, and test changes, and it clearly documents that native suites and device regression tests w…
Linked Issues check		Check skipped because no linked issues were found for this pull request.
Out of Scope Changes check		Check skipped because no linked issues were found for this pull request.

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The description is complete and relevant. It explains the sending, receiving, identity, forwarding, rollout, and test changes, and it clearly documents that native suites and device regression tests were not run.

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github-actions · 2026-10-18T16:11:59Z

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github-actions · 2026-10-18T16:35:02Z

MemBrowse Memory Report · Explore what changed →

heltec-ht62-esp32c3-sx1262

dram0_0_seg: .dram0.bss -304 B (-0.2%, 181,584 B / 321,296 B, total: 57% used)
drom0_0_seg: .flash.rodata +16 B (+0.0%, 2,122,015 B / 8,388,576 B, total: 25% used)
iram0_2_seg: .flash.text +72 B (+0.0%, 1,713,668 B / 8,388,576 B, total: 20% used)

heltec-mesh-node-t114

FLASH: .text +40 B (+0.0%, 720,728 B / 802,816 B, total: 90% used)
RAM: .bss -312 B (-0.3%, 105,464 B / 245,760 B, total: 43% used)

heltec-v3

dram0_0_seg: .dram0.bss -320 B (-0.2%, 192,360 B / 341,760 B, total: 56% used)
drom0_0_seg: .flash.rodata +16 B (+0.0%, 4,451,480 B / 33,554,400 B, total: 13% used)
iram0_2_seg: .flash.text +64 B (+0.0%, 1,797,608 B / 8,388,576 B, total: 21% used)

heltec-vision-master-e213-inkhud

dram0_0_seg: .dram0.bss -320 B (-0.2%, 159,620 B / 341,760 B, total: 47% used)
drom0_0_seg: .flash.rodata +4 B (+0.0%, 4,456,084 B / 33,554,400 B, total: 13% used)
iram0_2_seg: .flash.text +60 B (+0.0%, 1,785,104 B / 8,388,576 B, total: 21% used)

pico2w

FLASH: .rodata +8 B, .text +32 B (+0.0%, 1,211,600 B / 3,665,920 B, total: 33% used)
RAM: .bss -312 B (-0.2%, 150,860 B / 524,288 B, total: 29% used)

picow

FLASH: .rodata +16 B, .text +96 B (+0.0%, 1,235,332 B / 1,568,768 B, total: 79% used)
RAM: .bss -312 B (-0.2%, 148,552 B / 262,144 B, total: 57% used)

rak3172

FLASH: .text +48 B (+0.0%, 212,696 B / 247,808 B, total: 86% used)
RAM: .bss -312 B (-1.1%, 28,408 B / 65,536 B, total: 43% used)

rak4631

FLASH: .text +64 B (+0.0%, 714,296 B / 802,816 B, total: 89% used)
RAM: .bss -312 B (-0.3%, 97,072 B / 245,760 B, total: 39% used)

seeed-sensecap-indicator-tft

dram0_0_seg: .dram0.bss -312 B (-0.2%, 192,748 B / 341,760 B, total: 56% used)
drom0_0_seg: .flash.rodata +4 B (+0.0%, 7,590,676 B / 33,554,400 B, total: 23% used)
iram0_2_seg: .flash.text +60 B (+0.0%, 2,366,344 B / 8,388,576 B, total: 28% used)

seeed_wio_tracker_L1

FLASH: .text +64 B (+0.0%, 710,928 B / 798,720 B, total: 89% used)
RAM: .bss -312 B (-0.3%, 105,328 B / 245,760 B, total: 43% used)

t-deck-tft

dram0_0_seg: .dram0.bss -320 B (-0.2%, 186,584 B / 341,760 B, total: 55% used)
drom0_0_seg: .flash.rodata +24 B (+0.0%, 7,736,564 B / 33,554,400 B, total: 23% used)
iram0_2_seg: .flash.text +24 B (+0.0%, 2,439,920 B / 8,388,576 B, total: 29% used)

t-echo-plus

FLASH: .text +64 B (+0.0%, 721,832 B / 802,816 B, total: 90% used)
RAM: .bss -312 B (-0.4%, 88,216 B / 245,760 B, total: 36% used)

thinknode_m7

dram0_0_seg: .dram0.bss -312 B (-0.2%, 162,160 B / 341,760 B, total: 47% used)
drom0_0_seg: .flash.rodata +20 B (+0.0%, 4,596,660 B / 33,554,400 B, total: 14% used)
iram0_2_seg: .flash.text +4 B (+0.0%, 1,670,884 B / 8,388,576 B, total: 20% used)

tlora-c6

irom_seg: .flash.rodata +8 B, .flash.text +66 B (+0.0%, 4,165,897 B / 16,777,184 B, total: 25% used)
sram_seg: .dram0.bss -320 B (-0.2%, 205,240 B / 452,112 B, total: 45% used)

tracker-t1000-e

FLASH: .text +56 B (+0.0%, 505,016 B / 798,720 B, total: 63% used)
RAM: .bss -312 B (-0.4%, 86,704 B / 245,760 B, total: 35% used)

wio-e5

FLASH: .text +64 B (+0.0%, 235,000 B / 247,808 B, total: 95% used)

xiao_nrf54l15_lr2021

FLASH: .text +64 B (+0.0%, 580,696 B / 1,306,624 B, total: 44% used)
RAM: .bss -320 B (-0.5%, 68,604 B / 243,584 B, total: 28% used)

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coderabbitai · 2026-10-18T16:42:25Z

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Inline comments:
Review comments at @src/mesh/NodeDB.cpp:
- Around line 4409-4410: Use packet-level evidence of successful CCM
authentication instead of the channel’s AEAD setting in refusesUnsignedIdentity
and checkXeddsaReceivePolicy. Add a local-only packet flag set only after
decryptPacketCCM succeeds, clear it at ingress boundaries, and use it for both
unsigned-identity exemptions.

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📒 Files selected for processing: 11

src/mesh/Channels.cpp
src/mesh/CryptoEngine.h
src/mesh/NodeDB.cpp
src/mesh/NodeDB.h
src/mesh/Router.cpp
src/modules/NodeInfoModule.cpp
src/modules/TrafficManagementModule.cpp
src/mqtt/MQTT.cpp
test/test_mqtt/MQTT.cpp
test/test_packet_signing/test_main.cpp
test/test_traffic_management/test_main.cpp

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src/mesh/CryptoEngine.h

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Two cases expected updateUser() to refuse an unsigned update from a known signer under a zeroed config. Zeroed is Compatible, which now accepts it, so they failed in CI. Run them under Balanced, and add the Compatible counterpart so both halves of the rule are pinned at the updateUser level. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011DjtCrF8NLMGs9DtEVQkUK

Copilot

🔵 Needs a closer look

Authentication-policy changes need human security review and successful compilation and test results, which remain unverified.

No open issues 🎉

What changed in this PR

Reworks firmware packet authentication to avoid unnecessary signatures while retaining Strict enforcement and policy-aware identity protection.

Changes:

Stops signing in Compatible mode and on AES-CCM channels; adds Strict exemptions.
Centralizes unsigned identity checks and forwards signed NodeInfo requests instead of answering from cache.
Updates regression tests for signing, identity, MQTT, and traffic management.

File	Description
`test/test_traffic_management/test_main.cpp`	Tests identity guards and signed-request forwarding.
`test/test_packet_signing/test_main.cpp`	Updates signing and receive-policy coverage.
`test/test_nodedb_identity_hygiene/test_main.cpp`	Tests policy-dependent identity updates.
`test/test_mqtt/MQTT.cpp`	Tests revised unsigned downlink acceptance.
`src/mqtt/MQTT.cpp`	Updates policy comments only.
`src/modules/TrafficManagementModule.cpp`	Applies identity guard and forwards signed requests.
`src/modules/NodeInfoModule.cpp`	Uses shared identity policy.
`src/mesh/Router.cpp`	Revises signing, exemptions, and NodeInfo key checks.
`src/mesh/NodeDB.h`	Declares shared identity guard.
`src/mesh/NodeDB.cpp`	Implements policy-aware identity protection.
`src/mesh/CryptoEngine.h`	Removes unused signature-overhead constant.
`src/mesh/Channels.cpp`	Guards out-of-range AEAD lookups.

_{Review effort: Balanced}

NomDeTom

Is it possible, and what is the cost if it is, for trying messages to the same channel parameters (name, psk) for the non-aead equivalent when on an aead channel?

I'm still concerned that a single bool checkbox isn't enough to make it clear that a channel is wholly incompatible.

jp-bennett · 2026-10-18T19:22:33Z

@NomDeTom Yes, it's possible and cheap. But I'd use it to detect a mismatch, not to accept the packets.

What happens today. An AES-CCM channel's hash is the plain channel's hash ^ 0xAE (Channels::generateHash). Two nodes with the same name and PSK, one with use_aead on and one with it off, each see the other's packets as an unknown channel: relayed, never delivered, and nobody is told why.

Cost of trying the plain variant. Only packets whose hash equals one of our CCM channels' hash ^ 0xAE would get the extra attempt. In practice that's the mismatch case, plus about 1 in 256 by coincidence. Each costs one extra AES-CTR decrypt and a protobuf decode, in the existing channel loop in perhapsDecode next to decryptForHash.

Why detect rather than accept. Delivering a packet that only decrypted under plain AES-CTR would undo what AES-CCM is for: anyone with the PSK could send the unauthenticated version and have it accepted. When the plain variant decodes cleanly, the node would instead:

still drop the packet, as today;
send a rate-limited client notification, e.g. "Node X is on channel Y without AES-CCM; it can't hear this channel".

The reverse check works too, and is authenticated: a non-CCM node tries the CCM variant of its channels, and a valid CCM tag proves the peer holds the key.

On the checkbox. Agreed that a bare bool undersells it. The channel URL already carries use_aead, so nodes that join by URL or QR get it right; mismatches come from configuring channels by hand. The apps should say plainly that enabling it makes the channel incompatible with nodes that don't. Firmware detection would back that up in the field.

This PR doesn't change how AES-CCM channels are matched or decrypted; it only stops signing on them. So I'd keep the detection out of it and do it as a follow-up PR (firmware detection and notification, plus the app wording), if that works for you.

Generated by Claude Code

claude added 6 commits October 18, 2026 15:36

jp-bennett added the bugfix Pull request that fixes bugs label Oct 18, 2026

jp-bennett added this to the 2.8.2 milestone Oct 18, 2026

Merge branch 'develop' into claude/exciting-euler-ssw5z2

cc94749

jp-bennett marked this pull request as ready for review October 18, 2026 16:47

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Key verification: create the responder's NodeDB entry on commit #12194

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Rework XEdDSA signing policy: Compatible stops signing, AES-CCM overrides, Strict exemptions - #12191

Rework XEdDSA signing policy: Compatible stops signing, AES-CCM overrides, Strict exemptions#12191
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jp-bennett commented Oct 18, 2026

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jp-bennett commented Oct 18, 2026 • edited by coderabbitai Bot Loading Uh oh! There was an error while loading. Please reload this page.

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Summary

Sending (perhapsEncode)

Receiving (checkXeddsaReceivePolicy)

Identity

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Rollout note

Tests

🤝 Attestations

Summary by CodeRabbit

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coderabbitai Bot commented Oct 18, 2026 • edited Loading Uh oh! There was an error while loading. Please reload this page.

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github-actions Bot commented Oct 18, 2026

⚡ Try this PR in the Web Flasher

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github-actions Bot commented Oct 18, 2026 • edited Loading Uh oh! There was an error while loading. Please reload this page.

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MemBrowse Memory Report · Explore what changed →

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🔵 Needs a closer look

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jp-bennett commented Oct 18, 2026

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jp-bennett commented Oct 18, 2026 •

edited by coderabbitai Bot

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